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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines two central research questions: Can ‘race’ as both a historical 
and contemporary concept be dispensed with when it is perceived as socially real 
and has significant material consequences? And, can ‘race’ ever be justified as an 
acceptable category and concept if it (re)produces ‘natural’ and hierarchical 
differences which function to both explain and validate racism? Important 
historically and presently as seemingly every aspect of social and political relations 
has become deeply inflected by a racial dimension, these questions frame a 
problematic I refer to as postracialism. Methodologically a work of historical 
sociology this thesis draws significantly on original archival research and qualitative 
interview data in its critical analysis of the ongoing controversy surrounding the 
scientific, political and ethical status of ‘race’ through an exploration of the social, 
political and institutional histories of postracialisms. My project significantly 
expands contemporary postracial discussions which remain largely library based by 
examining unpublished archival material and qualitative interview data alongside 
ongoing literature and debates. This original data enables the thesis to open up a 
mutually beneficial dialogue between antiracist theory and antiracist practice, to 
assess the possibility of a postracial antiracism and to engage in critical reflection on 
the relation between activist and intellectual work. Ultimately, this thesis assesses 
whether race is a necessary, contingent, or dispensable category through an 
examination of the scientific, political and ethical stakes of getting rid of the 
category. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Outlining Postracialism 
 
 
 
Among the words that can be all things to all men, the word race has a fair claim to 
being the most common, the most ambiguous and the most explosive (Jacques 
Barzun, 1937:3). 
 
 
Perhaps it is wrong to speak of [‘race’] at all as a concept rather than as a group of 
contradictory forces, facts and tendencies (W.E.B. Du Bois, 1940:133). 
 
 
 
1.1 Dislodging Racial Eternalism 
 
‘Race’ has never been a neutral descriptor of ‘obvious’ physical difference. It has 
always been ensnared in power relations and hierarchical differentiation. This project 
engages two enduring questions: Can ‘race’ - as a historical and contemporary 
concept - be dispensed with when it is perceived as socially real and has substantial 
material consequences? And, can ‘race’ ever be justified as an acceptable category 
and concept if it (re)produces ‘natural’ and hierarchical differences which function to 
both explain and validate racism? These interlocking questions frame a problematic I 
refer to as postracialism which is important as seemingly every aspect of social and 
political relations has become inflected by a racial dimension. This thesis – a work of 
historical sociology drawing significantly on archival and interview data – critically 
analyses the ongoing controversy surrounding the scientific, political and ethical 
status of ‘race’ through an exploration of the social and political histories of 
postracialisms. Ultimately, this thesis assesses whether ‘race’ is a necessary, 
contingent, or dispensable category through an examination of the scientific, political 
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and ethical stakes of getting rid of the category. Before outlining postracialism, I will 
recapitulate the ‘race’ concept in history in order to contextualise the postracial 
intervention.   
 
The iniquity of ‘racial obviousness’ (‘race’ is intuitively recognised as an almost 
natural observation) is worsened when ‘race’ is projected backwards to time 
immemorial. Racial commonsense dispels the historicity of ‘race’ and reasserts 
‘race’ as the timeless and universal category of human classification. Racial 
commonsense predictably returns to Greek antiquity, the mythologised birthplace of 
‘civilisation’ and assumes ancient social organisation to have been thoroughly 
racialised. Social distinctions, however, were ethnocentric and xenophobic and did 
not involve ‘race’ (Banton, 1977).  
 
Difference pivoted on cultural and political cleavages while exclusion operated 
through the value-laden political and cultural binaries of democracy/despotism and 
civilised/barbarian (Eze, 1997). The special significance accorded to phenotypes and 
the indissoluble commitment to fundamental difference did not feature. The Ancients 
understood ‘obvious’ physical difference as the effect of diverse environments upon 
a uniform human (Snowden, 1983). The doctrine of nonracial species singularity 
would remain a longstanding conviction splintered only with the modernist creed of 
racialism.  
 
Scientific and popular forms of ‘race’ are historically located within modernity 
crystallising during the European capitalist expansion and conquest of the mid 18
th
 
century (Banton, 1987; Horsman, 1981). ‘Race’, a product of the modernist mission 
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to catalogue the natural world into a rational pattern, emerged with the discourse of 
racialism. Racialism rejected the authoritative biblical account of a singular human 
‘race’ reworking the narrative such that humanity was subdivided into racial groups 
with each ‘race’ possessing certain unfailingly heritable and unevenly distributed 
intellectual, moral, cultural and physical characteristics. ‘Race’ became a historically 
purposive and permanent feature of being.  
 
Racialism as an explanatory system did not proceed from one philosophy or 
movement. Racialism was a composite ideology of previously distinct traditions with 
roots in and ties to liberal political outlooks, the rise of the nation state and 
imperialist capitalism, biological and zoological investigation, and the invention of 
its arch pseudo-sciences of racial classification; phrenology (character divined by an 
examination of one’s exterior skull) and physiognomy (character explained through 
observation of one’s face, limbs and gestures) (Augstein, 1996: xi). Racialism 
provided the scientific ‘answer’ for armchair European naturalists vicariously 
encountering the puzzlingly diverse varieties of humankind in the travelogues of 
colonisers, missionaries and traders.  
 
The classificatory impulse of modernity reached its zenith with the botanist Carl 
Linnaeus (1707-1778) who introduced the first biological classification system to 
include humans. Linnaeus’ seminal contribution preserved the logical residue of the 
‘Great Chain of Being’- the ancient belief that God organised creation such that all 
living things could be classified in a ranked order from the divine likeness of 
‘mankind’ downwards through to the smallest observable creature. His analysis of 
human physical varieties attributed racially specific characterological traits and 
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ranked the ‘races’. The evaluative character of these ‘objective’ classifications 
illustrates how racism underpinned racialism fuelling the creation of ‘race’ as an 
intelligible concept and a boundary marker for humanity.  
 
The historical inseparability of the racism/racialism nexus is present in the 
(in)famous frontispiece to Linnaeus’ A Genuine and Universal System of Natural 
History. The image introduces the readership to a scientific cosmology with an 
orang-utan clutching his ‘Negro’ mate as he absconds into the jungle (1795). The 
painting suggests a natural kinship between the sub-human Negro and the non-
human ape. Before the written arguments the reader is told that blackness is excluded 
from the province of humanity. The ‘Negro’ is of a qualitatively different nature 
(‘race’), outside the liberal universe of freedom, rights and equality.  
 
Linnaeus’ foundational text overflows with racialised assessments of worth 
(Hannaford, 1996). From these exclusionary origins racialism would continue 
substituting racist judgments for ‘scientific’ ones reproducing itself as always-
already steeped in the value judgments of ancient mythology (wild men), travellers’ 
tales (noble savages) and aesthetic presuppositions derived from ancient Greece. 
Linnean racism became an institutionalised standard informing anthropological 
descriptions of racialised ‘Others’ for centuries (Eze, 2001:29) and even persisting in 
contemporary thought (see Rushton, 2000). 
 
Racialism in K. Anthony Appiah’s widely accepted definition is the intellectual 
precondition for racism. Racialism is not necessarily ethically perilous and can allow 
for ‘separate but equal’ ‘races’ provided positive moral qualities are distributed 
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across them (Appiah, 1990:7). Inverting Appiah’s formulation I argue that racism is 
the ideological system producing racialism and ultimately ‘race’. The emergence of 
the idea of ‘race’, the ascription of a biological content and the ‘scientific’ 
legitimation of a biological hierarchy were the end products of racism. Racism as a 
process of signification attributed meaning to certain phenotypical or genetic 
characteristics and created a system of categorisation attributing negatively evaluated 
characteristics to the people sorted into those categories (Miles, 1993). Racial 
categorisations became the basis for a hierarchy and prefigured the terms of 
in/exclusion in the allocation of resources and services. The causal ordering of 
‘race’/racism is something of a chicken-and-the-egg conundrum. How can you have 
racism before ‘race’? How can you have ‘race’ and not racism?  
 
I am not interested here in a final resolution to the issue of chronological ordering. I 
am interested in engaging the deep interconnections and contradictions between 
racism and ‘race’ and evaluating these implications in relation to postracialisms. 
Racialism, ever plagued by appraisals of innate moral, intellectual and physical 
worth, can never realise Appiah’s ethico-political indemnity. In this project, 
racialism is the ideological system engendered by racism, the essentialised and 
reified discourse used to justify and explain racist domination. Birthed by racialism, 
‘race’ is ineluctably steeped in assessments of worth and naturalised difference. 
‘Race’ science was underwritten by two evaluative assumptions (1) human (racial) 
types can be arranged hierarchically according to intellectual and moral capacity and 
(2) such characteristics are unchanging even in the face of social engineering. ‘Race’ 
was constructed and used to authorise violent domination, to reproduce social 
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hierarchies and to provide Europe with the racialised ‘Other’ of the uncultivated and 
prehistoric so central to European self-definition.  
 
The constructedness of ‘race’ is revealed in the contentious disagreements that 
characterised its scientisation (Eze, 1997). Naturalists labouring frenetically to 
specify the concept produced countless racial indicators. Skin colour, naturalised as 
that marker of difference which the innate perceptual scheme intuitively recognises, 
proved ever unreliable with permutations running imperceptibly into one another. 
The obvious ‘truth’ of racial difference was, quite simply, not so self-evident. The 
infinite variability of the human form meant ‘race’ had to be constantly (re)created in 
order to produce a stable racial truth.  
 
In this scramble for coherence, innumerable often contradictory classificatory 
systems emerged and collapsed under the weight of logical inconsistency and 
empirical evidence. Buffon, for example, protested Linnaeus’ claim that individual 
criterion could inform a racial methodology. Buffon’s ‘resolution’ considered an 
ensemble of physical and mental traits but only generated more confusion blurring 
the distinction between ‘race’ and ‘nation’ to one of degree. These classifications 
though factually groundless and scientifically spurious continued for centuries with 
constant modification, expansion and abandonment.  
 
While these classificatory debates are well rehearsed in the annals of anthropology 
(Hudson, 1996), lesser known are the dissents. The dissents varying in content and 
form maintained that humankind was not divisible into a specifiable number of 
‘races’ with fixed characteristics. This historically muted counter-discourse, what I 
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term ‘nonracialism’, rejected ‘race’ on philosophical, political, scientific and 
religious grounds. Nonracialism is a framework for physical variation where 
categorisation according to the immutability of ‘race’ does not feature. ‘Race’ as a 
category of natural and social recognition and representation does not exist. 
Nonracialism finds epistemological mooring for human sameness and difference in 
philosophical (universalism), political (natural rights doctrine), scientific (species 
unity), and religious (Christian fraternity) distinctions.  
 
The social constructedness of ‘race’ is evident in its historical variability. The 
Harlem Renaissance exemplifies how ‘race’ has always been a protean political 
resource continually transformed in struggle. The renaissance rearticulated ‘race’ 
without the biological traces of a fixed essence and drew upon constructionist 
notions to combat racism. Constructionism marks a paradigmatic shift. ‘Race’ as a 
biological concept is abandoned while ‘race’ as a social category is cemented and 
appropriated for oppositional cultural-political campaigns. Constructionism perhaps 
hastily assumes that in this re-articulation ‘race’ can be liberated from its essentialist 
premises. This in contrast to the way biological categories are assumed to be 
inevitably trapped within essentialism. Can constructionism free ‘race’ from the 
legacies of essentialised fixity and its use for purposes of subjugation? Presently it is 
important to note that the variability of ‘race’ discredits understandings of it as a 
permanent and inevitable principle of differentiation.  
  
Howard Winant (2002), in an error not too dissimilar to presentism, projects 
racialised dynamics infinitely into a racialised future; ‘Race is here to stay baby. Go 
home and tell your momma (2004: xix).’ ‘Race’ becomes incontestable with the 
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historical conditions which (re)make the discourse obscured. Postracialisms break 
with orthodoxy putting the taken-for-granted category under critical examination, 
even erasure. Distinct from nonracialism, postracialisms remain unconvinced of the 
efficacy of ‘race’, critical of its iniquitous applications and crucially advocate for its 
elimination. What I consolidate under postracialism, in no sense unitary or 
consistent, refers to the utopian ideas and practices that might enable a process of 
racial erasure. Unlike declarations of the postracial as existing in the here-and-now 
this is postracialism as a utopian ambition (St Louis forthcoming). 
 
Postracialism(s) aware of the scientific myths and spurious rationality of ‘race’ 
critically question(s) the political and ethical viability of the concept with attention to 
its reified descriptive and explanatory premises. Postracialism(s) has varied widely 
in both academic and popular discourse. I will now specify how I use the concept by 
sketching out its three major threads (1) scientific (2) political (3) ethical/ontological. 
Each discussion will also summarise the opposing conservationist position 
advocating the preservation of the category, discourse and practice of ‘race’. 
 
1.1.1 Racial (Pseudo)Science Today 
 
The conceptual crisis of ‘race’ in modernity is a fitting origin story for a mythic 
category informed by an inherently judgmental brand of science (Hoberman, 1997; 
Marshal, 1993). The scientific pedigree of ‘race’ has been contested since such 
legitimacy was first asserted. Today a near consensus in the biological and social 
sciences maintains ‘race’ has no reliable biological foundation (American 
Association of Anthropologists, 1998; American Association of Physical 
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Anthropologists, 1996). Molecular biology and genetics have produced results 
disavowing ‘race’ and have uncovered extensive evidence of human sameness 
(Graves, 2001). Technological developments have enabled a new threshold of 
visibility revealing the internal sameness of bodies rendering phenotypical difference 
and the racialised perceptual paradigm obsolete (Gilroy, 2000). Academic opinion 
notwithstanding, acceptance of the unified corporeality of humanity still lags in a 
public consciousness populated by everlasting racial myths such as the anatomical 
superiority of West African sprinters.   
 
Recently a scientific resurgence calling for the preservation of the biological concept 
(while also dismissing social constructionism as irrational dogma) has reopened 
debate. Racial realists, as the cohort is known, argue ‘race’ is genetically discrete, 
reliably measurable and scientifically meaningful. Racial realism encompasses far-
right racists such as J. Phillipe Rushton (2000) and Arthur Jensen (1969) to the more 
nuanced, ‘scientific’ arguments of John Entine (2000), Robin Andreasen (2004/5), 
John Arthur (2007), Phillip Kitcher (1999), Vincent Sarich & Frank Miele (2004) 
and Armand Marie Leroi (2005). In broad terms, racial realism refines ‘race’ to 
accommodate genetic evidence by maintaining that ‘race’ (phenotypic racial 
signifiers) has significant statistical correlation with the DNA markers that indicate 
genetic relatedness (genotype). Racial realism holds different ‘races’ - groups 
sharing distinctive genetic and ultimately phenotypic traits - result from ancestrally 
demarcated breeding populations produced through extended geographic isolation 
(Witherspoon et al, 2007; Yu et al, 2002). These breeding populations, however, do 
not comport onto the groups defined by the folk concept of ‘race’. The on-sight 
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logics of racialism do not hold at the genomic level revealing a massive disparity 
between phenotype and genotype.  
 
Racial realists have also resuscitated the biological concept through discussions of 
disease susceptibility and racially specific therapeutics. Different ‘races’, they 
maintain, are more susceptible to various genetically based diseases and in turn more 
responsive to certain courses of treatment or drug regimens (Risch et al, 2002). A 
wealth of research, however, demonstrates ‘race’ and disease linkages are 
determined by a complex entanglement of political pressures, cultural practices, 
environmental toxins, access to health care, education, economic resources and diet 
(Condit, 2004; Cooper, Kaufman & Ward, 2003; Root, 2001; Schwartz, 2001).   
 
Racial biology was first emphatically rejected after the atrocities of the Nazi Final 
Solution with the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation’s 
(UNESCO) refutation of Nazi ‘race’ science. The statement condemned ‘race’ 
science through a searching examination of its basic unit of analysis, ‘race’. The 
statement - far from relegating ‘race’ defunct - reignited an old debate still alive in 
the racial realism dispute. The backdoor (re)entrance of ‘race’ in genetics and its use 
in justifying atrocities such as the Tamil genocide and mass internment in Sri Lanka 
in 2009 highlight the ethical need for continued contestation
1
. Racial realism 
threatens to render social-scientific theorizing about the (in)significance of ‘race’ 
obsolete and so underscores the ethical stakes of postracial bioscience. The research 
assigns an independent reality to racial categorisation and refuels the enduring logic 
that genetic disorders and an ensemble of human traits and characteristics are 
                                               
1 http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/19/sri-lanka-end-war-civilians (accessed 10 February 
2013) 
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differentially distributed by ‘race’. ‘Race’, as a natural concept outside of human 
intervention, stands as one of the most persistent residues of racism 
 
Science has an imperative ethical task to use its rhetorical authority to dismantle 
commonsense racial biology and discredit naturalised notions of ‘race’. Widespread 
contestation remains a departure point although an excessive dependence on 
scientific formalism risks reducing the critique to an ethically vacuous discussion of 
competing scientific claims (St Louis, 2005a). Such a singular strategy is limited 
considering the allure of ‘race’ as both a constitutive feature of modern power and a 
formative prism shaping lived experience is not grounded on an understanding of its 
scientific status. Critical inquiry, aware of the deep social attachment to and material 
investment in ‘race, attempts to extend beyond the biological non/status of ‘race’ to a 
comprehensive engagement with what ‘race’ does, a re-orientation towards an 
ethico-political confrontation. I will continue by elaborating those political 
dimensions.  
 
1.1.2 ‘Race’ & Antiracism 
 
Postracialist positions scrutinise antiracisms exposing how its sometimes dictatorial 
character and narrow categories of operation evade ethical consideration and proceed 
unquestioned despite dubious alliances (Rev. Farrakhan and the KKK) and erroneous 
assertions (racialised diseases). Broadly speaking, postracialism(s) confront(s) the 
political dimension of ‘race’ through a reflexive examination of how ‘race’ operates 
in antiracism. Critical interrogation points to the unsettling truth that some 
antiracisms smuggle an absolutist ideology of ‘race’ into their frameworks. A 
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fanatical sense of insurmountable cultural and phenomenological divisions comes 
with this conceptual stowaway.  
 
Indigenous rights struggles in Ecuador’s petroleum-rich El Oriente region, for 
example, use a politicised indigeneity which appropriates the noble savage discourse 
to combat rapine expropriation, water contamination and deforestation by 
multinational oil corporations (Moore, Pandian & Kosek, 2003). This form of 
antiracism in collusion with racism makes ‘race’ into a fixed origin and 
institutionalises the imagined neat separation of ‘races’. The promise of a nonracial 
human community becomes an established impossibility. Conceptual and rhetorical 
dovetailing between antiracism and racism urges questioning; how radically 
transformative and analytically insightful can antiracism be if, as a discourse of 
resistance, it prompts identification with and in terms of the categories fundamental 
to the discourse of oppression?   
 
Much antiracism beyond its conceptual overlaps with racism also unwittingly 
recycles the ideological apparatus established to combat Nazism remaining 
powerless to stop the development of or even contest new patterns of exclusion and 
segregation (Hesse, 2011). Contemporary forms of culturalist racism forsake racial 
biology and hierarchy and borrowing the terms of liberal antiracism transmute ‘race’ 
into culture (Balibar, 1991). The right’s relativist multiculturalism has in 
successfully co-opting antiracism and its normative ideological values shattered 
commonplace political certainties.  
 
21 
 
During the 2012 US Republican presidential primary Newt Gingrich appeared to 
successfully disavow racist intent and to distance himself from extreme forms of 
intolerance while describing President Obama as the ‘food-stamp president’ and 
arguing that ‘blacks should demand jobs not food-stamps’ (Harris, 2012). An 
interpretive repertoire of individualism and aspirationalism replaces the now 
discredited biological referents. Gingrich vilifies and essentialises African-
Americans not in terms of their genetic makeup but for their supposed demands to 
‘special privileges’ and their pathological shiftlessness. Postracialism(s) advocate(s) 
the excising of the ‘race’ concept as a necessary political step to (re)empower 
antiracism against new forms of racism and to end the cyclical (re)production of 
‘race’ - the ideological prerequisite for racism.  
 
In postracialism social injustice and oppression will be tackled without recourse to 
analytically defunct forms of social description and explanation which reify ‘race’ as 
a normative social formation (St Louis, 2005b). Activism, freed from the naturalistic 
predicates of ‘race’ and its dubious explanatory frameworks, will be able to more 
effectively battle culturalist racisms. This is in contrast to institutionalised 
antiracisms such as a professionalised antiracist consultancy which trivialise racism 
and fail to raise important issues of social justice, and economic power. Antiracism 
has at times been superseded by a trite multicultural politics in education and 
government which reduced racism to the superficial and relegated it to the political 
periphery. Systematic trivialisation under the guise of ‘cultural enrichment’ in 
multicultural education reinforced unequal access, subverted minority resistance, 
reproduced socio-economic inequalities and ignored volumes of evidence of how 
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racist practices have (re)produced fundamentally in-egalitarian social and economic 
structures (Troyna, 1993). 
 
 1.1.3 Politics Without Guarantees 
 
‘Race’-based identity politics, the constructionist counterpart of antiracism and the 
site of hard-won oppositional identities, is long overdue for a theoretical and political 
interrogation. In pursuit of a reflexive and democratic society such an examination is 
welcomed. Identity politics as Brubaker (2004) has argued naturalise thinking in 
terms of bounded groups and assume the existence of racialised political alliances as 
self-evident. Its identitarian language occludes alternative ways of conceptualising 
political affiliation by falsely assuming a causal relationship between ‘race’ and 
political affiliation. This forecloses communication across difference and retreats 
inwards away from the searching ethico-political questions posed by postmodernity 
(Gilroy, 1997).  
 
These are the questions tested and risked in the encounter with that which is radically 
‘Other’. The encounter requires imagination and hermeneutical sensitivity. Critically 
engaged dialogue requires the opening of oneself to the full power of what the 
‘Other’ is saying without which the encounter descends into a self-deceptive 
monologue where one never risks testing one’s prejudgements. In the retreat toward 
security and stability, naturalistic claims solidify an empty political solidarity, 
unsustainably built on arbitrarily ascribed traits. Particularly alarming is how this 
pseudo-solidarity demands an unthinking dedication bypassing discussion and 
dissent. Mediated resolution is sidestepped and coercive techniques become 
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necessary to secure an ‘unearned’ solidarity which insists on conformity to authentic 
group behaviour and only underscores the need for an ethically empowered political 
discourse (Gilroy, 2004).  
 
For postracialism(s) resistance can only be realised with the abolition of ‘race’ and 
the creation of a postracial subject emboldened to think through and justify her 
ethical commitments and political ideas without the safety net of non-negotiated 
political positions (St Louis, 2002). Postracialisms maintain that if an authentically 
democratic political culture, not organised around the practical currency of ‘race’, is 
to be had, a deeper and more reflexive consideration of the global processes of 
community formation and representation is required. Having discussed the political 
critiques, I will now continue to the ethical critique. 
 
1.1.4 Beyond the Ethics of the Colour line 
 
Hard-won oppositional identities and solidarities, the sources of progressive ‘race’-
based mobilisations, are not easily relinquished. Racial conservationists while 
recognising the social constructedness of ‘race’, reject the postracial turn 
maintaining that the category is politically necessary to mobilise against racism 
(Hardimon, 2003) and integral to self-identity and group cohesion (Mallon, 2004). 
Conservationism represents the conventional social-scientific approach. 
Postracialism(s) sourced from a radical and future-oriented politics contend(s) that 
‘race’ is over-determined by a discourse that cannot be rearticulated without the 
historically inescapable taint of its absolutist predicates. Continued reference only 
exacerbates its reifying effects, dangerous commonsense meanings, phenotypical 
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allusions and its mobilisation for purposes of social exclusion and subjugation. The 
constructionist alternative remains hostage to the mythical ideas and political short-
circuits of racialism. 
 
For conservationists ‘race’ opens up an existential space for oppositional projects 
and a healthy psychology in the face of virulent racism (Alcoff, 2006). Postracialist 
critiques enumerate the regulatory and disciplinary tendencies of oppositional 
identities in an attempt to recover the critical self-consciousness regularly lost in 
‘race’. The disciplinary regimes of ‘race’, Appiah suggests, impose constricting life 
scripts, dissolve individuality and bind individuals to ready-made identities (1996). 
Compressing identity to the monadic focus on ‘race’ reduces the individual to a 
single descriptor through the exclusion of other converging social categories. The 
self when restricted to a prior racial ontology is over-determined with false 
essentialism, preformed values and choice-less frames of interpretation. 
 
 ‘Race’ proves incapable of being readily re(de)-signified without its reified 
tendencies and exclusionary history and only capable of reinforcing embittered 
distinctions between racial groups (Appiah, 1996). Postracialism(s) in an imaginative 
leap toward a radical freedom commence(s) a momentous moral evolution where the 
subject assumes a heightened ethical and political responsibility for her decisions 
and allegiances (Hill, 2001). The self is transformed from a project of being into a 
project of becoming without racially ontologised rules forbidding multiple social 
affinities and pre-political categories precluding negotiated positions. 
 
1.1.5 Not to Be Confused With… 
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Often this imaginative aspect of postracialism is sharply criticised as naively utopian, 
wholly semantic or worse consummately bourgeois individualism. Detractors 
accurately note postracialism’s utopian imagining beyond the strictures of ‘race’. 
Postracial utopianisms could be located in the radical traditions of Atlantic 
abolitionism and the suffragette movement. Utopian aspirations as for the 
abolitionists and suffragettes function as sources of strength and hope in working to 
transform the fundamentally unequal structures and institutions of power. 
Postracialism(s) promises to confront contemporary racisms, combat the social and 
economic reproduction of inequality engendered by racism, revive political culture 
beyond identity politics and to develop an authentically peaceful accommodation of 
otherness predicated on a fundamental commonality (Gilroy, 2004).  
 
Critics also accuse (confuse?) postracialism of offering little more than neo-
conservative colourblind rhetoric. Colourblindness suggests postracialism is 
attainable if practically adopted through ‘race’-neutral social policy and legislation. 
Contemporary racial inequality, if acknowledged at all, is understood as the outcome 
of nonracial dynamics with racialised stratification rationalised as the product of 
market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena and imputed cultural limitations. 
Colourblindness perpetuates racial inequality by leaving the fundamentally racist 
social and economic structures untouched and by actually codifying racism into 
ostensibly ‘race’-neutral legislation (Crenshaw, 1995). Colourblindness seeks to 
erase all formal reference to ‘race’ and to hail this semantic deletion as the 
realisation of true equality.  
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Another far right discourse celebrates the achievements of postracialism as having 
already arrived. Adherents cite the irrelevance of ‘race’ (and/or its declining 
significance) and racism in determining life chances and opportunities (D’ Souza, 
1995). Tokenistic examples of racial equality such as the growing presence of 
racialised minorities among the political elite become testimony to the post-racist 
era. Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example, was heralded as the 
embodiment of the American struggle to extend political rights to racialised 
minorities and prominently positioned to provide an official face to American 
diversity. President George W. Bush’s cabinet, the most racially diverse in US 
history, was supposed evidence that old racist hierarchies are no longer an intrinsic 
feature of today’s political order.  
 
Postracialism is distinct from these discourses in three crucial ways. First, 
postracialism presents a developed analytical paradigm capable of understanding and 
explaining the power of the diverse racisms that have taken shape today. Second, it 
imagines and works to bring into being a postracial political landscape that enables a 
radically democratic project unfettered by racial parochialism. As such, it promises a 
creative view of humanity complete with the conceptual sophistication for 
appreciating the fluidity of identities that stress experiential plurality, multiple 
affinities and negotiated political associations. And thirdly it facilitates the 
desperately needed ethical turn as it forces the subject to become self-critical and 
self-reflexive in both her political allegiances and affiliations. 
 
A central paradox lurks at the heart of postracialism. Charles W. Mills captured this 
well: ‘That race should be irrelevant is certainly an attractive ideal, but when it has 
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not been irrelevant, it is absurd to proceed as if it had been’ (1998: 41, original 
emphasis). This rearticulation of the postracial dilemma offers a powerful rejoinder 
to postracialism. Racism has made ‘race’ significant to life chances and 
opportunities, to science and to ontologies. The racial categories rejected by 
postracialism are paradoxically necessary to identify and combat racism and to 
develop ameliorative strategies. We cannot simply move beyond ‘race’. We need 
‘race’ in some form to track racialised inequality and to challenge it. Mills’ 
formulation of the postracial paradox presents a serious hurdle for postracialism and 
forms the foundation for manifold reservations. It refigures the postracial ambition in 
terms of the paradox of working both with and against ‘race’. I will return to this 
persistent challenge throughout this thesis.  
 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
 
This project beginning with nonracialism critically surveys and analyses the thus far 
unmapped intellectual lineage of postracialism. The project - driven by unpublished 
archival and interview data - interprets the significance of this unexamined heritage 
and critically evaluates its implications for contemporary theory. Chapter two 
outlines my methodology and discusses my approach to the qualitative data. Chapter 
three offers a broad historical survey of the existing literature and situates my work 
within the existing body of knowledge. Chapter four explores the concept of 
narcissistic non/postracialism and critically interrogates the humanistic epistemology 
underpinning these non/postracial expressions. Chapter five charts the ethical 
critique in postracialism showing how although ‘race’ is not biologically warranted it 
is nevertheless socially real and is crucially a central part of self-conception and 
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determinant of life chances. Chapter six explores the possibilities of a postracialist 
antiracism highlighting several key dimensions of the postracial problematic through 
interview material. Chapter seven examines postracial bioscience arguing it provides 
the affirmative basis for the ethical and political critiques of postracialism, extends 
beyond the empiricist assumptions of positivistic paradigms ultimately enriching 
epistemological, methodological and ethical understandings. Chapter eight explores 
‘postracial cosmopolitanism’ through theoretical literature and qualitative interview 
data arguing that in spite of its limitations it offers an ethically laudable attempt to 
reimagine how we live with difference and how we might do so beyond ‘race’. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
 
 
2.1 The Historiographical Origins of Sociology 
 
Sociology aims, ‘to enable men…to become aware of historical structures and their 
own place within them’ (Mills, 1959: 139). The sociological promise, as expressed 
by Mills, is deeply interconnected to historiography and consonant with sociology’s 
‘hallowed’ foundations. The collective oeuvre of Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and 
Max Weber - the holy trinity of sociological luminaries - inscribed the discipline 
with a strong historical consciousness. Durkheim’s Suicide: A Study in Sociology 
was an extensive analysis of official governmental records (1951). Weber’s research 
on religion which formed the bulk of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism was based on historical material (2010). And finally, Marx’s Capital 
Volume One grew out of an investigation of government records archived in the 
British Museum (1976).  
 
What distinguished this analysis as historical sociology was how it investigated 
social change and phenomena through an acute attention to the crucial patterns, 
processes and trajectories linked to specific contexts and locations (Abrams, 1982). 
Disciplinary boundaries were more permeable - indiscernible even - in the time of 
the sociological ‘founders’. My project follows the intellectual footprints of Marx 
and Mills with an orientation rooted in historical sociology and bolstered by archival 
and interview data. Original historical research and qualitative interviewing have 
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methodological merit and the promise of rich empirical data can greatly enrich social 
theory. Before explicating my methodology I will contextualise the lack of an 
historical sensibility in contemporary postracialisms to which my project and my 
methodology are responses.   
 
2.1.1 Loss of Historical Sensibility 
 
Recent decades have witnessed an increasing professionalization of the academy 
through the canonisation of ‘classical social theory’ (Wilford, 1995). 
Institutionalised in great part through the work of Talcott Parsons, the shift towards 
social theory displaced the tradition of historical inquiry in favour of contemporary 
concept formation and systematisation (Calhoun, 2003). Professionalization resulted 
in the formerly accessible intellectual discourse being replaced by a highly technical 
one, inscrutable to outsiders. Current postracialism, reawakened with the publication 
of Against Race (Gilroy, 2000), retraces Parsons detour around the methodological 
challenges of historical research and qualitative interviewing. Postracialisms offer a 
developed analysis of popular culture (Gilroy, 2004) but perhaps neglect the longue 
duree of its own histories and the possibilities for and problems with its realisation in 
the here-and-now. Gaps in the overarching historicity are exemplified in its failure to 
engage with its own key thinkers (i.e. Barzun) and moments (i.e. UNESCO debates) 
in any sustained manner. 
 
Contemporary postracial debates remain trapped in a specialised language and a self-
referential conversation confined for the most part to the private environment of 
scholarly life. Distanced and perhaps even disconnected from the production of 
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public ideas informed by engagement with radical struggles for social justice, 
postracial discussions are not linked to a discrete praxis or a concrete political 
programme. Chapter six ‘Postracial Futures: Practicing and Imagining Postracial 
Antiracisms’ represents my own struggle as an academic-in-training with this 
disconnect. The chapter can be seen as a critical response to the limited existence of 
anything resembling a postracial programme.  
 
Loose and fragmentary, postracialist positions (St Louis, 2009) advance theoretically 
sophisticated critiques of ‘race’. But reflexive dialogue and critical reflection on the 
formative patterns and trajectories of its own histories are lost in these abstract 
discussions. This in spite of the fact - as the next chapter demonstrates - that 
postracialisms have a long history spanning centuries and continents. Across space 
and time, postracialisms have varied tremendously in content and form, in concrete 
expression and reception in specific social relations and historical and institutional 
contexts. For example, why did Alain Locke’s trenchant dismissal of racial biology 
in 1916 not garner widespread recognition for decades? What about that historical 
moment marginalised his critique? And how and why were his once tendentious 
arguments amenable to UNESCO in 1950?  
 
My project centres archival and interview material in the exploration of 
postracialisms in ‘real-world’ contexts. This archival (re)turn is a methodological 
and theoretical response to the absence of historical and empirical work in current 
debates. The return to qualitative data is made with the belief that more empirical 
research is needed to support theoretical claims and to make social theory more 
relevant, more robustly evidenced. After all, the theoretical, political and ethical 
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issues surrounding the formation and proposed dissolution of racial categorisation 
only assume meaning in specific contexts. Such historical awareness is essential if 
postracialisms aim to broaden the diagnosis of the theoretical state of ‘race’ and/or to 
work in tandem with an engaged politics. 
 
2.1.2 Why a Qualitative Postracialism? 
 
A qualitative postracialism is further compelling considering how such a project 
would (re)visit both the ethical and political implications of ‘race’. Racialism is 
ethically problematic because it ranks humanity through somatised political 
relationships. Fundamentally political relationships are explained as natural, outside 
of time. The discourse transforms racial distinctions into an unquestionable 
commonsense that explains, rationalises and is used to interpret any number of 
complex social processes. In the US, for example, the Asian-American model 
minority myth offers a prefabricated theory that makes sense of the world through 
the exclusion of complex political, cultural, and economic factors (Saito, 1997). The 
comparative educational and economic success of Asian-Americans and their 
perceived assimilation into mainstream American culture is attributed to traditional 
cultural values and family structures. Other ‘minority’ groups are implicitly 
considered failures with blame attributed to endemic cultural and moral failings. 
 
The naturalness and assumed permanence of ‘race’ also flourishes amongst certain 
academics - the biological falsity of ‘race’ is recognised but the category is 
nevertheless reified. Howard Winant (1994), Joshua Glasgow (2009) and Anna 
Stubblefield (2005) defend the preservation of ‘race’ through an anti-eliminativist 
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constructivism –‘race’ is socially constructed and while lacking a biological 
foundation it is symbolically and materially real, and therefore should not be 
eliminated as a theoretical term and/or political concept. In the main, 
conservationists want to purge ‘race’ of hierarchy and to reconstruct an alternate 
model that is socially and politically useful and consistent with democratic justice 
(Outlaw, 1996).  
 
Certain accounts seem to reproduce the logics of biological essentialism in their 
treatment of difference and sameness. In the work of Glasgow and Stubblefield 
‘race’ is given a normative social status - the antiracist social justice agenda is 
limited as it can only be conceived in and through a racial politics. This 
conservationism tacitly positions the critique of the salience of racial identities as 
apolitical disengagement with the ‘race world’ and as out of touch with the practical 
lives of ordinary people. The reification of social structures, relations and actors 
presents difference and sameness as objective facts obscuring the naturalising 
process within difference discourse and its constant reinforcement by moral and 
rhetorical authority (St Louis, 2005b). Incorporating archival and interview data, I 
hope to highlight the process of reification and to show the dangers associated with 
constructionism.  
 
The constructionist matrix makes ‘race’, as both a political and ontological category, 
into something of an illusion of false necessity. Michael Omi and Howard Winant 
famously rejected postracialism arguing that, ‘It is rather difficult to jettison widely 
held beliefs, beliefs which moreover are central to everyone’s identity and 
understanding of the social world’ (1994:55). The framework theorises ‘race’ as an 
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unstable and decentred complex of social meanings continually reworked by political 
struggle. Conceivably the framework could include an anti-‘race’ formation. To 
paraphrase Winant, such a project would be disastrous; the end of ‘race’ is thus to 
contemplate the liquidation of western civilization (Winant, 1994: xiii). 
Constructionism inadvertently perpetuates a paradox. The meaning of ‘race’ is 
understood to be mutable, not real in any essential way. However, social reality 
becomes immutable over-determined by the incontestability and permanence of 
‘race’. Where this occurs the radical promise of constructionism, which betokened a 
move away from essentialism, appears gestural. In the final instance, ‘race’ must be 
preserved as an essential category for understanding human society.  
 
Constructionism, having endorsed ‘race’ in perpetuity, overlooks its most basic 
insight - the methodological cornerstone of historical sociology and a source of 
strength for postracialist aspirations. That racialism happens to be the organising 
model for 21
st
 century Western social relations does not necessitate that it is what 
must be. Nor has it always structured the socio-political order. Admittedly obvious, 
viewing the present in relation to the past is an essential technique for recognising its 
contingency and pressing oneself to attend not simply to surface phenomena but also 
to underlying causes and conditions that produce those phenomena (Calhoun, 2003). 
 
My semi-structured interviews complimented these perspectives offering a dialogic 
space for considering the future of ‘race’ in antiracism by opening up a mutually 
beneficial dialogue between theory and practice
2
. The interview was a critical site for 
thinking postracialism in practical contexts, some real and some imagined. This 
                                               
2 For more on the interviewees themselves please refer to Appendix 1 
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exercise enabled a critical analysis of postracialism and a richer engagement with the 
relationship between ideas and actions.   
 
Unlike the resignation of conservationism, my work grows out of a tradition that 
does not locate present-day social arrangements as beyond criticism. Not seeking an 
escape from categories into some ideal realm of pure facticity, my project hopes to 
stress the social factors that contribute to the (re)production of racial ways of 
understanding. My concern is not with ‘discovering’ ‘correct’ categories of thought 
but rather appreciating how the categories we use are constitutive of reality. And of 
course to use categories in an appropriately self-aware and critical fashion (working 
with and against ‘race’) requires attention to theory and history. A sociological 
understanding of past and present dynamics shaping the use and implications of such 
categories is essential.  
 
My excavation of postracialism explores episodes of contestation demonstrating the 
contingency of racialism - the conditions of possibility that allowed for the counter-
discourse to emerge, to gain traction and in other moments to dissipate. Beyond 
historical recovery, my inquiry sketches a genealogy of postracialism. Following 
Foucault I do not attempt a total history but rather map out a ‘general history’ 
focused on discontinuities (Foucault, 1989). This translates methodologically into 
the avoidance of treating history in terms of development and progress. General 
history is the abandonment of the philosophical project of reconstitution. General 
history makes historical evidence intelligible in terms of particular problems. 
Postracialism is not addressed in its totality rather my project brings particular 
problems to bear upon archival and interview data (Cousins & Hussain, 1984). 
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2.2 Genealogy and the ‘History of the Present’ 
 
My exploration of postracialism dispels the theoretical fatalism discussed above 
proving valuable for loosening the naturalised chokehold of ‘race’. Writing a ‘history 
of the present’ is not a complete understanding of the historical record. But neither is 
it a facile plotting of how the present has straightforwardly emerged from the past. It 
is a methodological intervention using history as a way of diagnosing the present. 
The concept combines seemingly opposing ideas - history and the present - to reflect 
on contemporary postracialisms. Reflection precipitates Foucauldian questions for 
the archives and the interviews; what are the conditions of reality for the discourses 
of postracialism to emerge then and now? How are they possible? (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999: 96). A qualitative approach also makes it possible to grasp 
postracialism in its contexts of production and application. Greater critical reflexivity 
requires careful attention to theory and history.  
 
If postracialism is to think through the production of knowledge and the politics of 
researching ‘race’ the historical dilemmas and ‘stuck places’ through and into which 
the body of theory has travelled need to be addressed (Lather, 2001). Historical 
inquiry and qualitative interviewing offer methodological spaces for thinking 
through the complexities, ambiguities and contradictions of postracial projects 
concerned with recognising difference and pursuing social justice. My methodology 
explores how events, understandings, structures and action are embedded in other 
simultaneous phenomena and time. Uncovering the complexity of the present 
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through the inventorying of the infinity of traces left in the present resonates with 
Gramsci’s methodological project.  
 
2.2.1 Genealogy and the Political Stakes of the Conjuncture  
 
My methodology borrows Antonio Gramsci’s central concept, the conjuncture, as a 
conceptual frame (1992). I use an attenuated version through a Foucauldian lens to 
minimise the obvious contradictions of combining Foucauldian and Neo-Marxist 
orientations. Propounded by Gramsci and developed by Stuart Hall, the conjuncture  
is an analytical device for theorising the present. Guided by Foucault and Gramsci 
my methodology embraces complexity and avoids the teleological and fatalistic 
tendencies of historiography.  
 
The conjuncture is a social formation characterised by a complex articulated unity or 
totality. Lawrence Grossberg summarises the conjuncture as:   
…a description of a social formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple 
axes, planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances or structural 
stabilities through a variety of practices and processes of struggle and negotiation’ 
(2007: 107). 
 
Not simply a slice of time, it is a concept indexing a particular moment defined by a 
condensation of contradictions, a fusion of different currents or circumstances (ibid). 
A concrete example will help to clarify. 
 
In the 1980s Stuart Hall took up Gramsci’s interest in historically specific 
institutional regimes and his concern with historical variation in class struggles. 
Thatcherite neoliberalism, for Hall, marked a rupture with the post-war consensus of 
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social democracy and its characteristically strong welfare state (Hall, 1985). The 
conservatives sought not simply to remodel society but to undermine the philosophy 
of social co-operation, mutual aid and care for the underprivileged which had 
historically formed the discursive basis of the Left. Thatcherism was committed to 
the philosophy that in order to really dominate and restructure a social formation 
political, moral and intellectual leadership must be wed to economic dominance. The 
Right must ‘win’ in civil society as well as in the state (Hall, 1985). A massive 
struggle unfolded as conservatives worked to institutionalise a social ethic of self-
interest in place of the social-democratic moral universe (Hall, 1988). Thatcherism 
moved to reconstruct the terrain of what was ‘taken for granted’ in social and 
political thought and so to form a new common-sense.  
 
Conjunctural analysis foregrounds contingency so although history is not already 
determined there are, nevertheless, determinate forces. These forces do not 
spontaneously arise. Forces have specific conditions of existence. Conjunctures 
contain dissimilar currents - some of a long, some a relatively short duration, that 
condense at particular moments into a particular configuration. It is precisely that 
configuration with its balance of forces which informs this inquiry (Hall, 2007).  
 
A genuine public intellectual, Hall has always been conversant with politics (Hall & 
Jacques, 1989) understanding the conjuncture not only as a social-historical category 
but crucially as a moral-political category. Oriented to the present political state the 
conjuncture pursues, ‘understanding the present…grasping it in its conjunctural 
specificity, in terms of the new problem-space of questions it poses, and the 
possibilities it both lays open and shuts down’ (Scott, 2005: 6). At heart the 
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conjuncture involves the reorganisation of an existing cognitive- political problem-
space, the reorganisation of an existing configuration of questions and answers. It is 
both an historical interruption and a conceptual reconfiguration in which one field of 
argument is displaced by another (Scott, 2005:5). The conjunctures highlight smaller 
uncertainties, imbalances and struggles of significance for the pathways of 
postracialism. Broadening the conjuncture to address the political, my project asks; 
Is ‘race’ a category that is worth having morally and politically?  
 
Not defined by the practice of guaranteeing some preconceived community, 
conjunctural politics understands solidarity as earned in struggle and not effortlessly 
derived (Scott, 2005). How identity is conceived and how it operates is central to any 
political movement. Through interviews exploring the relationship between 
postracialism and antiracism, my project investigates what modes of identity certain 
postracial formulations endorse and what modes of difference they seek to exclude. 
This attention to the inherently political activity of boundary-making centres the 
political stakes and implications of such a methodology. 
 
2.2.2 Foucauldian Methodology 
 
Having sketched some central Foucauldian insights, I will now discuss how I intend 
to use them. Grasping the histories of postracialisms necessitates empirical 
interpretation and theoretical explanation. Obviating the pitfall of false necessity is 
aided through empirical research. My methodology employs archival materials not to 
reconstruct the past but to methodically call into question what is given to us and 
what we take for granted in postracialism. In close dialogue with qualitative data, I 
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forge my critical concepts to assemble different, multiple and incomplete paths of 
development. Once denaturalised, the history can be lifted above the horizon of the 
taken-for-granted, put in context and broken up (Dean, 2003).  
 
To uncover the contingencies in postracialism, I extend beyond history as little more 
than a succession of isolated events in which the expert discovers discrete patterns. 
My work is concerned with the categories of discontinuity and difference, the 
notions of threshold, rupture and transformation (Sheridan, 1980). My thesis revisits 
some under-examined postracial moments and draws out their significance for the 
intellectual lineage. Through interview data the project also aims to contribute to 
shifts that are beginning to occur. Historically, for example, the status of ‘race’ in 
Christian universalism has remained under-examined, despite its significant role in 
structuring the lines of in/ex-clusion in a putatively nonracial community. In chapter 
three, I revisit this literature and critically assess nonracial Christian universalism 
and its complex relationship to racialism. 
 
My analysis draws on Foucault’s ‘historical a priori’ - a period delineating the 
paradigm through which a thinker operated and by which the limits to her perception 
were set (Poster, 1984). The historical a priori refuses to use the terms of the present 
and those concepts developed in earlier times. Foucault reminds us;  ‘The men of the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries do not think of wealth, nature or languages in terms that had 
been bequeathed to them by preceding ages or in forms that presaged what was soon 
to be discovered…’ (Foucault, 1970: 208). My approach excavates an account of the 
existence of various systems of thought, of the possibilities of development that lie 
within the paradigms from which they originated (Roth, 1981). The historical a 
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priori assumes an integral function becoming the fundamental structure of 
experience.  
 
While situated in a bounded moment my methodological intention is to return to 
history to address and explore the concerns of the present. In Discipline and Punish 
Foucault regularly returned to his present to engage the, ‘overall political issue 
around prison’ (Foucault, 1977:308). Foucault’s activist intellectualism included the 
formation of the Information Group on Prisons which established numerous groups 
investigating the conditions of prisons - not to effect reforms but to let the prisoners 
speak for themselves and to unify struggles inside and outside the prisons (Major-
Poetzl, 1983:49). Writing a history of the present is inextricably joined to the writing 
of a history in the present. Similar to the political impulses sustaining Hall, the 
‘history of the present’ signifies a self-conscious undertaking set in a particular field 
of power relations and political struggle. 
 
Our current moment is of serious significance for postracial debates. Here in London 
the ascendancy of the ‘declining significance of race’ discourse in the mayoral and 
central governments has pushed the issue of institutional racism largely off the 
political agenda.
3
 The discourse has been perniciously effective in regard to the 
undoing of antiracist demands for social justice, while simultaneously appearing to 
be engaging in a well-informed and even well-intentioned response to racial 
inequality. Racism is ‘taken into account’ only to be shown to no longer be occurring 
- irrelevant to contemporary politics because of its ‘pastness’ (Lentin & Titley, 
2011). Neoliberal subjects through the repertoires of freedom and choice in this 
                                               
3 See Prospect Magazine (2010) Rethinking Race Issue 175, October 
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aspirational meritocracy can choose to ‘go beyond ‘‘race’’’. The continued usage of 
‘race’ especially in mobilisations for inclusion and equality is made to seem 
redundant. Appropriated by the new right, postracialism has been emptied of any 
progressive meaning or connection to materialist antiracism. This is the postracial 
moment as the moment where inherently racialised (and racist) perspectives can be 
discursively laundered such that the racial position articulated can claim racial 
neutrality.  
 
Writing a ‘history of the present’ requires a certain imagination and hopefulness as it 
invokes pressing questions. How can contemporary postracialism combat this 
hegemony? How should it engage this field of power relations which etches new 
lines and (re)produces new realms of injury and injustice? And what would be 
effectual tactics in such a struggle? Across the Atlantic, colourblind rhetoric as 
exemplified in California’s 2003 Racial Privacy Initiative and the colourblind 
discourse of the Obama presidency threaten to push any serious sociological 
conception of postracialism to the margins. The Obama presidency is often presented 
to suggest that real equality has been achieved in order to install a whole repertoire 
of new meanings which emphasise that civil rights protection and equality legislation 
is no longer needed - it is a spent force.  
 
2.3 Archaeology in the Archive  
 
Informed by Foucault’s interpretive process in the Archaeology of Knowledge, I will 
(re)construct a coherent history from the scattered postracialist fragments themselves 
shaped by and located within particular historical conjunctures (Foucault,1989). 
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Foucauldian methodology informs the hermeneutic method in this thesis that 
attempts to engage with postracialism in its historical and textual specificity. 
Postracialism does not simply exist ‘out there’ – independently of the theoretical 
mode through which I am both constructing and interpreting it. In other words, a 
central issue in this methodology is not simply what is produced (a definition of 
postracialism), but how I produce it. These are inseparable issues in the process of 
social research (May, 2011). 
 
My project responds to the shortage of original research in postracial debates that 
engage only existing published material. Without greater interaction with primary 
data, the ability to explain and understand the findings of research that make ‘sense’ 
of data is limited. If sociology aims at the systematic study of particular phenomena, 
might that perforce entail a direct examination of those phenomena – the dynamics, 
content, context and structure of social relations? Postracial theory certainly has a 
role to help inform our understanding of the scientific, political and ethical problems 
with ‘race’ which, in turn, assists us in making research decisions and making sense 
of the world around us. These theoretical contributions have allowed us a perspective 
on our social universe which breaks free from everyday thinking on ‘race’ to 
consider ethical issues beyond our normal frames of reference (see Gilroy, 2000). 
 
I want to also call attention to how primary research can also perform this sensitising 
and orientating function. The experiences of conducting research and generating 
findings can influence our theorising. In the research process, we embark on 
empirical work and collect data that initiates, refutes or organises our theories and 
enables us to understand or explain our observations (May, 2011). Primary research 
44 
 
can work as a way of interrogating postracialism and perhaps even, ‘open our eyes to 
dilemmas that we can’t avoid and for which we have to prepare ourselves’ 
(Habermas, 1994:116-117). Habermas’ suggestion is evident in my later discussion 
of how postracial antiracism may trivialise the grave realities of ‘race’. For 
postracialism to continue to become more relevant to antiracisms and to be of use in 
understanding or exploring the social world, postracial theory needs research and 
research needs theory. There is a mutual interdependence between the two (Bulmer, 
1986).  
 
The results and practices of social research ‘feedback’ into social life; people engage 
in the interpretation of its findings and are co-participants in its process. The 
‘feedback’ of ideas and research into social life suggests postracial theorists may 
need to make connections between the language used in social theory and the 
methods of interpretation people already use in attributing meaning to their social 
environment. Research practice must take account of people’s everyday 
understandings and how and why those are constituted - what Giddens calls the 
‘double hermeneutic’ (1987). Being sensitive to the double hermeneutic would mean 
that postracialism cannot pre-emptively dismiss all forms of race-based identity 
politics. ‘Race’ has had and continues to have an informative role within socially 
transformative democratic struggles. Race-based identity politics signifies a worthy 
aim of building (in)formal political coalitions capable of identifying, articulating and 
tackling the injustice experienced by sectors of society that understand themselves as 
racial groups whether imagined or not. There are larger ethical and political 
considerations involved highlighted in my later discussion of the how the experience 
of racism can be an important site for forging of antiracist solidarities.  
45 
 
 
The constant slippage between the languages used to understand and explain social 
life and the meanings which people already employ in everyday life raises questions. 
How do translations between specialist and lay frames of meaning occur? And how 
are they negotiated and acted upon? And with what consequences? These are key 
questions considering the ontological role of ‘race’ for some. Primary research can 
aid in the development of a theory of social life which takes a fuller account of 
people’s experiences and understanding in the everyday.  
 
Standpoint feminists remind us of this in regarding experiences as a starting but not 
finishing point for research – theory is then deployed to situate the experiences of 
women within a wider context and the production of knowledge is regarded as a 
social activity (Harding, 2004). What primary research can potentially do for 
postracialism is enrich its theorisation by building democratic and participatory 
situations – as attempted in my interviews. This decision was informed by the 
concern that a postracialism too removed from the ‘state of affairs’ can regard the 
experiences of people as ‘faulty’ as opposed to understanding how certain types of 
knowledges predominate and the exercise of power sustaining and reproducing those 
knowledges.  
 
 I return to the unpublished record in an attempt to grasp the social problems which 
are important to specific ‘historical and structural’ contexts (Mills, 1959: 42). Instead 
of descending upon the social world armed with a body of theoretical propositions 
about how and why social relations exist and work as they do, following Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) I attempt to observe those relations, collect data on them and then 
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proceed to generate my theoretical propositions - to enable the, ‘imaginative 
engagement with data that the simple application of a string of procedures precludes’ 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2010: 25). Looking into the past through the archive I hoped to 
gain a richer understanding of postracialism in the present in order to empower 
theory with the hope for greater clarity in the future.  
 
(Re)constructing the history of postracialism and its conditions of possibility in the 
here and now places contemporary theory in conversation with its own history 
enhancing our understanding of our own present and more imaginatively the 
contemplation of our future. Mapping this is a sociohistorical endeavour attentive to 
the constructed rather than ‘found’ nature of its referents. The unity and significance 
formulated from the archival materials will not be given. The data is not simply 
waiting to be ‘read-off’ from the text itself but rather will be derived elsewhere from 
the interpretative task of ‘deciphering’ that which is both manifest and concealed 
within the text. Foucault argues that archaeology is another way of approaching the 
past of getting at history that can be complimented by existing methods of historical 
inquiry (Cousins & Hussain, 1984). I compliment my archaeology with archival 
research and semi-structured interviews. Having discussed my methodological 
practice, I will now unpack the archival dimensions of my project.  
 
2.3.1 Why the Archival Turn?  
 
The archive…is not a quiet retreat for professionals and scholars. It is a crucible of 
human experience. A battleground for meaning and significance. A place and a space 
of complex and ever-shifting power-plays. Here you cannot keep your hands clean 
(Cook & Schwartz, 2002: 183). 
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In Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression Derrida reminds us that the archive was 
originally defined as a privileged site where records were officially consigned and 
guarded by legal authority (1995). There has always been an intimate relationship 
between the institution of archives and the operation of state power. The historically 
durable procedures for guarding and authorising access demonstrate the equally 
longstanding association between the law and the integrity of a body of records. 
 
This symbiosis was evident at the American Philosophical Society, a private archive 
housing over eleven million items. Access required completion of a detailed form, 
two forms of identification and evidence of local address. Additionally, I was 
obliged to specify my project, its relationship to the archives and my intended usage 
of material. Publication of sourced material required prior approval. Through a 
network of surveillance and monitoring, the APS maintained strict control over its 
holdings.   
 
The practices associated with controlling access play a role in history as well in the 
scholarly practice of history. For Derrida, the struggle unfolds in the concepts of 
archontic power - control over the authorship, collection and interpretation of a body 
of writings and the counter-active anarchic power - a resistive power characterised 
by control over the drafting, destruction and dissolution of records to enhance the 
equivocality of interpretations (Lynch, 1999). The ensuing struggle over the control, 
and interpretation of records transforms the very concept of history rendering history 
less as stuff (historical description/information) and more as process (of imagining of 
remembering).The interpretive turn was a methodological move away from the study 
of documents to the making of them. Probing what constitutes the archive, how 
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documents collide and converge with memory forced me to rethink the archive 
beyond the inert site of conservation (Stoler, 2002). 
 
I strove to engage with material as cultural artefacts of fact production, of disparate 
notions of postracialisms. While reliability and representativeness remain pressing 
issues, my work followed the Foucauldian attentiveness to the social and political 
conditions that produced documents. Concern with distinguishing ‘fact’ from 
‘fiction’ waned with the heightened focus of tracing the production and 
conceptualisation of those facts themselves. The archive became my gateway into an 
enquiry into the grids of intelligibility that produced paradigms at a particular time, 
for a particular social contingent and in a particular way (Stoler, 2002: 91). Reading 
Hubert Harrison’s lecture notes, I was interested not in its authenticity but what they 
told us about understandings of racism in New York during the 1920s.  
 
Documents come layered with the received account of earlier events and the cultural 
semantics of a political moment. What constitutes the archive, what form it takes and 
what systems of classification it signals at specific times is the substance of politics 
(Stoler, 2002). Harrison’s commitments to socialism, antiracism and atheism (in a 
capitalist, racist and Christian nation) reinforced a neglect of his scholarship 
following his death. Eighty years later with Columbia’s acquisition and the 
publication of a digital finding aid, Harrison’s corpus was resurrected. The Harrison 
collection entered in a politicised manner having been collated by the independent 
socialist scholar Jeffrey Perry (personal communication July 2010). This example 
demonstrates the political aspect of the archive inasmuch as Columbia holds the 
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Harrison material that was collated by Perry, which indicates the position from 
which the material is presented. 
 
For Foucault, the archive is not an institution possessing the weight of tradition - the 
library outside time and place - but the ‘law of what can be said’. It is, ‘the system 
that establishes statements as events and things’ (Foucault, 1989: 123). 
Methodologically I wanted to explore how the archive reveals the rules of practice of 
what we can and can no longer say. In Montagu’s papers I encountered an 
unpublished compendium of ‘race’ sceptical and ‘race’ critical thought stretching 
centuries. Considering Montagu was widely published and commercially successful, 
why did this manuscript lay fallow? What does its non-publication tell us about 
postracialism in his time?  
 
I made the archival turn because that glimpse ‘behind the scenes’ was the only 
means of accessing the primary data needed to respond to the paucity of original 
research which can result in a body of theory detached from the processes and 
trajectories of its own history (Gidley, 2004). How can serious sociological theories 
and questions about the contemporary world be asked or proffered without historical 
questions (Abrams, 1982)? How can adequate theorizations and contentions not be 
couched in historical terms? 
 
2.3.2 Which Archives? Which Interviews? And why? 
 
In 2010 I generated a list of intellectuals integral to the development of 
postracialism. Through bibliographic snowballing I settled upon an intellectual 
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community from across the social and biological sciences. Their holdings were 
fortuitously centralised with repositories at Columbia University in New York, The 
American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia and the Moorland-Spingarn 
Research Centre in Washington D.C. During this time, I also attempted to secure an 
interview with C. Loring Brace, the evolutionary biologist who played a pivotal role 
in the dismantling of ‘race’ as a biological category (2005). Brace could have 
complimented my work through thick descriptions and a biographical exploration of 
that process. A concerted telephonic and e-mail effort to request an interview went 
unanswered. The ‘failed’ interview encapsulates the gap between the imagined 
research project and the missteps of actual social research. Challenges such as this 
force us to reflect on and think through methodological impediments (Law, 
2004:44). With the archives identified, I attended a research training course at the 
Institute for Historical Research which familiarised me with compiling a 
bibliography, using repositories and equipped me with effective research skills. I 
also learned practical skills such as working well with archivists and archival 
holdings. In short, the training enhanced my existing qualitative research skills. 
 
My Economic and Social Research Council recognised research training also 
equipped me with a skill set for approaching my interviews. In the interviews I 
wanted to respond to the dearth of engagement with postracial concepts and to 
explore the postracial problematic, framed by Gilroy, that ‘action against racial 
hierarchies can proceed more effectively when (it)…is purged of any lingering idea 
of ‘‘race’” (Gilroy, 2000:13)? Drawing on original data, this empirically informed 
and theoretically engaged thesis opens up a mutually beneficial dialogue for critical 
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reflection on antiracism asking when and why is ‘race’ necessary? In what 
conditions is it (in)defensible?  
 
Postracialism rejects racial concepts understanding them to support exclusionary 
practices such as discriminatory employment and hiring practices. Paradoxically, the 
concepts rejected under postracialism are needed in order to monitor these 
discriminatory practices. Longitudinal racial data is arguably entangled in reification 
and may even reinforce the damaging categories antiracism is attempting to 
challenge. Nevertheless, it provides the evidentiary basis of patterned inequality for 
developing corrective strategies and solutions. A foundational contradiction 
underscores the apparent divorce between postracialism and antiracism.  
 
Can the disconnect be remedied? Can postracialist insights enhance the effectiveness 
of antiracism? These questions guided me in identifying with whom I wanted to 
speak and in specifying what I wanted to explore. The interview data is principally 
concerned with investigating the implicit suggestion that (if possible) postracialism 
can enable a more efficacious antiracism. Questions explored the theoretical and 
practical efficacy of ‘race’ and investigated postracialism’s capacity to make 
possible resistance to racism. 
 
I contacted fifteen different organisations in London each involved in different 
aspects of antiracist work. Though the choice of organisations was my own, I sought 
guidance from ‘gate-keepers’ whose endorsement helped me to identify myself as a 
legitimate researcher, as well as triangulating my own views on who the relevant 
people within an organisation might be. My previous work with the Runnymede 
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Trust meant I was already familiar with institutional structures and key organisations 
in the field. Rob Berkeley, director of Runnymede, is the only interviewee who has 
not been anonymised. With his approval I named him because the interview data 
herein describes projects that would be immediately recognisable for anyone familiar 
with British antiracism. For those interviewees I did not know, an endorsement from 
my supervisor provided institutional imprimatur as did usage of a Goldsmiths email 
address to arrange the interview.  
 
Many interviewees were as interested in understanding my research as a source of 
knowledge for themselves as in providing data for me. With most organisations my 
university credentials, my supervisor’s support and in some cases my previous work 
or personal acquaintance with them seemed to identify me as a friendly researcher 
and my project as one they were interested in participating in and learning more 
about. For one organisation though my institutional capital and my existing 
connections did not work well and perhaps even operated as a barrier to access. The 
organisation’s deep commitment to intellectual autonomy and radical activism 
seemed to engender circumspection towards academic research or so it seemed in the 
email rejection. 
 
In many instances research participants appeared nervous in interviews with some 
confessing such explicitly. Part-way through an interview, even the most senior 
members of antiracist organisations might ask, ‘Is this alright? Is this what you 
wanted?’ or perhaps apologise for ‘rambling on’. In moments such as these I offered 
reassurance that I did not have a model answer which I ‘wanted’ them to articulate, 
and that I was glad that they were leading the conversation in the direction that was 
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most relevant to them. It is conceivable that participants might have had a suspicion 
that I could have ‘ulterior motives’. In my initial interview request letters and my 
face-to-face introduction I reassured interviewees that my recording and transcripts 
would not be shared with anyone and that extracts would be anonymised and that if 
interviewees wished any specific comments to remain completely confidential they 
had only to say so. I also explained that the research was to understand the potential 
insights that postracialisms could contribute to antiracism and not an exercise to find 
‘right answers’ or ‘best practice’- or indeed bad practice.  
 
Nevertheless, perhaps a mutual distrust or antagonism between theory and practice 
created the feeling in certain instances that my presence was seen as potentially a 
‘checking up’ exercise. Non-replies and cancellations left me with five organisations 
all under the ‘race’ equality umbrella, each nevertheless had a focused approach; 
three worked in social policy, one in direct activism and the final was a think tank. In 
accordance with British Sociological Association ethical codes I have anonymised 
the organisation and the speaker to protect them from breaches of confidentiality. 
 
Data collection followed the principles of the semi-structured interview. Interviews 
were sites of prepared conversational interaction structured by research concerns. 
During the interviews I used an active-follow up strategy consisting of questions and 
statements in the idiolect of the research encounter to enable respondents to impose 
their own system of understanding. It was challenging to develop a language for 
having a sophisticated discussion on the moral and political dilemmas associated 
with ‘race’ that would not disable communication. This was a case in point for 
Back’s argument that as, ‘our discipline has become ever more elaborate and 
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theoretically complex the impulse to communicate has been eclipsed by the desire 
for epistemological sophistication and theoretical elegance’ (2007:8).  
 
As I progressed through the interviews I began to modify my questions - analysing 
them in real time to be reflexive and to improve practice. I discovered early how 
postracialism could easily be misunderstood as colourblindness rhetoric and/or the 
declining significance of ‘race’ discourse. The discussion is very abstract and 
involves a sophisticated conversation about ‘race’ and racism. Miscommunications 
and misunderstandings threatened to take the interview into an entirely different 
direction than I had envisioned from my central research question. Gradually I was 
able to clarify how I was using the term and what the critiques were ‘really saying’ - 
all part of becoming a reflective practitioner. 
 
The analytical themes organising the chapters emerged from the data. To organise 
my data, I created ‘codes’ according to the themes within the qualitative data 
analysis programme NVivo. NVivo enabled me to systematically apply these codes to 
the transcripts as I re-read each one in turn. In the process of coding, additional 
themes emerged inductively and I created new codes for them to aid the organisation 
of the data. It is worth noting that as I coded my data much of the data was given 
several codes. Perhaps a different methodology would have investigated systematic 
correlations between codes (Fielding, 2002: 165). Not a technique to scientise this 
data, my coding functioned as a research tool for thinking about the data, for 
organising my thoughts and interpretations, and my data became my own coded 
archive. 
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In transcribing fifteen hours of interview material I became extremely familiar with 
the detail of the material and its broader themes. When thinking about emerging 
themes throughout my analysis, I was able to refer back to the coded archive to 
locate material I recalled as significant. Having the archive organised in this manner 
also enable me to re-read juxtaposed sets of interview material from different 
participants, thereby creating a different context for pieces of data than when 
embedded in their own individual interview transcripts.   
 
My interviewing method was largely wedded to a receptive mode of interviewing 
predicated on minimalist interviewer intervention. The interaction would begin with 
a single question to induce a narrative then move to focused issues through questions 
of clarification. Adherence to a ‘principle of deliberate vagueness’ (Wengraf, 
2006:124) enabled the respondent to impose her own system of relevance. 
 
2.3.3 Methodological Issues in Researching Postracialism 
 
Primary research on postracialism must negotiate the complexities of ‘race’ as 
something other than a dispassionate sociological concept. ‘Race’ involves the 
subjective attachments and investments of individuals. ‘Race’ is not just confined to 
the terrain of knowledge production. Racial categories also affect our ontologies 
(Gunaratnam, 2004). Many of my interviewees, for example, described their 
involvement in antiracist work through narratives about the experience of racism and 
the need to contest the dehumanisation and violence of racial prejudice. Their 
involvement and investment in antiracist work was not reducible to political 
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commitments or professional dedication alone. Research in postracial debates can 
create vulnerabilities for the researcher as well as the researched. Gunaratnam writes: 
 
The fundamental problematic of interpretation…is that it is always a risky, emotion-
laden and ethical business…[to] practise our…crafts in ways that aspire to the 
honing of technique and skill and that give recognition to our being touched…while 
all the time remaining faithful and vulnerable to the unknown (2009:59). 
   
Emotions are embodied response to situations (Sayer, 2005: 37) attached to 
commitments which mean something to the individual and which are part of the self-
not just a preference. Emotions, in the context of research into postracialism, should 
be taken seriously. In some interviews commitments came into conflict (professional 
and political) and the tension produced an emotional response as much as a rational 
or articulated one. Researchers should not be surprised if difficult subjects like 
imagining the end of ‘race’ create situations in which individuals feel uncomfortable. 
And we should not necessarily dismiss this discomfort as self-indulgent or self-
protecting.  
 
As sociologists we might usefully reflect on and take into account what provokes 
such emotional reactions and how these reactions can motivate action including 
within postracial projects. Although there is not space for a more rigorous discussion 
it may be worthwhile for future postracialist research to perhaps direct attention to 
the ways that affect and emotion inform social action and interaction and refract 
political behaviours. Attention to this is crucial not to produce empathy for the 
subjects whose emotional and emotive negotiations are at stake, but to concentrate 
on how this emotional filter comes to dominate discourse, process and action 
because of a particular moment of political and social formations, and how such a 
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filter (as a result of these formations) then informs and inflects the types of political 
and social action that is possible (Ahmed, 2004b; Sayer, 2005).  
 
Even in this small-scale project it was evident that emotions cannot be dismissed as 
inherently conservative or unthinking. Where a settlement is reached to cope with an 
oppressive situation emotions can function in conservative roles but they can also 
provoke resistance to dominant norms (Sayer, 2005:100). Emotional complexes - as 
Berlant describes in relation to compassion - have, ‘powerfully material and personal 
consequences’ (2004:11), whether progressive or conservative. Emotions and the 
emotionally uncomfortable positions of doing research on postracialism are worthy 
of study not simply as an experience within the self, but for their impact on social 
relations (Skeggs, 2002:350). 
 
Respondents and I spoke not from stable and coherent standpoints but from varied 
perspectives - structured and historically grounded roles and hierarchies of British 
society, particularly gendered, ‘raced’ and classed. How social positions emerged in 
the interview itself - apparent in talk and interaction between interviewer and 
respondent - was significant. Several of my respondents often moved between 
different social positions speaking in one instance as a victim of racial abuse then as 
women living in a sexist world (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). I approached the 
interview encounters as a constructed space in which I took seriously what the 
respondents shared. I did not dismiss their articulations as simple self-justifications 
(‘they would say that wouldn’t they’). At the same time I did not understand the 
interview transcript to be a straightforward explanation of ‘how it really is’. Taking 
the interview encounter seriously means understanding it as a negotiation in which 
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both the interviewer and interviewee reflect on and reproduce elements of the 
process of doing antiracist work and the self-making process. In this sense the 
interview provided concentrated access to such negotiations in process, rather than 
an unquestioned or unquestionable explanation of the situation (Jones, 2011) 
 
Interviewing leading officials in antiracist organisations did not easily slot into the 
methodological discussions of researching ‘up’ or ‘down’. My research participants 
are powerful and could most certainly be considered ‘elite’ in that they are opinion 
formers and being researched precisely because they are influential and powerful. 
Their elite status was in many cases directly comparable to that of the academic. In a 
few instances they may have been colleagues; or the same person may cross 
‘between worlds’ at different points. In my project I attempted to carve out a space 
between the assumption that power needs to be shared with the research participants 
and that the researcher is manipulated by the participants. I attempted to negotiate 
this position by paying close attention to the research participants’ accounts, being 
clear about the contexts of these accounts and explaining the grounds for my analysis 
and findings within the thesis so that they can remain open to challenge from the 
reader. 
 
2.3.4 Constraints & Power in the Archive and the Interview 
 
In many ways archival and interview work contested the conventional research 
sensibilities I developed in my research training. What you find determines what you 
can analyse and what you analyse structures what you look for in archival collections 
and what probing questions you ask in the interview (Wengraf, 2006). Archival 
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investigations and qualitative interviewing cannot be predicted or neatly packaged in 
guaranteed methodological formulas. The archives proved a series of perpetual 
surprises and intrigues. Similarly in avoiding leading questions, the interview 
became a site for potential surprise. At times I confirmed and in other moments 
disturbed my own speculative understanding of what ‘existed’. The possibility of 
disturbance or confirmation reflected the speculative nature of my research methods. 
 
Propelled by the deductive reasoning that a ‘richer’ story illuminating the history of 
postracialism lay in dusty manuscripts and in the ‘on-the-ground-view’ of antiracist 
organisations I made the qualitative turn with no certitude about the destination of 
that intellectual course. Uncertainty engendered an unending reflexivity and prepared 
me for discovery and disappointment. The odyssey into the unknown was rewarding 
in its challenging puzzles and unexpected revelations. In Montagu’s letters I 
encountered a series of exchanges with L.C. Dunn detailing how his anti-‘race’ 
position negatively impacted upon his professional career and weighed heavily on 
his interpersonal relationships. These exchanges textured the history of ideas and 
provided a rich context for understanding social and political backdrops. Similarly an 
interviewee stressed racism as the determinant force in (re)creating ‘race’  
demonstrating a keen awareness of the biological non-reality of ‘race’ and the 
(re)production of ‘race’ in racism. 
 
Archives are not just storehouses of aging rare materials. The archive is a 
multifaceted space - irreducible to the sum of its materials it exerts a two-fold power. 
On one hand, the holdings provided in-depth empirical data. On the other, the 
institutional apparatus of the archive subjected me to various technologies of power 
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(Ketelaar, 2002). The search room of the Rare Books and Manuscripts library 
functioned as a classical panopticon. Accessing the room itself involved a host of 
policing measures – registering, signing a statement of compliance, leaving my 
personal belongings behind before entering and obliging to have my possessions 
inspected upon exiting. A network of uniformed security personnel, CCTV cameras 
and archivists formed an enveloping gaze. Initially the experience of reading while 
being carefully observed, seen, heard and recorded was anxiety-inducing.  
 
In a related sense the interviews as communicative events occurring within a given 
social setting created its own set of circumstances. To manage the inevitable power 
balances I tried to select neutral social locations and timed the interview outside of 
normal working hours. In the interview we do not inhabit just one social role as 
‘research interviewer’ but rather carry a bundle. Like the archive, the interview 
involves its own set of power asymmetries that emerge through ‘metacommunicative 
norms’ - principles that invest the interviewer with control over the reverential 
content of what is said (by posing questions) the length and scope of answers (by 
deciding when to probe) and the way that all participants construct positionality with 
respect to the interview (Briggs, 2002).  
 
In designing my interviews I researched the interviewees’ biographies to understand 
what collective history we might share and the histories I imagine we might not 
share. For example, one of my interviews had completed her PhD at an institution 
with which I was familiar. I made use of that prior to the interview to create some 
familiarity and relax our discussion. Throughout the interviews I strove to stay 
sensitive to the unofficial goals and purposes of the interview doing my best to 
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understand that conversation is artful by interpreting the hints, clues, silences and the 
fluctuating power balance between the interviewee and I (ibid). 
 
In the archives I encountered more constraints and limitations when I wanted to 
photocopy Boas’ lecture notes at the APS. Photocopying is conducted solely by 
archival staff. At the Moorland-Spingarn Research Centre viewing Locke’s fragile 
correspondence required the acceptance of more intense surveillance including a 
solitary viewing room. The system of archival surveillance and discipline is 
ingrained in the archivist’s professional distrust of anyone other than archivists 
(Ketelaar, 2002). Issues of power inevitably raise political questions about 
ownership, inclusion and preservation. The archive is an active site where social 
power is negotiated, contested and confirmed (Brown & Davis-Brown, 1998). 
Memory and history are not found but (re)made. Documents are not ‘simple truths’ 
or empty templates (Foucault, 1989). Inside the reading room I often ruminated on 
these Foucauldian impulses reflecting on how a text is chosen and shaped, privileged 
or marginalised by archivist’s interventions. Had the holdings been catalogued to 
reflect an original order or rather to better reflect some ‘truth’ the archivist sought to 
elicit? 
 
Similarly meaning in the interviews was not only located in the words but the voice 
and tone in which they were delivered. Analysing the words alone would produce an 
impoverished sense of meanings neglecting how words are said and the rich 
complexity offered by the insights of paralinguistics. The use of irony to subvert 
meaning and the hesitations and declarations formed styles and modes of delivery 
that were central to unpacking the meaning of particular statements. Similarly non-
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verbal forms of communication such as shifting and moving about in the chair were 
part of a non-verbal language communication through infra-auditory channels. The 
interview, in other words, is not just a speech-event but a whole-context event.   
 
Much literature on archives focuses on technical issues such as implementing 
archival standards and record-keeping requirements and reflects the persistent 
legacies of positivism. With the proliferation of a postmodernist sensibility a new 
openness, a new visibility - a willingness to question and be questioned, a 
commitment to self-reflection - is slowly taken root (Cook and Schwartz, 2002: 
182). Crucial to my methodology was appreciating that no archivist is ever neutral in 
any documentary process nor is any ‘text’ a transparent window to some past reality. 
Everything takes place within a context; inside of that context, everything is filtered, 
mediated, or influenced by considerations of discourse, personal psychology and 
power (Cook and Schwartz, 2002:183).  
 
In the interviews I constantly reflected on what inferences I could or could not make 
from the ‘facts’ of the interview. Interviewees were meaning makers not passive 
conduits for retrieving information from a vessel of answers (Holstein and Gubrium, 
1995). Pressing myself to justify and explain how I made such inferences involved 
asking; what can I learn from this data? In analysing the interviews I attempted to 
identify the ‘deep structure’ underlying the ‘surface performance’ of the things 
actually said. In reviewing the data I would reflect on what the organising principles 
of the flow of talk in the interview were. For example, the significance of any one 
response cannot be gauged without understanding the implications of the question 
for the production of that response.    
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The research process engenders a unique set of structural constraints. Archivists 
wield considerable power over holdings as I learned when denied access to Barzun’s 
‘closed stacks’. Unlike library benefactors, archival donors (and literary executors) 
frequently retain rights over deposited materials (Hill, 1993). Barzun’s proprietary 
controls forced me to refigure my research itinerary and raised methodological issues 
of access (Gidley, 2004). Having contacted the archivists in advance and introduced 
them to my project, access was generally easy.  
 
Archival collections are non-circulating collections. Access required travelling to the 
research sites (Scott, 1990). Online digital finding aids enabled me to remotely 
browse holdings and to explore a network of indexes. This digital advancement 
lessened traditional constraints on access. The absence of the digital finding aid at 
Howard University was a conspicuous reminder of the uneven distribution of 
financial resources. One of the world's largest repositories for the documentation of 
the history and culture of people of African descent in Africa, the Americas, and 
other parts of the world, the Moorland-Spingarn Research Centre has recently 
experienced massive funding cuts and staff redundancies. The combination of 
reductions in funding and employee layoffs threatened the 95 year old institution 
with closure in 2009.
4
  
 
As a London resident, I unavoidably faced certain spatiotemporal contingencies 
including the time and expense of travel, food and lodging in the USA. Structural 
constraints were mitigated by sufficient time (research leave) and finances (grant 
                                               
4 http://www.thehilltoponline.com/moorland-spingarn-set-to-stay-open-1.2058120 (accessed 14 
February 2011) 
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money). Financial and spatiotemporal limitations illustrate how access to 
information - and thus knowledge - is shaped by the allocation of wealth, income and 
other resources (Cook, 1993). My decision to pursue this methodological project 
reflected a realistic appraisal of anticipated constraints.  
 
2.3.5 The Sociological Imagination in the Archive & the Interview 
 
Archival repositories challenge and extend methods of finding and collecting data. 
Accessing unpublished materials enabled me to document and explicate the lives, 
ideas and institutional embeddedness of key thinkers. As C. Wright Mills put it, ‘We 
have come to see that the biographies of men and women, the kinds of individuals 
they variously become, cannot be understood without reference to the historical 
structures in which the milieu of their everyday life are organised’ (1959:158). I used 
the sociological imagination in order to explore the dynamic relationship between 
society and biography in the context of non/postracialisms. Exploring the traces of 
these thinkers through this intimate lens offered insights into the myriad institutional 
processes in which they themselves were ensnared.   
 
I participated, like my respondents, in the interview from historically grounded 
biographical as well as disciplinary perspectives. Biographical perspectives in some 
instances framed entire analyses and even affected the selection of illustrative 
quotes. The biographical material expressed in my interviews draws from and is 
mediated by experiences from well beyond the interview situation and any one 
respondent’s life. Where interpretations of interview data are concerned, I was not 
concerned with reporting my findings but with linking the biographical with the 
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social and historical. Research practices that respect and reveal the social world of 
the lived subject are an important procedural step toward decomposing ‘standards’ 
into the variety of historically and socially relevant experiences that characterise a 
diverse society (Dunbar, Rodriguez and Parker, 2002).  
 
Making sociohistorical sense out of the documents proved an emergent process, 
much of my reflexive learning actually transpired in working with the documents. 
Spatiotemporal chronologies of networks and cohorts helped to organise materials 
and structure my research. While not revelatory, the strategies made seeing patterns 
and relationships easier. Biographies unfold over time and combing over personal 
papers I reconstructed a chronology of sociohistorical events. In time I developed 
some necessarily partial biographical timelines. These chronologies reflected my 
assumptions, convictions, and subsequent decisions about what to include and what 
to exclude. 
 
In archival research, interpretation and selection go hand in hand as one 
distinguishes the important from the irrelevant (Hill, 1993). I paid specific attention 
to dates of events documenting the subject’s entry into new roles and institutional 
arenas, changes in her status within a particular setting and her involvement in any 
roles that promoted cooperation or conflict between distinct spheres. I used a variety 
of materials - scrapbooks, passports, etc. - to trace their journeys. Correspondence 
with friends, colleagues and relatives provided clues to the rhythm of their lives. The 
chronologies were open-ended research vehicles that I repeatedly updated to 
articulate the subject’s biographical journey (Dean, 1994). Parallel comparisons of 
cohorts revealed previously unrecognised patterns. For example, Alain Locke and 
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Franz Boas attenuated the severity of their critiques of ‘race’ to preserve jobs and 
secure upward advancement. In the face of draconian First World War censorship, 
both made strategic choices in favour of pressing their critiques further. 
 
Comparisons helped identify anomalies and information gaps in the chronologies of 
cohorts. With more extensive chronologies I was able to pose and think through 
more sophisticated questions and to reflect on how the decision to document, 
describe, to make visible, to remember or to forget is positioned within and is shaped 
by larger forces that contest the terrain of social memory. Personal histories, 
institutional cultures, class relations etc. are always-already at play in processes of 
records description and in the interview. The archivist and the institutional value 
system select what to highlight and what to ignore (Duff and Harris, 2002).  
 
Equipped with this I explored in my preparatory notes the influential relationships 
between particular academics and showed how specific individuals exemplified 
various patterns of organisational participation. I traced the linkages by asking who 
of the new names I encountered and always connecting the frequency and nature of 
the individual to my target. In my exploration I was wary of the process of 
serialisation which archivists can use to bring the appearance of coherence to 
otherwise fragmentary pieces; an illusion known as the  ‘trick of truth’. Through the 
formal archival process hearsay can acquire the status of fact sounding like truth 
through the use of specific modes of writing and filing (Gidley, 2004). 
 
Strategic choices usually in support of metanarratives also show the archive to be a 
site where social memory is constructed. Archivist mediation in setting standards, 
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preserving, cataloguing and contextualising the record is important in shaping that 
meaning. No passive guardian of an inherited legacy, the archivist has an active role 
in shaping societal memory. Equally, no text is a mere innocent by-product of action. 
The ‘fact’ in a text cannot be separated from its ongoing and past interpretation. 
Power relationships shape the documentary heritage and indeed the document’s 
structure. My methodology explored how the text is anchored in historical power 
relations, how knowledge is organised and how discursive hegemonies operate. 
Beyond questions of political (mis)use of archives there exists a practice of archival 
politics, the ‘micro-physics of power’ in collection, classification, storage, 
processing and transfer (Foucault, 1989).  
 
Grasping archival data is an iterative process of imputing meaning through repeated 
reconsideration of older data combined with the constant infusion of new data (Dean, 
1994). The intellectual and historical significance of materials shifts continually 
during the investigation. Particular aims initially identified as interests come to frame 
part of an evolving sociohistorical picture as was the case with my ‘discovery’ of 
Hubert Harrison. Methodologically, I remained open to alternative modes of making 
sense of the traces residing in the archives. The archive never speaks to us as a thing 
in and of itself. It speaks through the specificities of particular relations of power and 
societal dynamics. Never a faithful reflection of reality memory is (re)shaped and 
(re)figured by the dance of imagination (Harris, 2002). Asking how it may otherwise 
be organised, what is missing and what channels are missing were Foucauldian 
inspired questions of interpretation and deciphering.  
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Throughout my research I grappled with the ethical issues inherent in the production 
of knowledge and the politics of doing research on ‘race’ (Bulmer & Solomos, 
2004). Working with and against ‘race’ involves the challenging task of thinking 
through the complexities, ambiguities and contradictions involved in doing 
qualitative research which seeks to recognise difference and pursue justice. 
Methodologically it proved challenging to use qualitative data to contest and 
transform, rather than to reproduce, ‘race’ and racial thinking. An un-problematised 
reliance upon categorical approaches to ‘race’, presents obvious and fundamental 
methodological dangers (Gunaratnam, 2004: 18).  
 
But equally challenging is resisting in discussions of (post)racialism the pull of 
‘race’ to overwhelm, to make postracialism complicit with racial thinking and 
reification. The doubled research practice of working both with and against 
categories is no easy task with the historically persistent and discursively pervasive 
category of ‘race’ (Gunaratnam, 2004). The central methodological problem I 
encountered was to generate and excavate from this entangled past a present and 
perhaps even a future where ‘race’ can be put to rest. While this obstacle was not 
entirely resolved, this research locates itself in an emergent tradition that refuses the 
commonsensical approach that produces straightforward and generalizable 
knowledge about ‘race’ often under the appearance of progressivism. The next 
chapter maps the lineage of this emergent tradition of non/postracialism and locates 
my own project within that intellectual heritage. 
 
69 
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review  
 
 
(Proto)Postracialism(s) span centuries, continents and boundaries of knowledge. 
Racialism and the counter-discourse of nonracialism formed during European 
modernity. The conceptual forerunner to postracialism, nonracialism opposed 
racialism through its historical mutations. Before continuing I will briefly restate 
racialism and nonracialism, two central concepts in this thesis. Racialism is the 
ideological system produced by racism, the essentialising and reifying discourse 
used to justify and explain exclusionary practices. Nonracialism, conversely, rejected 
racialism’s assessments of worth and naturalised difference on philosophical, 
political, scientific, religious and spiritual grounds. Biological categorisation 
according to the immutability of ‘race’ did not feature in these frameworks for 
human origins and physical variation. ‘Race’ as a category of natural and social 
recognition did not exist. 
 
 Nonracialism finds epistemological grounding for human sameness in philosophical 
(universalism), political (natural rights), scientific (species unity) religious 
(Christian) and spiritual (holism) distinctions. Difference moved along cultural, 
political and religious axes. Globalised and centuries-old, nonracialism incorporated 
and expanded arguments and evidence from philosophy, biology, anthropology, and 
theology. Small wonder, it represented a complex and contradictory ideological 
system.  
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This chapter critically surveys the seminal thinkers and critiques of nonracialism and 
postracialism. The critical survey contains a description of previous work while also 
identifying leading concepts, definitions and theories that have informed 
nonracialism and postracialism. The review also considers the way in which ‘new’ 
definitions and critiques were developed and operationalized as solutions to 
problems seen in previous research. To situate my own intervention in postracialism 
I will use this chapter to both identify and describe dimensions of the debate that 
other researchers have considered important. Through these descriptions I will also 
discuss some of what I contend to be shortcomings, tensions or potential areas for 
further analysis to be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
In (re)constructing the historical fragments of nonracialism I explore how the 
ideology rejected racialism and presented a counter-hegemonic paradigm that laid 
the foundation for postracialism. In tracing the conjunctures of non/postracialism, the 
history I assemble will not be a linear one. Thinking with the conjuncture - an 
historical interruption and a conceptual reconfiguration where one field of argument 
is displaced by another - involves jumping over periods where social formations 
were not conflictual, constantly in search of temporary balances through processes of 
negotiation (Scott, 2005).  
 
I have organised the diffuse literatures of non/postracialism into three historical 
periods - subdivided thematically and arranged chronologically. The phases map 
paradigmatic shifts in the central concerns and extensiveness of the critiques. The 
first encompasses the (pre)history of ‘race’ before the 18th century ending at the start 
of the 20
th
. The second begins in the 20
th
 century and stretches through to the 1980s. 
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The final period spans from the 1980s to today and includes a developed discussion 
of what I am consolidating under the term contemporary postracialism.  
 
3.1 Before ‘Race’ 
 
16
th
 century ‘voyages of discovery’ brought ‘Western’ explorers into contact with 
scores of diverse cultures. In the encounter with the ‘Other’ who differed historically 
and in pattern(s) of development, discussions of her ontological and historical status 
arose (Hall, 1996). Not yet a usable or consistent concept, ‘race’ was discursively 
absent (Mosse, 1978). The conceptual antecedents of ‘race’ (i.e. what constituted a 
‘human’), however, were present (Snowden, 1970). In medieval Spain, for example, 
autocrats enacted blood laws (limpiezas de sangre) to stigmatise converted Jews and 
Muslims who faced exile, imprisonment and even death.  
 
Legislated population management limited ‘crossing’ between Moor and European 
preserving a ‘pure’ line uncontaminated by ‘foreign’ corpuscles (Davis, 2001). The 
application of (proto)biological concerns to political boundary-making would 
become an organising principle in racialism. But in this moment, identity operated 
with flexibility and ambivalence unlike the scientific certitudes of racialism to come. 
The Spanish Inquisition and genocidal practices such as the extermination of the 
Aztecs comprise part of the nefarious histories of proto-racial thinking. Justifications 
for the expropriation of land and the requisition of ‘free’ labour relied on these 
discourses projecting a lack of intellectual faculties and morality onto the ‘Other’ 
(Poliakov, 1974). Moral and cultural ascriptions over-determined the ‘Other’ as 
incapable of reason and faith occupying a sub-human rank in the scale of creation.  
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Racialism was underwritten by presuppositions about the unalterable nature of racial 
others, and their status in the natural world. The (non)possession of rationality 
determined who was accorded moral treatment (Hobbes, 1651/ 2009; Locke, 
1689/1966). Rational capacity set limits upon the natural equality of humanity and 
circumscribed political participation. This short historicisation gives some context 
for Descartes’ pronouncement; ‘Because reason…is the only thing that makes us 
men, and distinguishes us from the beasts, I would prefer to believe that it exists, in 
its entirety in each of us…’(1637/1961:222). Descartes’ statement of the equal 
distribution of reason commands recognition for its implicit call for full moral 
treatment and political inclusivity.  
  
Cartesian humanism is an oft-overlooked predecessor to the Hegelian consensus 
which concretised racialism by ranking the species in racial terms. Hegel froze the 
‘African’ in pre-political being (Hegel, 1892/1991). The binaries introduced in and 
extrapolated from Hegel’s philosophy rationalised European capitalism and 
brutalised humanity by reducing it to an obstacle in the path to progress. It was in 
this context that the economic and political domination of Africans appeared a 
necessary moral task.  
 
Recalling Locke’s endorsement of slavery (‘Negro’ irrationality), the assertion of the 
universal possession of reason is considerable. Slavery became defensible when 
based on a ‘just war’ in which captured ‘Negroes’ must forfeit their claim to life 
(Locke, 1689/1966). With grave stakes, the magnitude of these objections is 
appropriately established. Although ‘race’ did yet not denote visible, biological 
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identity these objections remain a vital chapter in nonracialism. Contemporary 
postracialist humanisms (Eze, 2001) duly establish Descartes in this heritage. The 
critique of proto-racialist concepts would continue to strengthen paralleling racialism 
as it garnered conceptual shape in the 18th century.  
 
3.2 Dissonances in Modernity 
 
Some have thought fit to employ the term race for four or five divisions 
originally made in consequence of country or complexion: but I see no reason for 
this appellation. Race refers to a difference of origin, which in this case does not 
exist…In short, there are neither four nor five races, nor exclusive varieties on 
this Earth. Complexions run into each other: forms follow the genetic character: 
and upon the whole, all are at last but shades of the same great picture, extending 
through all ages and over all parts of the Earth. They belong not, therefore, so 
properly to systematic natural history, as to the physic-geographical history of 
man (Herder, 1784/1997:298). 
 
 
Johann Herder (1744-1803) argued that ‘race’ lacked scientific credibility and 
remained analytically irrelevant to the philosophy of history. It is, however, difficult 
to ascertain a straightforward Herderian ‘position on race’ because of the 
fragmentary and contradictory nature of his corpus. There is no definitive text to 
consult for transparent position statements. Herder’s disavowal though conflicted did 
provoke a debate with his erstwhile teacher, Kant, who endorsed racialism as the 
structuring framework for Anthropology. 
 
Herder dismissed Kantian racial essentialism instead affirming the anti-essentialist 
singularity of humankind (Schutze, 1921: 362). Herder maintained species 
singularity established a fraternity that should always be respected. This position was 
connected to his rejection of ‘race’ as an ‘ignoble word’ (Herder, 1800:150). Sharp 
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categorical divisions, Herder feared, were likely to support oppressive treatment. 
Herder’s anti-race position is not without its own contradictions. An explicit 
opposition to Eurocentric judgments remains incongruent with aesthetic evaluations 
based on implicit Eurocentric criteria - of which he seemed to be unaware. Most 
notably his association (equation?) of China with despotism and insularity painted a 
distorted picture of almost every facet of its culture and history (Herder, 1997). 
 
 Herder’s renunciation synthesised ancient science with recent discoveries in 
anatomy and physiology. Herder’s studied examination of the iniquitous 
implications of ‘race’ is a formative antiracialist statement uttered at the apex of 
European imperialism discrediting the ‘civilizing mission’ and assumed European 
superiority. Herder also incorporated the science of the natural historian Georges 
Buffon (1707-1778). Historically Linnaean taxonomy enabled the development of 
‘race’ as a workable scientific concept. Buffon criticised Linnaean classifications as 
arbitrary catalogues unreflective of the continuous gradations in nature – loosening 
the racialist emphasis on value (Bernasconi, 2001:116). Buffon’s conception of 
‘race’ included inconsistent positions - although human varieties were capable of an 
indefinite quantity and quality of change over numerous generations, individuals 
born in presently existing types (folk ‘races’) did have innate characters (akin to 
racial essences) which remained fixed during their lifetimes. 
5
  
 
Buffon facilitated the transition from Platonism (unconscious striving toward 
metaphysical destiny) to biology in shedding some of the racialist residues of 
immutability and eternalness. This initiated the shift away from essences to the 
                                               
5 CF. the section, ‘Varieties dans l’espece humain’ in Buffon’s ‘Histoire naturelle de l’homme’ 
  (1749) (Buffon 1853, 2,pp. 137-221) 
75 
 
contention that only organisms are real. That contribution helped to establish an 
intellectual space for appreciating the scientific import of the absence of sharp 
morphological gaps albeit within the terms of debate predominant in Enlightenment 
intellectual circles. Here a strong condemnation of the African slave trade coexisted 
with the suggestion that ‘Negroes’ were naturally less intelligent (Buffon, 1853 vol. 
2:189). Nature’s continuous line of imperceptible gradations encouraged the 
rejection of the generalising trends of racialism (Hull, 1967: 322).  
 
Buffon’s rule - a species consists of a succession of individuals who procreate to 
produce fertile young - affirmed species unity and the fertility of ‘mulattoes’. Both 
would become powerful tools in later critiques of ‘race’. For Buffon, phenotypic 
diversity - commonly (mis)understood as essentialised difference - signified the 
slow, imperceptible modification of the human by temperature, the transmissibility 
of the characteristics thus acquired, and the general correlation of latitude and skin 
colour (Buffon, 1749/1997). This reinforced the scientific credibility of 
environmentalism and inveighed against the racialist tenet that visible difference 
reflected an innate essence. Colour difference was superficial difference and the 
mutability of form, part and parcel of the human constitution (Buffon, 1749/1997: 
481-484, 511-514.).  
 
Buffon also aided in discrediting racist hierarchy by theorising ‘race’ as superficial 
difference. Buffon, however, did not discard ‘race’ although he refused to introduce 
a determinate concept preferring to acknowledge its continued imprecision. The 
science - part of a larger humanist project of peace - supplied evidence for nonracial 
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humanism, recognised human biological interconnectedness and questioned 
doctrines of superiority.  
 
Thomas Jefferson’s (1743-1826) impassioned rejoinder offers a historical snapshot 
for grasping the contentiousness of Buffon’s arguments (Jefferson, 1781/1943). 
Jefferson assailed these democratic implications asserting the aesthetic superiority of 
white women - preferred by black men as uniformly as the orang-utan prefers 
‘Negro’ women. From such racist premises indebted to Linnaeus frontispiece 
discussed in my introduction, Jefferson advocated eugenic practices and decried 
miscegenation. Humanity was hierarchised by ‘race’ which explained the ‘Negroes’ 
inferior power of reason (Jefferson, 1781/1943: 662). Through Jefferson’s riposte – 
‘race’ was the organising concept of the geo-political order of modernity - we might 
glimpse the larger implications of Buffon’s work.  
 
Against Jeffersonian typology, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) emphasised the 
individual and stressed the significance of variation. The individual, an organism 
governed by the unpredictability of natural selection, enabled the exhaustive 
appreciation of nonracialist intra-species variety. Darwin’s focus on complexity 
coupled with historicism problematised the extra-environmental status of ‘race’: 
The variability of all the characteristic differences between the races, before referred 
to, likewise indicates that these differences cannot be of much importance; for had 
they been important, they would long ago have been either fixed, and preserved or 
eliminated (1871: 249). 
 
Scrutinising grand typologies Darwin noted the conceptual imprecision of ‘race’ and 
spotlighted the indeterminacy of ‘race’ (1871: 223). The hazy border of ‘race’ was 
no border at all. Darwin weakened racialism as a scientifically convincing system 
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without completely rejecting ‘race’. The Descent of Man renounced bigotry, affirmed 
the need for self-critique and cross-cultural interaction and called for expanding the 
circle of human sympathy. In considering Darwin historically we must be aware that 
the belief that peoples are genuinely varied in the degree and proportion of their 
human capacities and even that they can be hierarchically ordered as a result 
(Darwin endorsed both) is not logically incompatible with the belief that they should 
be treated decently. 
 
Darwinian science demonstrated natural selection produced abundant variation in 
every generation and so initiated the gradualist discrediting of permanent types 
(Mayr, 2001:491). Evolutionary theory emphasised the irrelevance of ‘race’: ‘But the 
most weighty (sic) of all the arguments against treating the races of man as distinct 
species, is that they graduate into each other, independently in many cases, as far as 
we can judge, of their having intercrossed’ (Darwin, 1871: 226). Assiduously 
collected evidence established the common origin of all life giving scientific proof of 
interrelatedness to theological nonracialism and secular ethics. Darwin also 
introduced history into scientific thinking a cross-fertilisation that fused ethical and 
scientific postulates into nonracialist arguments. The resulting conceptual system 
invalidated polygenism which maintained innately different ‘races’ - possessing 
specifiable moral, cultural and biological traits - originated in separate acts of 
creation. 
 
Natural selection and the explanatory significance of time also enabled the rejection 
of determinism, creationism and essentialism - hegemonic reinforcements of 
racialism (Banton, 1987:88). Evolving entities superseded stable types and created a 
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sophisticated language for making sense of the complexity of populational variation 
(Mayr, 2001). Evolutionary theory questioned the explanatory significance of ‘race’  
and generated innumerable problems forcing anthropologists working under the 
banner of racialism to acknowledge that those groups designated ‘races’ were 
usually political units of mixed origin and that natural selection showed types to be 
alterable and impermanent - pushing typology towards the dustbin of ideas (Banton, 
1998:86). Darwinism loosened the epistemic grip of ‘race’ and enabled the assertion 
of an empirically supported nonracialism. Of course Darwinian principles were also 
mobilised for explicitly racist ends in Social Darwinism. In this thesis I am not 
interested in situating Social Darwinism as a corruption of the progressive nonracial 
science of Darwinism but rather in pointing to how evidence can be mobilised in 
various political directions. 
 
3.2.1 Nonracial Universalisms 
 
In addition to secular critiques, Christians championed (hu)man’s singular biblical 
beginning described in Genesis - implicitly suggesting a nonracial humanity. 
Nonracial fraternity was common to 18
th
 century Quaker abolitionists (Benezet, 
1783) which held man possessed a physically and spiritually unified origin anathema 
to racial subdivision. Some refused racialism recovering conceptions of difference 
where religion and culture were salient. ‘Race’ as a social category was for many in 
contravention of scripture (Jordan, 1968: 279). Others implicitly dismissed racialism 
because of the evaluative assumptions (1) human (racial) types can be arranged 
hierarchically (2) such characteristics are impervious to religious conversion. In the 
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main, Quakerism believed humanity to be one family of equal worth and common 
origin. I will critically discuss Christian universalism in the next chapter.  
 
Secular universalisms such as Herder’s Humanitat eschewed purity and partition 
presenting a nonracialist pluralism dismissing cosmopolitan ‘citizens of the world’ 
as delusional ‘human shadows’ (1784/1997: 333). Herder’s nonracialism respected 
and preserved the particularisms of different cultures. The study of human difference 
therefore belonged, ‘not so properly to the systematic study of natural history, as to 
the physico-geographical history of humanity’(G 6:256, C 166). Thus there could not 
be a single standard which determines whether an individual is cultured. 
  
The cultural and moral essences of racialism were incongruent with his secular 
relativism. ‘As soon as it is shown that what I on the basis of reasons take to be true, 
beautiful, good, pleasant can likewise on the basis of reasons be regarded by another 
as false, ugly, bad, unpleasant,’ Herder wrote, ‘then truth, beauty and moral value is 
a true Proteus who by means of a magic mirror ever changes, and never shows 
himself the same’. (1784: 247). Herder’s revolutionary doctrine of cultural pluralism 
could not help but have ethical and political implications - an obvious ground for 
opposition to colonialism and imperialism. Herder’s relativism attempted to liberate 
humans from essences allowing the discovery of moral orientations within the 
horizons of particular cultures. Herder believed different societies and ages hold 
distinct systems of belief regarding what is good and bad, right and wrong. And 
there are no objective trans-historical cultural criteria for judging between these. The 
genuine valuing of cultural diversity preserved diversity without pluralism’s 
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blindness to difference. Herder’s relativism was a world yet-to-be, an imagining of 
life without the dictates of racialisation.  
 
3.2.2 Destabilising Racialism  
 
Herder’s utopianism was strengthened by earlier denaturalisations of slavery  
asserting slaves were legally constituted by social laws. Critics (Benezet, 1767) 
emphasised the legal construction and economic (re)production of ‘race’, an 
emphasis that refined future critiques. Dispelling racial essentialism the Quaker 
abolitionist, Anthony Benezet (1713-1784) highlighted how segregation and 
exclusion (re)produced Black slavery (ibid). Racial subdivision was also vigorously 
contested because it undermined Christendom. Benezet’s friend and fellow Quaker 
abolitionist John Woolman (1720-1772) attributed physical variety to social and 
environmental conditions stressing habituated social exclusion and subordination not 
racial essences were at the roots of inequality (Woolman, 1805).  
 
Quaker abolitionism was part of that mosaic of 18
th
 century revolutionary political 
ideology igniting the American struggle for independence. In this conjuncture, 
natural rights theory, environmentalism and revolutionary philosophy coalesced into 
an evanescent political indictment of racialism (Jordan, 1968). Racism was 
understood to be an unforgivable contradiction of inalienable rights. A racially 
stratified polity revealed the aporia of revolutionary rhetoric. How could democracy 
be furthered by such a narrow claim to liberty? David Cooper (1725-1795), another 
Quaker abolitionist, remarked upon the Declaration of Independence: 
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If these solemn truths, uttered at such an awful crisis, are self-evident: unless we 
can show that Africans are not men, words can hardly express the amazement 
which naturally arises on reflecting, that the very people who make these 
pompous declarations are slave holders, and, by their legislative conduct, tell us, 
that these blessings were only meant to be the rights of white men not of all 
men… (1783: 290). 
 
Cooper showed how natural rights discourse secularised equality extending 
Christendom to the political actor. Racialism was untenable not because it fractured 
spiritual union but because it (re)produced hierarchy and violated ‘natural’ rights. 
Slavery was a violation of political not Mosaic Law signalling a shift from a 
theological foundation (equal as candidates for immortality) to a secularised 
foundation (equally entitled to rights and privileges). Nonracial brothers in Christ 
were transubstantiated into nonracial sons of liberty due recognition and fair 
treatment as political beings. Questions of the scientific validity of ‘race’ were 
forever present in these debates. But it would be the increased interest in the science 
of ‘race’ in the early 20th century which would create the conditions for a more 
forceful contestation.  
 
3.3 20th Century ‘Race’ Science 
 
Early 20
th
 century critiques, indisputably more forceful than their predecessors, 
reveal a complex and uneven rejection. Differentiating between defenders and 
reformers of ‘race’ was not always straightforward as both often believed in the 
existence of mental or physical differences between the ‘races’. Confusion aside, the 
interregnum of war marks an important conjuncture when scientists across the 
disciplines documented the epistemological deficiency of ‘race’ and expressed 
empirical concerns with its endless inconsistencies and irresolvable contradictions.  
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The Boasians, an intellectual circle of cultural anthropologists based at Columbia 
University and working under the leadership of Franz Boas, repeatedly cited the lack 
of consistent racial indicators with which to establish a meaningful definition 
(Herskovits, 1928; Klineberg, 1935). Interwar critiques extended Enlightenment 
scepticism by directing attention to wider impacts - concentrating on how racial 
classifications became entangled with politicised categories such as national identity 
and events such as Jewish ghettoisation. Blighted by taxonomic chaos and the 
impossibility of formal categorisation, ‘race’ was put under searching critique by the 
Boasians. 
 
But equivocation in the critiques (re)produced much of the ambiguity and 
inconsistency in racialism. Equivocation and contradiction as will become clear 
throughout this thesis characterise much of nonracialism and postracialism. I will 
discuss a particularly illuminating example in the next chapter in relation to the 
mixed-race movement and white abolitionism. The interwar conjuncture witnessed 
not so much an unequivocal hostility to racial categorisation as it did see the rise of a 
new scientific timidity (‘race’/intelligence debate, see Klineberg, 1928) and an 
ethico-political hesitancy (Nazism, see Barzun, 1937) about drawing firm 
conclusions regarding racial difference. The accumulation of contradictions marks 
this conjuncture as a moment where a new problem-space was posed in relation to 
‘race’ which opened up possibilities for an ethical critique. These steps, although 
tentative, were nevertheless significant milestones in the deconstruction of racialism.  
 
3.3.1 Rejecting Racial Determinism and Formalism 
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Boas (1858-1942) laid the groundwork for the dismantling of ‘race’ by 
problematising ‘races’ as discrete units. Boasian anthropology gleaned evidence 
which rendered phenotypic differences inconsequential and offered a dynamic 
alternative to racial determinism. Anthropology before this culturalist turn was 
essentially physical, that is racial. Boasian anthropology rebutted racial determinism 
and contested the aetiological dominance of ‘race’.  
 
Through a fastidious exposition of culture, the Boasians unwound what was the 
unifying concept in anthropology (Benedict, 1942; Herskovits, 1941). The Boasians 
did not dismiss ‘race’ altogether but did succeed in prying the concept away from 
culture and disproving its causal relationship to intelligence. Stripping racialism of 
certitudes they staked an ethico-political territory from which credible, nonracialist 
arguments could be articulated and popularised in widely read texts and popular 
news media. Boas and his renown student Margaret Mead were published and 
discussed in the widely read periodical TimeMagazine for example (Baker, 2004). 
 
In the escalation preceding WWII, the cultural historian Jacques Barzun (1907-
2012), dismissed ‘race’ as ‘ethnic fiction’, explicitly engineered for political 
purposes (1937:198). Barzun cited Boas’ environmentalist investigations an 
intertexuality exemplifying the growing popularity of ‘race’-sceptical thought. In 
1935, with Germany gearing for a global ‘race’ war, the British scientists Julian 
Huxley (1887-1974) and Alfred Cort Haddon (1855-1940) published We Europeans: 
A Study of Racial Problems which explored the conceptual imprecision and 
definitional inconsistency of ‘race’. In a more unequivocal pronouncement they 
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described ‘race’ as, ‘a pseudo-scientific rather than a scientific term…with no 
precise and definable meaning’ (1935: 322).  
 
The critique of racial formalism (the exaggerated scientific concern for racial 
classification) was a composite of psychology and biometry (Boas, 1940). The 
Boasians established continued variance and transformation both of which would 
become key themes in later non/postracial formulations discussed in chapter seven in 
relation to postracial bioscience. Reflecting longstanding ethical concerns Boas 
cautioned against the reductivism linking cranial capacity to intellectual endowments 
and creating a naturalised hierarchy of inferiority. The success in contesting 
racialism is attributable to the shift from morphology to culture (Gosset, 1963). 
Critics warned that, ‘to interpret as racial character what is only an effect of social 
surroundings’ represented a cavalier determinism capable of naturalising egregious 
social conditions (Boas, 1911: 123). Racial formalism’s eventual decline came 
through the dynamic science of human biology and the challenge of the virtually 
unquestioned assumption of the stability of hereditary characteristics under any 
environmental conditions (ibid).  
 
Alain Locke (1885-1954) the American philosopher also detailed how anthropology 
could not isolate any static factors; ‘Really when the modern man talks about race, 
he is not talking about the anthropological or biological idea at all. He is really 
talking about the historical record of success or failure of an ethnic group’ (1992: 
133). This decisive rejection criticised racial formalism as mythic rationalisation and 
pointed to the determining role of history in constructing racial naturalism. Locke 
went beyond his contemporaries declaring ‘race’ fiction though preserving a thin 
85 
 
account as a political resource for progressive change. I will discuss critical forms of 
racial conservation more fully in my discussion of postracialism and ethics in chapter 
five.  
 
His scientific rejection would become indispensable to later nonracialisms. Barzun 
extended the critique illustrating how racism spills ‘race’ into culture. He dealt a 
coup de grace to racial formalism in noting the fallacy of exception, ‘If race is an 
unchanging factor which marks humans distinctively, it cannot break down at any 
point but race-mixing and intra-group racial variation clearly disproves this’ 
(Barzun, 1937: 144). Detractors echoed Locke dispelling phrenology and the 
spuriousness of racialist anthropology (Haddon & Huxley, 1935). Critiques exposed 
the tautology of racial reasoning and the absence of agreement as to what ‘race’ was 
or could be. In short, logical and principled argument enabled the steady 
deconstruction of racialism. 
 
3.3.2 Relativist and Methodological Interventions 
 
Relativists also dismantled racial formalism through a critique of the hierarchical 
cultural scales on which ‘races’ could be appraised. Above all, relativism offered an 
anti-essentialist understanding of groups - each group possessed value sets and 
practices valid on its own terms. Relativism provided an egalitarian theory of 
difference and developed analytic categories and evaluative standards that did not 
valorise Europe as the standard of perfectibility (see Boas, 1911). Relativist 
paradigms also refused Durkheim’s distinction of irrational/rational cultures using 
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more sophisticated understanding of the formative role of culture. Definitions of 
culture as unitary and bounded were not congruent these frameworks.  
 
Universally possessed, culture was understood as axiomatic evidence of a common 
and (formally) equal humanity. The scholarship of Locke (1992), Boas (1911) and 
Hogben (1936) demonstrated that purity was a racialist fantasy neither achievable 
nor desirable. In nonracialism the difference that mattered was cultural not biological 
(Stocking, 1982). Relativism shifted racial theory with its dismissal of biological 
determinism, its rejection of ethnocentric standards of evaluation and its appreciation 
of the role of unconscious social processes in the determination of behaviour (Adler, 
1911).  
 
In addition to epistemic challenges methodological interventions (i.e.historicism) 
utilised an antiracialist particularism focused on individual facts over broad 
categorisation. This approach dismissed the search for causal relations and if/then 
statements (Harris, 1968: 250). The idiographic method (‘in ethnology everything is 
individuality’) emphasised individual phenomena, not over-determined by ‘race’ 
(Boas, 1911: 77). General anthropological (read racial) laws, ‘will be necessarily 
vague, and we might say, so self-evident that they are of little help to a real 
understanding’ (Boas, 1940: 258).  
 
Historical emphasis discredited racialist grand narratives and re-humanised groups 
stripped of dignity through controlling racist representations. The Caribbean (St. 
Croix Danish West Indies) socialist Hubert Harrison (1883-1927), for example, 
recovered Egyptian contributions to the ascent of Greece challenging the folklore of 
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European self-creation and the myth of Africa as a cultural wasteland
6
. Decades 
before Martin Bernal’s Black Athena (1991), Harrison showed that the experiences 
of Black people were integral to modernity and global development. His scholarship 
criticised obsessions with racial purity and yielded a course of lessons about the 
instability of identities which are inescapably hybrid. 
 
Nonracialisms also subverted the methodologies of racial realism challenging ‘race’ 
in science where it had enjoyed almost unanimous support. For example, Boas 
successfully applied statistical methods to human metric variation demonstrating the 
importance of variation and discrediting typology (Boas, 1911). Investigations 
interrogated existing methods and discredited reliable racial indicators - debunking a 
longstanding taken-for-granted premise of ‘race’ science. Chapter seven will 
examine the contemporary expression of this science, postracial bioscience an 
integral part of the affirmative basis for ethico-political postracial projects.   
 
Under this emergent Boasian paradigm, culture and the environment replaced 
biology and behaviour as causal forces signposting the decline of biological 
determinism (Caspari, 2003:67). Methodological conflicts between biometricians 
and geneticists also facilitated the scientific decline of ‘race’ (Barkan, 1996). While 
neither championed an avowedly non-racial analysis, the mutual acceptance of new 
methodological ground-rules of population and inheritance analysis from the 
Darwinian synthesis eased the deconstruction of racialism (Schaffer, 2005). Many 
assessments of this literature overstate the radical depth of contributions. We must 
                                               
6 Hubert H. Harrison Papers at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library Columbia University  
         Socialism and The Negro Box 13 Folder 1 ‘In the melting pot (re Herodutos)’ New Negro 4 Oct 
        1919 pp. 14-15. 
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not lose sight of these thinkers as prisoners of their time. Many of them were more 
reformers than revolutionaries and sought only to empty ‘race’ of its iniquitous folk 
meanings while preserving a revised scientific version. Very often the terms in 
which ‘race’ was contested were those established by Social Darwinists committed 
to racial hierarchies (Baker, 1998).   
 
3.4 Early 20th Century Political and Ethical Critiques  
 
Subsequent decades witnessed a growing enthusiasm for nonracialism and with 
Hitler’s election in 1930 a public antiracialist science emerged (Stepan, 1982). 
Violent applications of eugenics together with racist subjugation formed the political 
backdrop for the scientific engagement with ‘race’. The centrality of ‘race’ in Nazi 
policy caused a decline in its scientific respectability and opened the concept to 
ethico-political interventions. Reformists included Alfred Cort Haddon who 
maintained that rational capacities were equally possessed, Gordon Childe, the 
Australian Marxist who advanced a straightforward political critique (Childe, 1933) 
and Lancelot Hogben, a critic of eugenics (Hogben, 1936). J.B.S. Haldane drew on 
his socialist affiliations to help defeat typological thinking (Barkan, 1996). Julian 
Huxley expressed the hesitancy common to these critiques: ‘The term race is often 
used as if races were definite biological entities, sharply marked off from each other. 
This is simply not true (1931: 15-16)’. The interwar period signalled a shift in the 
critique of ‘race’ because of how it foregrounded the dangerous political context for 
‘race’ showing how the concept functioned political and how it was applied. The 
concern was no longer strictly about the scientific question what ‘race’ is or is not, 
but the social function and political applications of ‘race’.   
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We Europeans (1935) written for a popular readership, undermined the scientific 
basis for racism and offered an explicit rejoinder to Nazism. Additionally it 
integrated ethical and philosophical issues into the science of ‘race’ including an 
hostility towards British colonialism. This politicized science opposed racial 
thinking and its ethical consequences. By the mid 1930s a broad coalition of British 
scientists responded with a critique of Nazi racial theory (Hogben, 1936; Huxley, 
1931). Growing concern with totalitarianism in 1934 led the Royal Anthropological 
Institute to host a ‘race’ conference. While no consensus emerged, the event was a 
pivotal intellectual response to the politicisation of ‘race’ in Nazism and a call for 
further engagement with the ethico-political issues in racialism (Schaffer, 2005). 
Chapter five will examine the ethical critique of postracialism in relation to these 
historical forerunners and more contemporary concerns.    
 
‘Reformist’ nonracialism challenged ‘race’ as a usable concept and produced 
substantial scientific rejections showing ‘race’ to be an invalid concept, useless in 
scientific analysis (Haddon & Huxley, 1935: 322). Barzun also noted the duplicity of 
‘race’; ‘The race science of Nazi Germany cannot be exonerated of charges that they 
were inspired and brought to completion for some other motive than the discovery of 
divisions’ (1937: 134). Reformists demonstrated that racialism was thoroughly 
enmeshed in racism. The nonracialist tenor strengthened tremendously after 1930 
and included a public debate which compelled recognition of the lethal potential of 
‘race’. 
 
3.4.1 Ethical Beginnings  
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Ethical objections to racialism - such as concerns over racialised intellectual 
capacities - were also put forth by the American philosopher, Josiah Royce (1855-
1916). Royce problematised the common usage of ‘race’ and exhorted against its 
scientisation: 
No argument has ever been advanced by any reasonable man against the fact of 
differences among men. The whole argument is about what differences exist and 
how they are to be gauged. It is impossible to fight the real forces behind race-
hatreds until they have been uncovered by the general recognition that race 
theories are pretexts-unconscious hypocrisy or wilful camouflage (1908:201). 
 
Royce recognised how projects of domination masquerade as objective research. His 
anti-essentialist position exposed the intrinsic signification of values to human 
morphology. The argument, in a limited sense, began to unwind ‘race’ in the terrain 
of values demonstrating the limitations of scientific formalism as a singular 
deconstructive strategy. The history traced in this chapter shows racism has never 
required a credible referent in order to structure the social and economic order. 
‘Race’ has always been slippery and incoherent. Royce implicitly contended that 
antiracism must encompass ethical concerns and value systems, sites where ‘race’ 
acquires its social weight and meaning. 
 
Some scholars have interpreted Royce anachronistically as antiracist and described 
his philosophy as multicultural (see Kegley, 2005; Sullivan, 2008). We must 
consider the historical a priori of Royce - the historically relevant lens through 
which he operated and by which the limits of his perception were set. Royce held an 
anti-essentialist position on ‘race’ while also adamantly championing British 
colonialism and assimilation as remedies to the ‘race problem’. It is as dangerous as 
it is erroneous to assume that anti-essentialism is of necessity not racist.  
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While Royce did not believe that inherent differences among the ‘races’ determined 
cultural achievements and further that any one ‘race’ was naturally superior and 
possessed the right to conquer the others, he did apparently think that people of 
African descent were culturally inferior to their Euro-American counterparts. 
Royce’s contradictions (Curry, 2009; Tunstall, 2009) signal the complexities of his 
position, the difficulties in thinking with and against ‘race’. It is not doubt clear at 
this stage that such contradictions and hesitancies are characteristic of the larger 
body of nonracialist work.  
 
Royce also recognised how racialism precluded egalitarian interaction labelling 
certain ‘races’ ontologically (psychologically) and functionally (cognitively) 
deficient (Eze, 2001). Racialism defined ‘races’ as endowed with different 
constitutions and held that these differences in kind yielded different kinds of human 
beings:    
How are we to deal with men who seem to us somehow very widely different 
from ourselves in physical constitutions, in temperament, in all their deeper 
nature, so that we are tempted to think of them as natural strangers to our souls, 
while nevertheless we find that they are stubbornly there in our world, and that 
they are men as much determined to live as we are, and are men who, in turn, 
find us as incomprehensible as we find them (1908:266). 
 
In answering the dilemma of how to treat the ‘Other’ humanely, Royce’s suggested 
seeing beyond the body - transcending the corporeal. This approach directed 
attention to the constructed nature of what appears to be natural (‘race’) both in 
terms of physical constitution and deeper nature:  
.…in dealing with races, in defining what their supposedly unchangeable 
characteristics are, in planning what to do with them, we are all prone to confuse 
the accidental with the essential. We are likely to take for an essential race-
92 
 
characteristic what is a transient incident, or a product of special social 
conditions (1908:277). 
 
Royce’s positions, while not amounting to a complete rejection of ‘race’, represent 
an interrogation of Enlightenment conceptions of man focused beyond the corporeal 
- a move from brain and body to mind and soul. Royce also dismissed man’s rational 
essence, the cherished precept of racialism. Royce distanced himself from modernist 
rationality and instead privileged the spiritual. The universal possession of soul not 
rationality unified his conception of humanity.  
 
3.4.2 Cosmopolitan Beginnings 
 
Royce’s critiques were expanded at the 1911 Universal Race Congress where the 
damage wrought by capitalism moved scholars to testify to planetary fragility and 
the need for nonracialist ethical sensibilities (Spiller, 1911). Contributors advocated 
a cooperative society that safeguarded Earth and worked towards international 
accord. The Congress’ attention to practical concerns is remarkable considering 
nonracialist critiques and political programmes have remained excessively abstract. 
Uniting the theoretical with the concrete, they serve as important reminders that to be 
politically relevant the marriage of theory and praxis is necessary and expedient. I 
will return to this complicated relationship between theory and praxis in chapter six 
through a discussion of postracialism and antiracism.   
 
Not long after the ink had dried on the treaty ending WWII, the American polymath 
WEB Du Bois (1868-1963), published Negro in the Warsaw Ghetto, a cosmopolitan 
exposition of racism. Reflecting on the prohibitions against Jewish Poles and their 
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exclusion from education and employment, Du Bois sketched a nonracialist 
understanding of racism. Previously, he conceptualised racism in terms of colour 
with particular reference to slavery (distinctively American historical realities) but 
‘race’ in Poland challenged his taken-for-granted understandings. In Poland racism 
did not necessarily involve physical characteristics nor was Nazi slaughter simply 
religious. Du Bois re-theorised racism as an adaptive ideology which remade ‘race’ 
such that it cut across lines of colour, belief and status.  
 
Beyond the black/white binary, racism became a complex, worldwide problem (Du 
Bois, 1941: 472). Du Bois disputed white supremacy as the only form of racism 
intimating an ethics beyond Manichaeism. This cosmopolitan leap recognised the 
mutability of ‘race’ and pointed to an ethical need for liberation not only from white 
supremacy but perhaps too from all racialising thought and racialised seeing. Du 
Bois’ hoped to reactivate politics beyond the coordinates of ‘race’ and nation to 
tackle the complexity of racism and appreciate that resistance cannot arise 
effortlessly from shared phenotypes. A contemporary postracialist may well argue 
that the realisation of this vision will require new forms of racially transcendent 
cosmopolitan connection. I will discuss this contention and cosmopolitanism more 
fully in chapter eight. 
 
3.4.3 Constructionism Takes Shape  
 
Like Du Bois’ cosmopolitanism, Locke’s conception of ‘race’ focused on how the 
subject’s relationship to power under imperialism was defined through ‘race’.  
Racism marked out the enslaved and the murdered. Locke also explored how 
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imperialism organised power racially, symbolically inventing and materially making 
‘race’ through racist practices. Locke’s nonracialism stressed ‘race’ as a fictive 
category cohered through social relationships and typified by subjugation. 
Dispensing with the superiority/inferiority axis, he transmuted ‘race’ into a concept 
to be used (against its own essentialist logics) for progressive change. This analysis 
concentrated on the socioeconomic forces producing the racial relationship. Locke 
strategically deployed ‘race’ to challenge racist stereotypes (1992) and stressed the 
specificity and worth of Black experience as having universal applicability. He 
combined individual particularity and general humanity through a strategy 
committed to imagining justice beyond the colour line. 
 
Locke’s interlocutor, the poet and novelist Jean Toomer (1894-1966), adumbrated a 
nonracialism that re-worked an ascriptive category into an elective category. 
Dissatisfied with his inability to escape its essentialist predicates, Toomer jettisoned 
‘race’ altogether. He imaginatively theorised a nonracialist subject empowered to 
consciously author herself and assert control over her socialisation through scrutiny 
and critical rejection. Long before the vocabulary existed, Toomer sculpted a 
postracial space beyond the prescribed racial self. In sum, Toomer rejected racialism 
and the order it implemented to produce and regulate individual subjects by shaping 
how they come to know, understand and indeed constitute themselves as racial 
beings.  
 
Weber (1864-1920) also advanced a constructionist position: 
… race creates a ‘group’ only when it is subjectively perceived as a common 
trait: this happens only when a neighbourhood or the mere proximity of racially 
different persons is the basis of joint (mostly political) action, or conversely 
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when some common experiences… are linked to some antagonism against 
members of an obviously different group (1958:385). 
 
For Weber ‘racial problems’ were not ‘natural’ but rather socially determined 
through the ‘monopolization of social power’ (1958: 386). Causal inversion 
mistakenly understands racial signifiers as preceding classification and determining 
social position. This obfuscates the relations which constitute racial categories and 
make ‘race’ into an independent variable causing the observed inequalities. Weber 
cautioned against naturalism which makes history invisible and conceals how the 
association between category and signifier is born in specific relations. He posited 
that political and socio-cultural factors not racial kinship influence the importance of 
blood relationships (1958:387). For Weber, ‘race’ was cohered through common 
history and shared experience, constituted and imagined through social practices.  
 
3.5 Post-War Critiques 
 
In 1950 the UN convened a panel of specialists to confront Nazi ‘race’ science. 
UNESCO’s examination trenchantly condemned eugenics reaching a global public 
through its accessible language and signalled the beginning of the decline of ‘race’ 
and the advent of cogent postracialism(s) (Reardon, 2004). The statement dismissed 
the myth that ‘race’ determines intellectual faculties and social habits. The folk 
concept - whatever commonsense thinks about race (i.e. bio-behavioural essence) - 
was labelled dangerous and recommended to be dropped. ‘Race’ could only continue 
in a strictly scientific definition divested of ideological content. The critique 
discredited racism at the level of international politics, initiated the repudiation of 
scientific racism and defined ‘race’ as a social construct.  
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UNESCO’s rejection nevertheless failed to raze racial taxonomies - only their 
implications were denounced - and so the debate persisted into the 21
st
 century. 
Montagu, rapporteur of the first Statement, proposed dropping ‘race’ and replacing 
it with ethnic group, a non-biological term signifying cultural difference. Montagu’s 
substitutionism could not realise its aspirations. Conceptual seepage resulted in 
ethnicity performing all the essentialising work of ‘race’ (Montagu, 1997). The 
ethical, analytical and political problems of ‘race’ could not simply be solved with a 
‘new’ and ‘accurate’ concept. 
 
3.5.1 Ending ‘Race’ 
 
The rejection initiated by UNESCO has since become scholarly commonsense 
(American Association of Anthropologists, 1998; American Association of Physical 
Anthropologists, 1996). The near agreement has, however, faced opposition. Racial 
realism in genetics has brought a ‘halo of legitimacy’ to racist stereotypes where 
purely genetic arguments are invoked to account for behaviours resulting from a 
complex combination of factors threatening to render social scientific theorising 
about the (in)significance of ‘race’ obsolete (Bourdieu, 2003). Racial realism 
remains dangerous because it confers an independent reality to ‘race’ and re-fuels the 
logic of 18
th
 century racialism - if genetic disorders are differentially distributed by 
‘race’, why aren’t other human traits and characteristics (Bourdieu, 2003; xi). 
 
Unlike earlier incarnations, contemporary postracialisms extensively refute ‘race’. 
‘Race’ can only be said to exist if the genetic distance (degree of variation) between 
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a set of populations is lower than the amount variation between that set and others. 
Studies consistently demonstrate that populations are so polymorphic that the genetic 
variation within any one population exceeds the variation between it and another 
population (Alland, 2004). ‘Race’ has no scientifically verifiable referent. 7  
 
Continued discoveries in genetics further discredit racial taxonomies and explode the 
coherence of ‘race’. Indeed some scientific and medical research exhibits explicitly 
postracialist approaches (Barbujani, 2005; Wilson et al, 2001). Chapter seven 
includes a developed discussion of postracial bioscience presently I will attempt only 
an introduction. Postracial researchers do not use ‘race’ to describe genetic 
relatedness. Barbujani (2005), for example, advocates a postracial bioscience which 
tracks gene flows instead of gene isolation, often a scientific euphemism for ‘race’. 
He maintains this will enable a better understanding of patterns of human diversity 
and the underlying evolutionary processes. And it will also be indispensable for the 
development of diagnostic and therapeutic tools designed for the individual 
genotype, rather than for ill-defined racial genotypes.  
 
With no descriptive utility for representing genetic variability most modern racial 
classifications are crude re-framings of 18
th
 century typologies amounting to little 
more than a recycling of arbitrarily selected differences (Livingston, 1993). 
Significantly no features employed to define ‘races’ unambiguously correspond to 
the ‘existing’ social groups commonly referred to as ‘races’. In summary, ‘race’ does 
not correspond to observable natural variation. 
8
   
                                               
7 The literature demonstrating this is vast see: Cartmill, 1998; Cavalli- Sforza, 1995; Gannett, 
2004; Gould, 1997; Olsen, 2002; Smedley, 1999; Templeton, 2002. 
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3.5.2 ‘Race’ Science Returns 
 
Recently, epidemiology has become the primary place for ‘resolving’ problems with 
racial biology and for reasserting ‘race’ as a scientifically verifiable concept. A 
genomic zeal has in some instances led to the selective ignoring of data and the 
improper categorisation of various disorders as racial. ‘Race’ is being smuggled back 
into the province of legitimacy. Deference to genetic determinism oversimplifies 
complex conditions and readily services the scientising of ‘race’.  
Ashkenazi Jews are often (mis)represented as a discrete biological ‘race’ because of 
the presence of the diagnostic allele for Tay-Sachs disease whose incidence is 
notoriously high - with a carrier frequency around one out of every twenty six among 
Ashkenazi Jews as compared to one out of every one hundred and sixty-six in other 
European populations (Charrow, 2004). Complicating this data is the similar 
presence of Tay-Sachs amongst Irish populations (Branda et al, 2004). More to the 
point, twenty-five out of twenty-six Ashkenazi Jews do not carry the Tay-Sachs 
allele, and in this way one defines a set of subjects at risk, not a ‘race’ (Barbujani, 
2005).  
 
Racialising disease is pregnant with concrete consequences.
9
 The tendency to 
characterise multifactoral disorders as racial shapes how they are understood in both 
public and scientific domains and can easily reinforce commonsensical racial 
                                                                                                                                     
8 For examples of the dissonance between ‘race’ and natural variation see Graves,  
  2001; Race, Ethnicity and Genetics Working Group, 2005. 
 
9 Differential access to healthcare is the obvious example here. See Duster, 2003  
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biology. Despite the absence of identifiable genes, an increasing racialised emphasis 
is being placed on heart disease and cancer, conditions in which environmental 
factors contribute both to disease initiation and progression (Duster, 2003). Research 
agendas examining racial causality can lead to the marginalisation of preventative 
strategies and integrated approaches that examine the environmental factors involved 
in disease initiation and progression.  
 
Ironically, (re)constructions of ‘race’ inside of the DNA revolution produce an 
unavoidable crisis in which the very meaning of ‘race’ is being unmade (Graves, 
2001). Discoveries have falsified ‘race’ showing it to be a crude, useless concept. 
Nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy and other innovations in medical imaging 
have certainly transformed the relationship between the seen and unseen and 
rendered ‘race’ increasingly irrelevant (Gilroy, 2000: 49). Nevertheless, how 
forcefully (and perhaps responsibly) can this breakthrough be asserted considering  
racism particularly in the US exiles millions to lives of privation without access to 
even basic healthcare (Auerbach & Krimgold, 2001)? Blindness to the material 
inequalities of racism can only discredit postracialism and risks conflation with 
colourblind discourses.  
 
While reversion to Marxist nostrums (i.e. the abolition of class will end racism) is 
certainly not the solution here, to be politically credible and theoretically robust 
postracialism must address materialist manifestations of racism. It is also important 
to appreciate that commonsense sentiments that both obscure and justify the 
biological foundations of ‘race’ feature commonly from widely read magazines 
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(Runner’s World)10 to specialist publications (New England Journal of Medicine)11. 
Lay readership unfamiliar with the science of ‘race’ are at the mercy of racial 
folklore or worse still the commercial advertising blitz for racially specific 
pharmaceuticals. 
12
 The commonsense salience of racial biology suggests 
postracialism cannot only be involved in (dis)proving the scientific facts of human 
corporeality. What is at stake is not whether the ‘objective’ facts of racial biology are 
accurate but how they are understood and interpreted and what meanings are given 
to them.  
 
Postracialisms (St Louis, 2005b) also perhaps too boldly declare the death of ‘race’ 
while not fully appreciating the realist dissent. Academic arguments (Sarich & 
Miele, 2004) and ‘tabloid science’ (Burfoot, 1999; Entine, 2000) demand ethical 
contestation in light of the implications of the ‘halo of legitimacy’. Still, the ‘crisis of 
‘race’’ concept proves an innovative critique using scientific developments to 
successfully puncture ‘race’. Unequivocal rejection and the restatement of a 
nonracial humanity are invaluable contributions to the eventual transcendence of 
‘race’.  
 
Given the authority of science in the ‘Age of Biology’ illuminating the conceptual 
imprecision of ‘race’ remains ethically imperative. Postracialism cannot be reduced 
to the circular logic that only allows for the (counter) assertion of truth claims (St 
                                               
10 Amby Burfoot (1992) ‘White Men Can’t Run’, Runners World August 89-95. 
11 Bibben-Domingo, K. et al (2009) ‘Racial Differences in Incident Heart Failure Among Young 
   Adults’ NEJM 360:1179-1190. 
12 In 2005, the US Food and Drug Administration approved the first drug labeled for a 
    racially identified population: BiDil®  for the treatment of chronic heart failure in African  
    Americans.  Also in 2005, the European Patent Office renewed a patent 
    for the BRCA2 gene test ‘for diagnosing a predisposition to breast cancer in Ashkenazi 
    Jewish  women’, because mutations of this gene  are frequently found in that population. 
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Louis, 2005a). Purely scientific rejections reduce themselves to the following linear 
reasoning: ‘race’ is without a measurable and scientifically meaningful referent. 
Ergo it is analytically defunct and unsuitable for sociological analysis.
13
 Such 
reasoning - given the symbolic effectiveness of ‘race’ is not based on its scientific 
status - is of limited use. The inherent constraints in formalism direct debate towards 
ethico-political complexity. Appreciating not only the definitional status (what ‘race’ 
is/is not) but also its operative function (what ‘race’ does) postracialism can engage 
‘race’ politically and ethically.  
 
3.5.3 Constructionism and the Political Rejection 
 
Postracialism also details the crisis in social constructionism. Feminist (Bryson, 
1992) and queer theory critiques of essentialism (Butler, 1993) presaged this with the 
examination of the reification of gender and sexuality. The critiques showed how 
reification continued to the point of naturalised fixity and also scrutinised the 
essentialised political positions which emerged from these reified identities. 
Extrapolating from these insights we can witness how constructionism can 
potentially remain complicit in reification through the tautology of biology. The 
constructionist crisis can be precipitated by the inescapably reified premises of ‘race’ 
which (re)produce ideas of embodied racial identification and group solidarity short-
circuiting chosen political positions (Bhatt, 1997). Essentialist approaches to 
solidarity can unwittingly remain part of constructionist versions of ‘race’. The 
                                               
13 Neo-Marxist such as Darder & Torres, 2004 fall prey to this 
   reasoning. 
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continued reliance on the effects of racial hierarchy to supply a binding agent that 
precedes political consciousness raises questions (Gilroy, 2000: 208).  
 
 ‘Race’, postracialists maintain, also lacks conceptual sophistication for making 
sense of the manifold social affinities and negotiated political affiliations of 
postmodernity (Hill, 2009). The discourse of ‘race’ prefigures its meaning with 
absolute predicates and hierarchical language. Continued reference only aggravates 
its reifying effects and re-activates its divisive history (Gilroy, 2000). In general, 
postracialisms places the formerly inviolable concept under tireless interrogation by 
resisting and combating the very category of oppression.  
 
Some expositions of ‘race’ also analyse how the category operates in antiracism 
(Gilroy, 1992; Taguieff, 1999). The critiques exploit real-world examples to indicate 
how ‘progressive’ mobilisations can be sustained by ethnic absolutism (Brubaker, 
2004). This postracialist acuity broadens the ethico-political maturity of Hall’s ‘end 
of the essential black subject’ breaking the causal relationship between ‘race’ and 
politics - deconstructing the white oppressor/black oppressed schism (Hall, 1996: 
443). Postracialisms attempt to reject non-negotiated positions inextricably linked to 
biology and to critically reflect on the premises of activism, which have come to 
resemble both conceptually and rhetorically, its authoritarian counterparts. Some 
struggles rely on unitary narratives to the suppression of cultural difference between 
victims - which can impose an exclusive and racially biased framework for action 
and theory (Bonnet, 2000).  
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To this end, some welcome the re-framing of antiracism beyond the negative (what it 
is opposed to) towards the affirmative moment of debating what it is for. Noticeably 
no affirmative postracial antiracisms (explored in Chapter 6) have been described or 
proposed. Detractors have seized upon this reticence charging it to be the aporia of 
postracialism (Asante, 1998 & 2001). For conservationists, antiracism loses its 
salience without recourse to the tried and tested category of ‘race’. The role of ‘race’ 
in moulding and influencing counter-narratives and its function as an inescapable 
predicate for antiracism suggests that postracialism must confront ‘race’. 
Paradoxically disavowal requires acknowledgement. The term cannot simply be cast 
away in the dustbin of the history of ideas, but rather racist discourse and practice 
must be dismantled. Defending against the conservationist charge of hollow 
utopianism may require a prescriptive politics. What is demanded from antiracism is 
also needed from postracialism - what are postracialism’s political prescriptions?  
 
Hegemonic antiracisms frequently shore-up support through an homogenisation of 
identity flattening social and political processes into an abstracted communitarianism 
(Hall, 1990). This gives ‘race’ a reified and normative status akin to national origin. 
‘Race’ is presented as existing prior to racism (Giddens, 1985). Certain postracialists 
hope to requisition antiracism’s radical potentiality and to discontinue its reification 
as given and normative. Postracialism of this variety arguably represents a project of 
coming to terms with injustice and oppression without recourse to spurious forms of 
description, explanation and justification.  
 
Postracial proponents maintain that purging naturalistic predicates from its 
arguments (Hill, 2001) will empower antiracism to more effectively deal with 
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racisms. But what will antiracism look like without ‘race’? How will it obviate the 
trap of individualization that has derailed intersectional approaches such as human 
rights? I examine these and other questions closely in chapter six in relation to 
antiracist politics and chapter eight in the context of postracial cosmopolitanism. 
With few affirmative prescriptions this utopianism approaches bourgeois 
individualism. Such cynicism perhaps misses the importance of critical reflexivity 
and the movement of ideas from the theoretical to the practical. Although abstract, 
postracialist theory could be understood as a necessary first step - a theoretical 
rehearsal of what might later be translated into concrete political programs. 
Postracialism, in this sense, represents an imaginative mode of sociological thinking 
interested in what can be and how that might be realised.  
 
3.5.4 The Ethical/Ontological Rejection  
 
Building on the above critique, certain positions subject the oppositional identities of 
‘race’ to ethical scrutiny and unpack the disciplinary tendencies of these ‘liberating’ 
modes of being (Blum, 2002). Ethical dissection explores how racialised life scripts 
compress individuals to preformed identities. In general terms, postracialisms work 
to deconstruct raciology, which situates ‘race’ as a constitutive and permanent 
feature of one’s humanity. Certain postracialists suggest that after raciology being 
can exist beyond scripted existence and preordained frames of interpretation. 
Broadly speaking, postracialisms attempt to open and to transform the self, from a 
project of being into a project of becoming (Hill, 2001). These ethical critiques of 
‘race’ is examined in detail in chapter five. 
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Some varieties draw on a revived humanism to outline a prescriptive politics beyond 
the tight boundaries of ‘race’ (Gilroy, 2004; Hill, 2009). This perspective confronts 
the deprivation of individuality and the alienation from species life resultant from 
racism (Gilroy, 2004). In it, cosmopolitan estrangement and democracy introduce 
new modes of thinking about ‘race’ and its relationship to politics and power which 
go beyond identity politics. Postracialist cosmopolitanism hopes to restore the 
human dignity stripped away in racial assignment by re-focusing the ‘human’ 
beyond ‘race’ (Butler, 2003; Gilroy, 2000). The (re)turn to humanism represents an 
interesting move as humanism has been widely understood to partner ‘race’ in 
modernity.   
 
An audacious jump, cosmopolitanism must now redeem a philosophy historically 
handcuffed to racial division. Such theoretical intrepidity is surprising considering 
the summary judgment of ‘race’ as beyond redemption, always-already trapped in 
essentialised premises (Gilroy, 2000). The creation of a counter-history which 
reckons with the destructive consequences of ‘race’ and refuses the colonial denial of 
modernity (Eze, 2001) could produce an ethically invigorating political project. But 
can this exhumed ‘human’ be re-signified in a way that escapes its ethnocentric 
history? Cosmopolitanism offers little compelling instruction on how the histories of 
suffering will be sensitively approached so as to not exalt victimage or reinforce the 
hierarchy of world-historic injustices. I will return to cosmopolitanism in chapter 
eight. 
 
Conservationists suggest these ‘planetary’ (Gilroy, 2000) humanisms lack a defined 
political project with systematic ideas for engendering political activity. Without a 
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specified project, these works remain deeply vague and even politically impotent. 
However, the promise of a creative view of humanity with the conceptual 
sophistication for appreciating experiential plurality remains a powerful 
counterpoint. Through principled estrangement from one’s own culture, 
cosmopolitanism could engage complex contemporary dilemmas. Significantly, 
cosmopolitanism expands estrangement beyond the nation enabling the individual to 
connect with and understand the globe - to build a multicultural society beyond 
xenophobia and the paranoia of ontological jeopardy (Levinas, 1998).  
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Chapter 4 Escaping the Allure of ‘Race’?: Narcissistic Non/Postracialisms 
 
 
Humanistic universalism(s) inextricably partner ‘race’ in the discourses and practices 
of modernity. Bound to this divisive history, universalisms face the burden of 
conceptual redemption. Can non/postracialist universalisms transcend their historical 
association with racism? In this chapter with the aid of qualitative data I explore 
non/postracial universalisms attempting to (re)signify the human in ways that refute 
the ethnocentric histories of modernity. A closer look reveals contradictory features. 
Critiques of racial exclusion, for instance, coexist with a fidelity to existing racialist 
conceptions. I develop narcissism, racial ventriloquism and anti-identity identity 
politics as concepts to discuss what I contend represent three forms of narcissistic 
non/postracialism: religious universalisms, mixed-racialism and white abolitionism. 
Section 4.1 examines Quaker universalism, Baha’I nonracialism and secular 
nonracialism critically exploring the connections, complexities and contradictions 
between these and postracialism. Section 4.2 investigates postracialist mixed-
racialism and unpacks the promises and problems of this approach through the above 
framing concepts. Section 4.3 examines white abolition arguing that this incomplete 
postracialism highlights several critical dilemmas in the postracial ambition. Fleshed 
out in the coming pages, I will briefly introduce these concepts now.  
 
Narcissism refers to the pattern of self-focus and inflated superiority underpinning 
certain universalisms (Lasch, 1979). The concept shows how these discourses 
challenge and reproduce the identity, sets of relations and ideological apparatuses 
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they seek to move beyond. Racial ventriloquism is a discursive act that assails 
racialism through a well-intentioned form of racialism - hiding its sources and 
throwing itself disembodied into the ‘Other’. Racial ventriloquism entails a violent 
silence on the part of another showing how racialist language is a function of power. 
Anti-identity identity politics recognises how narrowly defined identity politics can 
impede more inclusive solidarities. In the disavowal there is an insidious re-
inscription of a particular identity. Unwittingly held to be universal this particularism 
(re)produces homogenisation and essentialism.  
 
4.1 Quaker, Baha’I and Secular Nonracialisms 
 
Quaker universalism imagines a racially transcendent community linked by common 
theological roots and ancestral lines (Benezet, 1767; Woolman, 1805). Racial 
taxonomies violate Biblically enshrined equality. This subsection investigates the 
contradictory relationship of nonracialist universalisms in the transmission and 
reproduction of racialist logics. I argue that narcissism expressed as an obsessive 
concern with self-construction invites reflection on the challenge of escaping the 
‘allure of race’ and the problem of how we constitute identity and live with 
‘difference’. Narcissism raises key questions for postracialism concerning modes of 
identification based on sameness and the recovery of histories of suffering. Racial 
ventriloquism offers insights on thinking through the dilemmas of recovering 
histories of suffering for the non/postracial project and the dilemma of speaking for 
racial ‘Others’. With anti-identity identity politics I explore the limitations of social 
constructionist non/postracialisms namely the reliance on ontological security 
arguing that this limits the possibilities for an anti-foundational postracialism. I 
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argue that postracialism with the aid of Butler’s work on performativity (1993) and a 
postmodern ethics offers a compelling anti-foundationlist and reflexive approach 
capable of deconstructing ‘race’.  
 
4.1.1 Narcissism & Racial Ventriloquism 
 
Quakers countenanced moral parochialism – disregard of or aggression against 
outsiders - where narcissistic norms of conduct restricted full moral respect to their 
exclusivist community (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001:181). Many 18
th
 century Quakers 
while championing abolition and believing in a common nonracial humanity as 
accounted in the Bible paradoxically excluded freedmen from the Society. 
Discursively dismissed, ‘race’ still circumscribed the full extension of rights and 
privileges suggesting abolitionism was not only freedom for enslaved Africans but 
also a narcissistic exercise in community self-construction. Revolution against the 
sinfulness of ‘race’ appeared alongside a concentration on communal intellect that 
hardened Quaker self-identification. Sanctimoniousness and excessive self-
referentialism formed a ‘covert narcissism’ cloaking a vulnerable and sensitive self-
concept (Post, 1993). This nonracialism could not fully escape the centripetal forces 
and the ready-made solidarities and ontologies offered by ‘race’. Postracialism (Hill, 
2001) attempts to reject raciological thinking which issues individuals with symbolic 
commitments to fixed affiliations and promotes inward-looking modes of 
identification based on sameness.  
 
Narcissism underscores the allure ‘camp mentality’ and its cathartic identities based 
on sameness have (Gilroy, 2000). The trap reduces the formation of political 
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alliances to negativity, those who do not belong. Quaker universalism exemplified 
the struggle to conceptualise identity and difference within a commitment to 
negotiated political affiliations that are ethically responsible. Simplistic lines of 
exclusion (who has/not converted) can circumvent the need for positions arrived at 
through political labour. The postracial signals an invitation to construct new non-
reified marks of social identity that move beyond those naturalized forms of 
affiliation mobilised to shortcut political solidarity.  
 
The rejection of ‘race’ was channelled by ecclesiastical organisation which confined 
discussion to the meeting house (Jordan, 1968: 272). Concern with ‘race’ occurred 
during a tribalistic preoccupation with the Quaker spiritual condition in a backdrop 
of anxiety about American self-definition (Jordan, 1968). Nonracialism was a moral 
refining with Africans as a means to a narcissistic end - securing a fragile moral 
community. In this relationship, the slave was used for self-cathexis. Narcissism 
reminds us how the escape from ‘race’ cannot be easily achieved and requires 
careful attention to how racialism can persist in camouflaged forms. Postracialism 
considers how we constitute identity and how we conceive of and live with 
‘difference’ - affirmative questions taken up in the next chapter. 
 
Not immune to self-conceptions as elite Westerners, Quakers projected fears onto the 
natives, reproducing the narcissistic complex (Borossa, 2007). Interaction was 
comparatively equitable - Quakers advocated reparations for victims of European 
expropriation. This colonial context was characterised by the imposition of and 
resistance to European norms with difference (the lesser native) imagined through 
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Western perceptual modes. This contradictory rejection of ‘race’ was perhaps more 
formalistic than categorical.  
 
Racial ventriloquism condemned slavery while also reproducing the denial of the 
slaves’ right to and means of speaking for themselves - a denial foundational to the 
structure of racialised slavery (Miller, 1996). Slave identity was to a significant 
degree constituted by this kind of racialised silence. The slave was always-already an 
object of some subject. Who spoke, who was spoken of/for, and who listened were a 
result, as well as an act, of racialised political struggle. The speaking practice 
positioned the Quaker as an authoritative subject and reduced the slave to an object 
to be championed. This contradictory effect reinforced racism, further silencing the 
slave’s own ability to speak and be heard (Alcoff, 1992).  
 
Racial ventriloquism facilitated Quaker self-invention - speaking as and for slaves 
created a public, discursive self and impacted the self experienced as interiority. 
Believing the parameters of faith and democracy to be questionable only by stepping 
outside them, Quakers ‘went native’ stepping into blackness to lose whiteness, 
reform Christianity and re-democratize American culture. Assuming the position of 
the slave in the moment of self-critique appears predicated on the myth of the 
vanishing African.  
 
The ‘Other’ can no longer speak; she must be echoed by an alienated (hegemonic?) 
group mourning that which its ‘own’ society has destroyed. Alienation is expressed 
in racial terms – a cynical nostalgia for what one has oneself dehumanised (Vizenor, 
1994). The ‘Other’ vanishes in the margins of self-introspection in this imperialist 
112 
 
self-critique. The Quaker attempt to recover histories of suffering and to re-inscribe 
Atlantic slavery as a universal event illustrates a central non/postracial problem. 
How can racialised histories of suffering be articulated sensitively so that they might 
resonate throughout humanity and not be reduced to narrow proprietary claims?  
 
Quaker universalism is a courageous humanist move to replace racial exceptionalism 
with empathy and understanding. But Quakerism appropriates slave testimonies in 
an exclusionary solipsism that ruptures the humanistic imagination. Recovering 
these histories may be crucial to an ethically responsible humanism. But how might 
a cross-cultural approach to the history and literature of extreme situations be 
achieved without an ethical language and a particular political project (Gilroy, 
2000)? Racial ventriloquism enacts a discursive erasure; racial meaning is 
assimilated but the racial provenance of this meaning persists beneath the surface. 
The ‘Other’ cannot speak because the Quaker has already spoken for her. 
 
Under the guise of a discursive blackness, Quakers ‘became’ fictional slaves for 
demagogy. In racial ventriloquism the white subject sheds the universal and 
embodies the particular by asserting a political difference from its racial self - a 
political agent effecting revolutionary change and redefining existing social 
relations. Racialised ‘Others’ are spectators to this history. The Quaker guarantees 
approval through a wilful self-production. She becomes the ‘Other’ - the source of 
approval and admiration (Emmons, 1987). The difficulties in developing a 
non/postracialism universalism combining individual particularity and general 
humanity should not diminish the extent to which colonial histories were shaped by a 
complex process of resistance and accommodation. At first glance the exercise of 
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colonial hegemony, the imposition of democracy, for example, is better understood 
as the requisition of institutions and discourses to strategic effects on the part of 
colonised. 
 
Abolitionists committed to a division of labour in which white people agitated on 
behalf of passively suffering black people, understood their task as speaking the 
unspeakable (Nudelman, 1992). The ‘sympathetic’ scripting of slave experience 
illustrates how nonracialism can be complicit in racial objectification for racialised 
purposes or desires. The language and techniques of melodrama and sentimental 
literature serviced nonracialism. In the right narrative form, slave suffering was for a 
certain consumer, a source of pleasure. Racial ventriloquism ‘resolved’ the paradox 
of a sympathetic white audience that was at once eager for and unable to hear the 
slave speak (ibid). The deconstruction of racialism occurs in a field of racialised 
desires and socio-political relations. Rupturing racialism may require more than 
Quaker universalism – more precisely a willingness to ask imaginative questions 
about the (non)future of ‘race’. What is the alternative to ‘race’? How else can life be 
organised? What is glaringly lacking and perhaps desperately needed is the 
stipulation of an alternative or a coherent program for its dissolution.  
 
 Racial ventriloquism encapsulates the non/postracialism dilemma of speaking for 
others. Perhaps the lesson to be gleaned is the encouragement of receptive forms of 
listening on part of the discursively privileged and discouraging oppressive practices 
of speaking for the ‘Other’. There is no easy resolution to this problematic. 
Prohibition against speaking for would undermine political effectiveness or worse 
function as a disguised defence to avoid political work. It also presupposes that one 
114 
 
can make claims singularly based on her discrete location, disentangled from 
intersecting practices and networks.  
 
Can speaking for the ‘Other’ ever be valid? History is replete with examples of 
privileged persons reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for. The ‘demand 
for the women’s voice’ privileged white women’s voices as it disempowered women 
of colour by mystifying the differences in privilege within the category of women 
(Lugones & Spelman, 1986). This dilemma cannot be resolved by restricting the 
practice of ‘speaking for’ to groups of which one is a member since their speech will 
not necessarily be liberatory or reflective of their ‘true interests’ if such exists 
(Spivak, 1990). The dilemma postracialism identifies in identity politics intimates a 
rethinking of how we constitute politics. Can we dispense with identity politics and 
focus on the social, political and economic issues reproducing these subjectivities 
and retrenching inequalities?  
 
An inherent problem arises. Racism always involves language as a social practice to 
signify self and ‘Other’. The discourse of ‘race’, in other words, is inextricably tied 
to racism. Ending racism requires the end of racial signification. But how can 
non/postracialism escape this language loop when to seriously engage racism you 
need ‘race’? Racial ventriloquism ambivalently disrupts ‘race’ (contesting racialised 
enslavement) and retrenches its force (enacting racialised silencing). Quaker 
nonracialism challenges racism but in the attempt to undo race from within, we 
learn, ‘race has no outside’ (Leonardo, 2009). Racial ventriloquism reflects the 
ubiquity of racial discourse and the difficulty of contesting it. Perhaps Quaker 
nonracialism was attempting (inadequately?) to ask new questions about the destiny 
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of ‘race’; to engage the, ‘opportunity to experiment, to re-imagine and to think 
outside the category of ‘race’’ (Nayak, 2006:427). 
 
There is a further problem of political responsibility. Might silence represent an 
abandonment of political responsibility – incurred by privileged positioning - to 
speak out against oppression? Retreat from speaking for could stem from a 
narcissistic desire to establish a position beyond the postracial challenge of ethical 
reflection. Postracialism leaves us ‘without guarantees’ and with the daunting task of 
determining our ethical commitments and political aspirations, constructing 
alternative(s) to ‘race’. How can we forge dialogically negotiated and ethically 
defensible progressive political projects? What would postracial political solidarities 
and ethical commitments look like?  
 
4.1.2 Anti-Identity Identity Politics 
 
Locke intimated at a nonracial politics in his practice of Baha’I, a monotheistic 
religion emphasising spiritual unity. His commitment to ‘race amity’ gained 
expression through universal religious ideals; ‘any remedy seriously proposed must 
be fundamental and not superficial, and wide-scale or universal rather than local or 
provincial’14. In other words, global racial justice must address material and 
representational inequality. Might this panacea echo the dangers of grand narratives 
in appealing to the ‘fundamental’ and the ‘universal’?  
 
                                               
14 Alain Locke Papers{ALP} 164-128 Writings by Locke Folder 25 ‘Unity through Diversity: A   
    Baha’I Principle’ 
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A ‘revolution within the soul’ would transform racial injustice into democracy. 
Locke’s ‘secularised’ universalism appears a palimpsest with Christian strictures of a 
secure nonracial identity in residue form – an anti-identity identity politics. This is 
the recurring (intractable?) problem in projects of racial deconstruction that rely on 
social constructionist approaches. Postracialisms (Gilroy, 2000) stage a split with 
orthodoxy and an epistemological re-orientation against racial ontology. The 
constructionism in Baha’I nonracialism, conversely, necessitates the ontological 
security of a knowable object. This reliance highlights the high stakes ethical and 
political gamble waged in surrendering the symbolic and material gains secured on 
the unstable ground of ‘race’.  
 
Anticipating a rejection of his argument as political treachery against those whose 
democratic claims rest on identities and solidarities solidified in racial categories 
Gilroy cautions, ‘The first task is to suggest that the demise of ‘‘race’’ is not 
something to be feared’ (2000:12). If ‘race’ thinking is connected to racism - an 
essential means to an unethical end - it follows that we should abolish those racial 
categories which have divided humanity for centuries. Consciously setting aside the 
‘primordial feelings and mythic varieties of kinship’ mistakenly believed to be 
elemental to modern political culture, how might we constitute collective identity 
(Gilroy, 2000:106)? How will we ensure that community and solidarity do not 
disappear from social life?  
 
In an unpublished manuscript, Locke negotiated the perils of postrace: 
That all nations shall become one in faith, and all men as brothers; that the bonds 
of affection and unity between the sons of men should be strengthened; that 
diversity of religion should cease, and differences of ‘race’ be annulled…These 
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strifes and this bloodshed and discord must cease, and all men be as one kindred 
and family.
15
 
 
Locke affirms the interconnectedness of ‘race’ and nation hinting that nationalism 
and the mythic identities it (re)produces impair postracialism. He re-imagines 
supranational belonging through faith. Masculinist forms of kinship appear to 
replace the loss of a category that for some may equate with the obliteration of an 
identity and shared way of life. However tarnished, ‘race’ has been an important 
organising site for political mobilisations and social change.  
 
Baha’I functions as a quasi-secularised set of moral rules to follow with implicit 
claims to objectivity. The claims of Baha’I are deemed to be egalitarian, bracketed 
off from rigorous critique. This is the non/postracialisms tendency to become post-
politics. The epistemological and ontological scrutiny directed at ‘race’ is foreclosed 
(St Louis, 2002). Baha’I scrutinises some moral categories and racial terms while 
leaving others beyond scrutiny. There is an irresolvable contradiction in anti-identity 
identity politics – the irony that these political formations rarely investigate the 
foundations of their own guiding principles. In other words, they ignore the 
identitarian quality of their politics.  
 
Baha’I swallows other religions into its own credos and fills the void with its own 
universal spokesman (Bauman, 1993). Unlike its rivals, its moral code rests in the 
nature of man. The universalisation of morality tends to smother the array of 
difference and eliminate ‘wild’ sources of moral judgment (Lyotard, 1998). This 
practical instability reveals the narcissistic paradox; reaching for self-affirmation and 
                                               
15 ALP 164-128 Writings by Locke Folder 25 ‘Unity through Diversity: A Baha’I Principle’. 
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inclusion, destroys the very relationships needed for desired approval. Anti-identity 
identity politics may be caught in the impossible task of laying an unshakable 
foundation for a binding morality. 
 
Montagu similarly disavowed ‘race’; ‘Man is born good. Devotion to human ideals, 
love, sympathy, understanding, justice, peace and the embodiment of these values in 
human relations is the true religion of man. Failure to practice this faith is the only 
real atheism.’ 16 Montagu’s reverses human nature as rotten. Can such an abstract 
universal that streamlines individual choices be helpful? Montagu still attempts to 
offer guarantees but without ‘race’ and its nefarious baggage. In this anti-identity 
identity politics, the human is anchored by the ‘proper objects’ of love, and 
sympathy (Butler, 1994). Postracialism obviates the constructionist trap in its anti-
foundationalist approach. Not given ontological security, ‘race’ is theorised as a 
practice with no solid basis outside the discursive, material, structural and embodied 
configurations though which it is repetitively enacted, performed and tenuously 
secured (Leonardo, 2009).  
 
The absence of a solid basis for ‘race’ is ontologically and politically daunting. 
Small wonder, these non/postracialisms attempt to re-stabilise just as the racial 
foundation is eroded. Supplanting ‘race’ with another category perhaps misses the 
radical intervention to show how the racialised body is a highly uncertain zone upon 
which to anchor difference. As Blumenbach noted in the 18
th
 century the body is a 
slippery surface for sustaining racial meaning. Deference to the ontology of social 
constructionism limits the project of interrogating the nature of the construction of 
                                               
16 Ashley Montagu Papers Box 78 ‘Race’, Science and Humanity Draft’ undated 
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racialised difference and problematising the taken-for-granted assumption of the 
irreducibility of ‘race’ (Butler, 1993). Postracialism does not smuggle in a 
replacement rather it strives to illustrate the reality that our bodies are thoroughly 
unreliable sources of racial truth. In varying degrees Locke and Montagu expropriate 
the individual’s right to independent moral judgment. Can a postracial ethics work if 
it is subjected to formalisation and universalization? I address this question in the 
next chapter. 
 
Anti-identity identity politics attempts to organise the messy ambiguity of moral 
reality as if all problems were resolvable through systematic reasoning. The 
individual is expected to abide by specified standards and rules (Bauman 1993). 
Moral systems, once institutionalised, become limited in their ability to adapt at the 
pace of complex social problems. Moral foundations regularly come in the form of a 
self-authorised authority that makes binding pronouncements on persons and their 
acts (Bauman, 1993).  
 
Postracialism is radical not in its rejection of modern moral concerns but in its 
rejection of typically modern ways of going about moral problems. It does not 
respond to moral challenges with coercive regulation and the search for absolutes. It 
is inordinately arduous because of an insistence that human reality is messy. Moral 
decisions are ambivalent. Without the modernist delusion that messiness is 
resolvable, postracialism enters a space of moral uncertainty. Gilroy’s (2000) and 
Butler’s (2003) postracial formulations advocate a Levinasian being for the ‘Other’ 
which contains no demand to be repaid. The radical ethical maturity of postracialism 
lies in its call for the readiness to sacrifice for the ‘Other’. The command is not 
120 
 
universalizable (moral because it is not generalizable) (Bauman, 1993: 51). Being 
moral means, I am my brother’s keeper, irrespective of my brother’s views on me.  
 
Reliance on a ‘legislative’ approach with a generalizable set of rules empties 
conflicts of their complexity and precludes reflexive strategies. The challenges 
presented by racism appear insufficiently answered with the coercive regulation of 
anti-identity identity politics. In an unpublished leaflet, Locke mirrored and refracted 
this approach: ‘Only a widespread almost universal change of social heart, a new 
spirit of human attitudes, can achieve the social redemption that must eventually 
come.
17’  
 
‘Social heart’ highlights the affective dimension of ‘race’. Combating racism 
involves structural and attitudinal transformations. Locke wrestled with this 
complexity envisaging that a spiritual component must be involved in, ‘the social 
redemption that must eventually come’ - a moral antiracism, not based on elusive 
and subjective predicates. But his anti-identity foundations emerge from Baha’I 
pronouncements carrying almost legal status. How can antiracist morality avoid 
becoming little more than proceduralism? Identitarian residues threaten to swallow 
discussion into a kind of ‘collective monologue’ (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). 
Postracialism provides a complex anti-foundational critique of identity stressing the 
impossibility of racial identity. But with the irrational and corporeal ground of ‘race’ 
still operating as a powerful force how useful and how meaningful is this critique 
(Ali, 2003)? I return to this question in chapter eight. 
 
                                               
17 ALP 164-27 Writings by Locker Folder 2 
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Institutionalised religious discourse operating in the sacred register often shields 
itself from rational analysis and ethical scrutiny - deaf to arguments outside that 
referential universe. Anti-identity identity politics - without justification beyond its 
normative existence - abstains from determining through discussion its commitments 
and aspirations. Community appears pre-political, a short-circuited solidarity 
evading the dialogue necessary to build lasting cohesion. Such solidarities mimic the 
naturalness of ‘race’ falsely promising unity outside history. In postracialism moral 
consensus cannot be held. Insecurity is endemic and incurable. The postulated 
community, the only community that can be, must be always re-examined and 
refigured. Unlike contractual moralities, postracialism leaves us in perpetual moral 
anxiety. Although potentially exasperating this anxiety can operate as a substance, as 
the urge to do, not the knowledge of what is to be done (Bauman, 1993). 
 
4.2 Mixed-‘race’ Rejection 
 
To be raceless in contemporary society is, in effect, to be anti-race. Resisting 
bi-racial categories the racial authenticity of mixed raced could therefore be 
the racial position of anti-race (Zack, 1995: 305). 
 
Unlike the totalising logics of universalisms, mixed-racialism deconstructs racialism 
by simultaneously extending and resisting existing racial categories. The field 
challenges commonsense assumptions including the taken-for-granted stability of 
racial classification and self-understanding (Ifekwunigwe, 1999). Broadly speaking 
mixed-racialism questions the adequacy of official taxonomies and disturbs the 
notion of ‘pure’ kinds (Parker & Song, 2001).  
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In this section, I examine postracialist mixed-racialism which works towards the 
transcendence of ‘race’. I explore how the critique in addition to problematising 
‘race’ also reproduces a narcissistic nonracialism through the balkanisation of a 
reified concept. Preserving the concept whose effects it seeks to erode, the 
transformative capacities of mixed-racialism encounter conceptual and political 
problems that paradoxically reify ‘race’ and create opportunities to rectify the 
political disengagement of postracialism. I also argue that mixed-racialism enacts a 
racial ventriloquism reproducing racialism as natural and forestalling radical 
postracial questions. Finally, I explore the contradictions of mixed-racial politics as 
an anti-identity identity politics that delegitimises ‘race’ with drastic and unintended 
consequences for racial justice.  
 
4.2.1 Narcissism 
 
Mixed-racialism erodes racialism through an appreciation of the complex and 
creolised nature of identity (Zack, 1993). Might residual loyalty to pure ‘races’ 
(re)empower racial decorum to over-determine the self? The valorisation of self-
defining ‘mixed-race’ identity has led not only to the erection of seemingly 
insurmountable boundaries but has also denied its consequences for how we think 
about these communities.  
 
As sociologists we do not merely reflect and analyze existing relations. We 
participate in the social construction of ‘race’ and its reproduction as a given 
category. Uncritical usage makes ‘race’ appear pre-discursive, masks the relations of 
power we are situated in, and contributes to the consolidation of racial categories. 
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Mixed-racialism empowers mixed-race people, valuing their experiences and 
developing an oppositional consciousness by turning scholarly work into political 
projects anchored in social situated-ness (Collins, 1989). The epistemological and 
methodological problems of racialism are addressed by beginning with mixed-race 
experiences, lives and activities. Zack writes: 
 
The fact that many of the young scholars and researchers on the subject of 
mixed race are themselves of mixed race informs their work with motives 
and experiences in a way that is now recognised to be necessary for the 
advancement of a discussion within an emancipatory tradition (1995:xi). 
 
Belief in a specialised knowledge produced by mixed-race people that clarifies a 
particular mixed-race standpoint can obscure the power relationships that constitute 
‘race’. These narcissistic claims rest upon ‘experience’ (assumed to be self-
explanatory) as a theoretical foundation. At times ‘experience’ indexes the emotional 
and the personal and at other moments it is concretised to reflect structural factors 
economic and political contexts that shape the lives of mixed-race people (Lazreg, 
1994).  
 
Postracial critiques (Gilroy, 2000) recognise this oversimplified analysis. Does this 
mean we jettison experience altogether? Or might it be possible to widen our 
understanding by examining its socio-historical specificity through the, ‘webs of 
social, political and cultural relations which are themselves organised on the axes of 
power and which act to constitute subjectivities and identities’ (Lewis, 2000:173). 
Mixed-racialism centres self, identity and community. In this relationship between 
self and community, mixed-race writers on a practical as well as emotional level, 
strongly invest in the mixed-race identity as a rupture of the white/black binary.  
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Mixed-racialism though sometimes beset by reification, Ameri-centrism, and 
essentialism may provide the basis of a ‘new politics of resistance and critique’ 
(Hall, 1992: 251). Significantly mixed-racialism is rooted in the critical analysis of 
mixed-race lives and an understanding of experience as central to knowledge 
production. The narcissistic assumption that one experience is more valuable than 
another imposes constraining notions of authenticity and authority. The assumption 
also allows mixed-race people to conceive of themselves as active agents in their 
social worlds. In this way mixed-race writing (Zack, 1995) refutes the steady 
withdrawal of intellectual life from anti-racist politics which has rendered some 
expressions of racism invisible.  
 
Contemporary postracial concerns with the ‘end of race’ (Gilroy, 1998) have 
witnessed an intellectual retreat from the sphere of macro-structural concerns and the 
material realties of discrimination – sites where mixed-racialism has been so 
successful (see Zack, 1995). This has led to the separation of theoretical and 
empirical labour and the disappearance of the traditional role of the ‘activist-
intellectual’ (Alexander, 2002). Mixed-racialism operates outside the apolitical 
trends of the contemporary academy. Zack reminds us of the inseparability of theory, 
politics, ideas and their materiality in the formation and contestation of racial 
ideologies and practices. In spite of above limitations, mixed-racialism as a form of 
postracialism illumines an over-attentiveness in certain postracialisms (see Hill, 
2001) to the question of whether ‘race’ is real or not.  
 
This focus can be doubly disabling - (re)confirming charges of apoliticality and 
neglecting the question of how and why it can/might be used progressively. The re-
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inscription of racial logics and the at best ambiguous (re)fixing of the premises of the 
racializing project seriously inhibit and perhaps condemn mixed-racialism’s 
postracial potentiality. Nevertheless, there are a course of lessons here about political 
engagement and the need for greater empirical research as part of an integrated and 
grounded postracialism.      
 
4.2.2 Racial Ontologies 
 
Mixed-racialism’s ambivalent rejection signals the psycho-social ramifications 
involved in the rejection of ‘race’. Racial identity can be known through lived 
experience and experienced emotionally. Racial ontology liberates and imprisons. In 
an unpublished letter to Alain Locke, Jean Toomer wrote:  
I am of no particular race. I am of the human race, a man at large in the human 
world, preparing a new ‘race’. This is an accurate statement of my position as 
regards race. I am disassociating my name and self from racial classifications, as 
I believe that the real values of life necessitate it
18
. 
 
Toomer responded to the limitations of racial being by refusing racial categorisation. 
He located himself in a forward-looking postracialism, an identification with a 
transcendent humanity. Toomer’s life, characterised by self-imposed exile and 
outward exclusion, can be read as a cautionary tale; betray one’s ‘genuine’ identity 
and drift into vacuous abstractions and psychic isolation (Posnock, 1998:32). Will 
identification as mixed-race carry with it psychic isolation and social stigma? Might 
mixed-race result in more exaggerated ‘camps’ practicing even harsher exclusion?  
 
                                               
18 ALPP 164-90-12 Correspondence Undated Letter from Jean Toomer. 
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There is an incompleteness here attributable to a paradigmatic tension in the 
approach to ‘race’. Perhaps for strategic purposes race is, on the one hand, theorised 
as socially constituted while, on the other hand, mixed-racialism continually imparts 
ontological value to it, resulting in reification. In Sara Ahmed’s words: 
We cannot do away with race, unless racism is ‘done away with’…Thinking beyond 
race in a world that is deeply racist is at best a form of utopianism, at worse a form 
of neo-liberalism: it imagines we could get beyond race, supporting the illusion that 
social hierarchies are undone once we have ‘seen through them’(2004a: 48).  
 
Mixed-racialism does not fully appreciate that racial identity is an incomplete project 
forever in process. Racism cannot be denied but a postracial possibility beyond 
neoliberal accounts can exist – an imaginative re-writing of ‘race’. There is serious 
danger where the ontological status of ‘race’ and its more powerful signifier 
phenotype are transformed into the authentic fixed coordinates around which such 
‘effects’ can be mapped.  
 
Passing and misrecognition show the tenuous ontological security of ‘race’. 
Extending Butler’s insights we might suggest that there is no racial identity behind 
the expressions of ‘race’, no ‘doer behind the deed’ (Butler, 1990: 142). ‘Race’ is 
performatively constituted by the very expressions which are said to be its results. 
‘Race’ and the establishment of norms of racial difference are produced in the 
repetition of discourses. Mixed-race enables more complexity but in racial terms. 
Violation and transgression re-impose the black/white dichotomy as the standard of 
mixing. Postracialism enables a critical understanding of how we perform or ‘do’ 
‘race ‘which may yet inform strategies and techniques to ‘unmake’ it. If racial 
identities are not rooted in ‘proper objects’ there is hope for change and intervention. 
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Mixed-race writers deploy the term at the same time as they refute the limitations 
(even existence) of ‘race’. The call for abolition (unwittingly?) bestows ontological 
security upon a stable, knowable racial identity. It stills hold to, ‘the idea of race as 
some kind of ontological category, a real foundation for what one ‘‘is’’ and thus 
provides the basis for questions about equality and difference - and how they may be 
tied to a racial identity’ (Ali, 2004:324). Postracialism eschews racial ontologies 
through an anti-foundationalist perspective. ‘Race’ is a fiction only ever given 
substance through the illusion of performance and utterance. Repetition creates the 
compelling illusion making ‘race’ appear as-if-real.  
 
Mixed-racialism inadequately questions an assumed corporeal certainty of what 
mixed-race is. Racial identity is something we can assert but never accomplish. 
Mixed-race as a social process is conflated with a secure object ‘mixed-race people’. 
Theoretical understandings of mixed-race as relational and socially constructed 
nothwithstanding, mixed-racialism leaves us with the tangible irreducibility of ‘race’ 
(Nayak, 2006).  
 
Could mixed-racialism reproduce the homogenising logics of ‘race’ by assuming the 
existence of a coherent identity? Is the creation of an mixed-race identity a social 
fiction considering self-understandings can be divergent and are grounded in varying 
biographies and cross-cutting cultural contexts (Rockquemore & Brunsma, 2008)? 
Does the diversity of family structures, the variation in the experience of racial 
socialisation and the heterogeneity of communities contribute to the absence of a 
singular understanding of what mixed-race identity might be? This plurality can be 
overlooked where reified attitudes of racial being persist.  
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Ontological attachments to ‘race’ are connected to concerns about the political gains 
made through ‘race’ and the structural inequalities connected to the category. This 
duplicity about how sociologists conceptualise ‘race’ forms part of the postracial 
problematic. What Gilroy frames as the, ‘pious ritual in which we always agree that 
‘‘race’’ is invented but then are required to defer to its embeddedness in the world 
and to accept that the demand for justice nevertheless requires us to enter the 
political arenas that it helps mark out’ (Gilroy, 1998: 842).  
 
Mixed-racialism perhaps privileges the political ‘demand for justice’ without fully 
considering how that might operate as a fixed and inflexible category. Ontological 
preservation in the name of political expediency works as a riposte to the postracial 
critique. For racialised minorities postracialism may equate with the annihilation of 
an identity and shared ways of life that silence marked experiences and cultures 
(Nayak, 2006). Postracial dialogues represent an imaginative project of envisaging 
new spaces and forms of cultural identification that subvert ‘race’ and can enable 
other ways of being. Additionally, postracialism may be able to genuinely appreciate 
that race has no pre-discursive ontological grounding. It can only ever be arbitrary 
and ambiguous.The transformative possibilities of mixed-racialism remain limited 
by the very system it seeks liberation from. The rejection of ‘undesirable’ options is 
underpinned by what it means to ‘be’ of a particular ‘race’. With the identity 
outcomes of racialism still intact, mixed-racialism cannot fully realise the liberation 
of identity from a constraining past that shapes the present and future and proscribes 
available life projects (Zack, 1992).  
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Mixed-racialism shows the inflexibility of racialism. Is mixed-race a largely 
interiorised identity accessible only to elites? Differential access to cultural and 
material capital demonstrate that the ‘right of exit’ from and voluntary affiliation 
with racial identity is more select privilege than universal access (Shelby, 2002). 
Does a latent elitism pervade mixed-racialism and place an excessive emphasis on 
the knowing individual’s right to assert ethnic identities? The right to choose an 
ethnic identity is an important part of a contemporary politics of citizenship which 
addresses issues of difference and belonging and the complex ways people 
participate in social life. But who exactly can freely select her identity? Mixed-
racialism seems to lack a materialist sensibility concerning how access to non-
traditional life-style practices are delimited by socio-economic stratification, 
educational attainment and access to welfare provisions 
 
4.2.3 Racial Ventriloquism 
 
 
Mixed-racialism stakes an agential claim, the power to self-define and to not be 
defined from without. Crucially self-identification does not include the refusal to 
identify oneself racially. Self-identification seems to presuppose that ‘race’ is a 
primary category of human classification. Postracialism’s anti-foundational rejection 
helps to show how the ‘freedom’ of racial self-classification in mixed-racialism is 
perhaps not a freedom at all but rather an outgrowth of a presumed naturalism. 
Postracialism contests ‘race’ in order to end the category not perpetuate it. 
 
The democratic freedom of self-naming is underpinned by the racial ventriloquism 
of an imposed identity. Racial ventriloquism is also enacted through the 
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bureaucratic-statistical requirements that enforce racialising imperatives for political 
purposes. Ventriloquism has a force where the numerical politics of racial naming 
and placing have a legislative mandate (Goldberg, 1995). The census, a flashpoint in 
the battle for mixed-race categorising, was about managing effective resource 
distribution and voting access.  
 
Mixed-racialism pays insufficient attention to how a racial self is a fiction cohered 
through common history. Mixed-race people, Zack maintains, are alienated because 
they lack a recognised history. But if the ‘true’ racial self is a fiction cohered through 
common history, as postracial positions maintain (St Louis, 2002) than might its’ 
usage obscure the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of actual history? A mixed-race 
history could deny the normative condition of hybridity. The original critical intent 
could backfire reinforcing the racialist tenet of legitimacy as derived from claims to 
a prior ontology. The necessity of mixed-‘race’ is then justified a priori and is 
crucially not predicated on an ethico-political analysis of how the identity is situated 
within modalities of essence and difference. 
 
Locke wrestled with these problems earlier in an unpublished exchange with Gunnar 
Mydral:  
The widespread notion of negro culture as separate and sui generis is very 
unscientific and contrary to fact. …the color groups not only have certain differential 
by and large but this varies between north and south, urban and rural areas, and 
seems to me even to vary between the sexes.
19
 
 
                                               
19
 ALP 164-74-12 Correspondence Letter from Locke to Gunnar Mydral 23rd Feb 1939 
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Representations of Black culture as discrete and original are contradicted by the 
historical record of their hybrid nature amounting to little more than racial 
essentialism. ‘Race’ is commensensically understood as an umbrella term 
consolidating internal diversity through a transcendent identity. Locke corrected this 
popular and academic misconception citing how class, geography and gender 
fracture racial homogeneity. 
 
He points towards the internal diversity of Black as a collective social category while 
rejecting definitions which fail to acknowledge heterogeneity. His contestation of a 
singular African-American identity is noteworthy for postracialism because it 
disturbs the normative sense of distinctions between groups as forming the 
fundamental basis of racial particularity. By stressing dissimilarities within 
racialised groups (i.e. class), Locke placed the accepted notion of difference between 
‘races’, taken as proof of coherent racial categories, under a great deal of analytical 
and practical stress (St Louis, 2005b). What becomes of collective racial identities 
when the assumption of its constitutive internal similarity and external differentiation 
melts?  
 
This political manoeuvre of inhabiting racial identity in order to deconstruct it can be 
problematic. Harrison grappled with this when, discouraged by reductionist class 
politics, he advanced a ‘race first’ political agenda:  
For the similarity of suffering has produced in all lands where whites rule 
colored races a certain similarity of sentiment viz: a racial revulsion of racial 
feeling. The people of those lands begin to feel and realise that they are so 
subjected because they are members of races condemned as ‘inferior’ by their 
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Caucasian overlords. The fact presented to their minds is one of race, and in 
terms of race do they react to it. 
20
 
 
Harrison stressed how racism over-determined social life such that ‘race’ was 
reproduced by both oppressor and oppressed. He suggested ‘race’ is a reified concept 
and alluded to the work ‘race’ performs. I interpret the ‘racial revulsion of racial 
feeling’ as a reference to the ontology of ‘race’. Racial identity exists in part because 
it is felt and not simply existent empirically or as a social effect. ‘Race’ is a 
situational and comparative construct not a primordial one.  
 
The fight against racism, he hinted, remains mired in categories originally generated 
in racism. Over-determined from without and racially conscious from within, 
Harrison struggled with the ethics of racial identification. Racial identities remained 
problematic because they rearticulated hegemonic representations of inferiority into 
positive affirmations. Establishing identity through what one is not one remains, to 
an extent, within the prior ontological universe of what one (falsely) was (St Louis, 
2005b). The passage silently asks postracial questions; is ‘race’ necessary to press 
for transformative democratic change? And if so, why considering unitary racial 
identities and their unifying political positions are unsustainable?  
 
Mixed-racialism offers an oblique challenge to the prescribed racial self with its 
limiting ethical reflexivity (Gilroy, 2000). Essentialist premises of normative racial 
identity – that personal identity begins with ‘race’ – are not fundamentally 
challenged. What does mixed-racialism offer as compelling ethical justification? 
What ethical reasons for the continuance of a racialised value system can it support? 
                                               
20 Hubert Harrison Papers Box 13 ‘Two Negro Radicalisms’ 4 October 1919: 4-5 
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Postracialisms negotiates this challenge by escaping the dangerous tautology of 
mixed-race identity refusing to refer to ‘race’ as a coherent even acceptable category 
despite people ‘positioning’ themselves racially (St Louis, 2009). As currently 
conceived, it is unclear how mixed-racialism will respond to this ethical and political 
maturity - a new responsibility that challenges us to develop social positions within 
ethical parameters beyond the false conditions of ‘race’.  
 
4.2.4 Anti-identity Identity Politics   
 
The Association of MultiEthnic Americans (AMEA), established in 1998, is 
dedicated to advocacy and education on behalf of the ‘multiracial community’. The 
organisation played a key role in the 2000 census decision to revise its standards for 
collecting racial data and allowed people to tick ‘one or more races’. For AMEA 
racial self-description disrupts external ascription stretching the colour line to the 
point of making ‘race’ less relevant.  
 
The ‘tick all that apply’ box aims to get racial identity correct in self-assignment and 
state-recognition. Rendering less relevant those racial categories historically linked 
to equal opportunity policy, rather paradoxically, releases the state from previous 
civil rights obligations namely equal access to employment, housing, education etc. 
What began as a progressive project of recognition and redistribution becomes a 
regressive anti-identity identity politics - swallowed into the neoliberal privatisation 
of social problems. This is a reminder for postracialism. Deconstruction will need to 
account for the organisation of power in a racialised economic and social system and 
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more specifically the significance of orthodox racial categories in the maintenance of 
racial equality.  
 
Mixed-racialism unleashes multiplicity upon identity enabling a state endorsed 
postmodern identity formation. But anti-identity identity politics - the radical 
sanctioning of mixed-race to delegitimise ‘race’ – has a drastic unintended 
consequence. The state no longer needs to ensure equality. AMEA’s emancipatory 
vision comes through the proliferation of racial difference such that racial justice 
disappears. How can racial inequality be identified, corrective solutions developed 
and remedies achieved without the categories that have been the organising concepts 
for stratification?  
 
As the state makes more precise self-descriptive possibilities accessible, ‘race’ 
signifies itself into nonexistence. Mixed-racialism’s hope for liberation from ‘race’ 
inadvertently aligns with a market liberalism. ‘Tick all that apply’ offers a wealth of 
identity options but comes with the withdrawal of any structural understanding of 
racial inequality. People simply belong to whatever they choose.
21
  How can de facto 
civil rights infringements be the objects of legal redress if racial distinctions 
proliferate to the point of their de jure disappearance (Hill, 2004: 42)? AMEA’s 
work with its cohort of neo-conservative allies makes anti-essentialism a matter of 
state policy and with it state concern for civil rights obligations is dissolving. 
Postracialism cannot so quickly forget about ‘race’. Mixed-racialism reminds us 
again of the important and challenging task of working with and against ‘race’ to be 
discussed more fully in chapter six.  
                                               
21 http://www.ameasite.org/census/ 
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AMEA’s anti-identity identity discourse implies the acceptance of some specifically 
racial difference. Treated as real, or at least concretely apprehensible, ‘race’ is often 
uncritically accepted (Guillaumin, 1995). Confusingly ‘race’ comes to play a role as 
determining cause and concrete means. A recent newsletter trumpeted the success of 
the Topaz Club a ‘social/support’ club for biracial people for sharing personal 
narratives with, ‘others who have had similar experiences’. 22 While creating space 
for the positive affirmation of multiracial identities, the discourse reifies racial 
identity and seems to potentially ignore how identity is crosscut by other social 
categories.  
 
Reification in this anti-identity identity politics makes ‘race’ - an effect of social 
relationships - into a cause. ‘Race’ appears a basic legal category alongside 
nationality. The social is regarded as natural (Miles & Brown, 2003). Antiracist 
hopes notwithstanding, AMEA revivifies the ‘race’ relations paradigm leaving out 
the element which contributes most to the perpetuation of the racial context: 
technical and economic power. With description and explanations solely in racial 
terms, AMEA at worst denies and at best disguises the real social relationships 
(re)producing ‘race’ and racial stratification.  
 
Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) is another American non-profit that 
campaigns nationally for a multiracial classification.
23
 Executive Director Susan 
Graham recently opined that the organisation’s goal is its own erasure; ‘In a post-
                                               
22 Volume 1(3) pg. 7 
23 http://www.project’race’.com/ 
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racial America, we would be able to close down Project RACE. We would no longer 
need to advocate for a multiracial classification or for rights for multiracial children 
and adults.’24 This is an anti-identity identity politics that makes ‘race’ everywhere 
significant and yet nowhere identifiable. Admitted with greater nuance, ‘race’ is 
evacuated of former political significance. Paradoxically, the full extension of civil 
rights discourse actually unmakes civil rights achievements (Hill, 2004).  
 
At times Project RACE validates the characterisation of human groups in somatic 
terms unwittingly confirming the commonsensical belief that physical characteristics 
are the cause of social relationships.
25
 Their website also tacitly accepts the basic 
postulate of racialism - biologically specific groups exist and are recognizable by 
measurable somatic and genetic criteria.
26
 ‘Race’ becomes a given, natural category 
with all the intellectual and social authority of science. The relationships of power 
that constitute the foundational category appear natural and inevitable (Spencer, 
1999). The un-problematised reliance upon categorical approaches to ‘race’ presents 
fundamental political and methodological dangers reifying ‘race’ as an entity that 
individuals are born into and inhabit rather than recognising ‘race’ as a dynamic and 
emergent processes of being and becoming. In addition, the conceptual fixing of 
mixed-race theorising limits analyses and reproduces wider forms of essentialism, 
stereotyping and racism. 
4.3 White Abolitionism 
 
                                               
24http://www.project’race’.com/fromthedirector/archive/012009_obama_post_racial_america.php  
   (accessed 25th May 2012) 
25http://www.project’race’.com/teenproject’race’/invisible_public_service_announcement_youth 
  ube.php (accessed 24th May 2012) 
26 http://www.project’race’.com/urgentmedicalconcern (accessed 24th May 2012) 
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4.3.1 Narcissism   
 
Emerging alongside mixed-racialism in the wake of the political and intellectual 
challenges offered by British anti-racism (Gilroy, 1992) and radical multiculturalism 
in the USA (Chicago Cultural Studies Group, 1992), white abolitionism, a 
prescriptive scholarly effort with the goal of creating a more humane society, called 
for the dismantling of whiteness. The historicisation of whiteness made white racism 
into an object of concern and reflection. This raised a degree of scepticism with fears 
that already limited attention to and resources for fighting racism might be diverted, 
‘back to white people and their perspective’ in ‘a sneaky form of narcissism’ (Dyson 
cited in Talbot, 1997: 116). In this section, I argue that the narcissism of abolitionism 
offers a space for reflecting on and thinking through the postracial dilemma of how 
any discussion of ‘race’ risks reification, even essentialism. ‘Race’ cannot be so 
easily disentangled from its social materiality.  
 
This narcissistic expression reflects the opening-up of a ‘new’ field, a reification 
now boasting material value in scholarly journals and edited collections. 
Postracialism necessarily involves a re-examination of our professional interests and 
a re-examination of our degree of complicity in the reification of racial difference 
(Gilroy, 1998). This attempt to fully escape the force of ‘race’ raises an inherent 
dilemma. The envisaging of new spaces and forms of identification that can 
engender other non/postracial ways of being is often incomplete. Abolitionism, for 
example, features a pattern of self-focus with analysis and prescriptive proposals 
presented alongside personal anecdotes and ruminations often in the form of an 
introduction (see Roediger, 1994).  
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The advent of whiteness studies curiously coincided with the hard-fought 
institutionalisation of multicultural curricula in the academy. Whiteness became an 
academic vogue when white scholars started emphasizing European culture and 
history (see Allen, 1997). Abolitionism was received with enthusiasm and suspicion. 
Is it possible to escape, dismantle and challenge whiteness while avoiding 
inadvertently bolstering the logics of white supremacy which underwrite it? There is 
a narcissistic danger in the reduction of whiteness to a form of self-help for white 
people suffering an identity crisis. Whiteness without a clear programme for 
unpacking the ways in which it is used to maintain privileged power and to 
marginalise and disempower others (Projansky & Ono, 1999) risks complicity with 
white domination.  
 
It is believed that once whiteness is rendered visible, racism - in the form of white 
privilege - can be reduced if not eliminated. This is consistent with the postracial 
ambition of going through ‘race’ reckoning with its destructive material and psycho-
social consequences as opposed to a colourblind insistence that whiteness remain 
unmarked and invisible. The ubiquity of ‘race’ and its role as an inescapable 
predicate for the discussion of antiracist and postracial possibilities suggest going 
beyond whiteness will involve going through whiteness. The potential danger is that 
whiteness as a social process – fluid, contradictory and endlessly reconstituted – will 
be conflated with a secure white racial subject.    
 
Abolitionism identifies not ‘race’ or ‘racism’ as the primary social problem but the 
‘white race’: 
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The key to solving the social problems of our age is to abolish the white race. Until 
that task is performed there can be no universal reform, and even partial reform will 
prove elusive, because white influence permeates every issue in US society, whether 
domestic or foreign (Editorial, 1996:9). 
 
Whiteness is the foundational source of oppression. Complexity in social description 
and explanation is lost in a reified whiteness. This is not an epistemic deficiency in 
abolitionism but an example of how discussing ‘race’ (even in postracial projects) 
risks continual reification and essentialism. Whiteness - an imaginary category - is 
invested with an illusory salience and explanatory capacity. Experimenting with 
postracial vocabularies could ameliorate the missed opportunity in reified whiteness 
to benefit from other discourses of struggle and perhaps to build a politics that 
lessens the political purchase of ‘race’.  
 
Where whiteness oppresses all and must be abolished in order to free all, related 
struggles around other forms of domination are relegated to the margins. Narcissism 
threatens to insidiously re-inscribe subjugation and devaluation through the neglect 
of the lived experiences of those perceived as non-white. The narcissism of abolition 
stymies dialogue and coalition building across liberatory struggles. The resulting 
approach - without an analysis of concrete social and material conditions - can be 
more obscuring than clarifying, more damaging than ameliorating. 
 
An explanatory over-reliance on whiteness comes close to portraying whiteness as a 
ubiquitous and unchanging trans-historical force rather than a shifting and contingent 
construction
27
. Many authors who view whiteness as an independent category come 
close to reifying it and thereby lose sight of its contextual variations and perhaps 
                                               
27  Problems with explanatory over-reliance and reification can be found throughout whiteness 
studies see Jacobson, 1998; Lipsitz, 1998.  
140 
 
even undermine the very understanding of ‘race’ as socially constructed. Perhaps as 
Frankenburg (1993) suggests this is a symptom of working with whiteness which is 
itself real and unreal; ubiquitous and invisible. Might a subversive reification be 
necessary to dismantle whiteness? Reconfiguring ‘race’, in other words, requires its 
formal acknowledgement and not only its abolition. Could a ‘weak constructionist’ 
(St Louis, 2002) white racial identity provide the basis for a critical and ethically 
responsible usage of race? Might this retention offer greater descriptive and 
explanatory capacity and enable more accurate theories of the complexities of 
materially and symbolically significant racialised social structures, relations and 
interests? Or is whiteness irredeemable? Reckoning with whiteness frames the 
postracial conundrum; how can the fallacious idea of ‘race’ be disentangled from its 
social and political materiality? And what is at stake in such a move? 
 
Abolitionists - in revealing how whiteness functions as a racial norm - have begun 
denaturalising whiteness and thereby robbing it of some of its power to order thought 
and practice (Ignatiev & Garvey, 1996). But questioning power from a position of 
power is not a straightforwardly progressive exercise. For Spivak (1990) it is an 
impossibility. The narcissism underwriting abolitionist zeal ultimately depends on 
white privilege for its articulation. The project re-centres whiteness by positioning 
white people as the ultimate agents of change. Uninterested in ‘redeeming’ 
whiteness, the symbolic death of whiteness becomes the potential for real identity. 
Whiteness becomes a twisted self-love, ‘the whiteness we love to hate’ (Moon and 
Flores, 2000: 101). Abolitionists hope to realise cross-‘race’ class struggle by opting 
out of whiteness (which can be chosen or rejected) disentangling it from histories of 
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white supremacy through public acts of social treason. But outside of a larger 
political movement what is the effect and meaning of this treason?  
 
This analysis of racism is problematic because of its limited ability to help us think 
about how to overcome the connection to a racist past - beyond dangerously 
suggesting that ‘whites’ are not really connected to that past. The difficulties of 
Gilroy’s (2000) postracial humanism are highlighted when a well-intentioned racial 
abolition quickly descends into a potentially sanitised and particular testimony 
appropriated by a Marxist solipsism that ruptures the postracial imagination. The 
self-conscious production of the postracial subject reconfirms a narcissistic logic. 
The recovery of American labour history enables the reclamation of the white 
subject who can then dis-identify with the political power of white skin (Wiegman, 
1995: 2). Historical re-appraisal places agency centre stage recognising that the 
white supremacist order was historically produced in a construction beyond 
phenotypes.  
 
4.3.2 Racial Ventriloquism  
 
Abolitionism, in only targeting whiteness, seems to resurrect the essentialised and 
homogenised notion of blackness Hall (1996) attempted to lay to rest. In this section, 
I examine racial ventriloquism and explore how it enables a critical revisiting of the 
postracial dilemma of how reference to ‘race’ appears incapable of escaping its 
historical mobilisation for purposes of exclusion and domination. This incomplete 
deconstruction remains in the essentialised terrain of oppositional identity politics: 
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Once you enter the politics of the end of the essential black subject you are 
plunged headlong into the maelstrom of a continuously contingent, 
unguaranteed, political argument and debate… You can no longer conduct 
black politics through the strategy of a simple set of reversals, putting in the 
place of the bad old essential white subject, the new essentially good black 
subject (Hall,1996: 28). 
 
It is worth nothing that deconstructionism, which only seizes upon the erasure of 
whiteness and the declaration of it as culturally empty, has fuelled a reactionary 
whiteness. In the backlash, white ethnic identity achieves victim status with white 
privilege understood as threatened by the injustices of multicultural programs and 
movements (Hewitt, 2005). In California during the 1990s a fierce white backlash 
saw a legislative assault on immigrant access to education and healthcare. 
 
The notion of ‘race’ in abolitionism - reliant upon a fixed and eternal notion of 
difference - notably shares conceptual ground with racist arguments. The fixing of 
blackness seems to encourage the presupposing of the permanency of affiliation – a 
political racial ventriloquism. Acknowledging the multiplicity of different ‘black’ 
subjectivities or engaging with the positionalities of a variety of black masculinities 
becomes a challenging, if not impossible task (Mercer, 2001). Abolition remains 
caught in the postracial dilemma – reference to ‘race’ and its continued application 
only serves to reinforce its dangerous common-sense meanings that cannot escape its 
historical mobilisation for purposes of exclusion and domination (Gilroy, 2000). 
Racial ventriloquism threatens to totalise discussions delimiting considerations of the 
multiple inflections of sexuality and gender in the structures of racism.  
 
Such implicit reductionism is alarming because of the potential to oversimplify 
politics leading to the lazy equation of blackness with a radical political identity. 
Might this well-intentioned essentialism and the re-appropriation of racialist 
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understandings of identity undermine much of the radical premises and promises of 
abolitionism? We might also reconsider this as signifying a perhaps insoluble tension 
in postracial projects. The tension captures a theoretical/practical impasse that 
resonates deeply in the schism between intellectualism and activism. Postracialism(s) 
- powerful and cogent in its identification of the ethical tensions and political 
problems with the concept - remain(s) in a sense impotent with the recognition of the  
utility of ‘race’ to antiracism (Lentin, 2000). I will discuss this dilemma at length in 
chapter six. 
 
Without greater specification, the racial ventriloquism in abolitionism (re)turns to 
essentialism; just being black is good enough. The value of political allegiance to 
certain actions, strategies and ethical commitments dwindles. Abolitionism argues 
that ‘good whiteness’ is deeply problematic. At worst it implies racism stems from 
ignorance and that the solution lies in changing minds not confronting structures and 
interests while at best it accepts the legitimacy of racial identification which vitiates 
against the constructed nature of ‘race’. There can be no ‘good whiteness’ that 
imagines nonracist ways of being and non-normative ways of being white 
(Frankenburg, 1993). Abolition instead involves the production of a new antiracist 
subject created through a ventriloqual retrieval of nonwhiteness. Such a thesis stands 
in direct opposition to an anti-humanist and post-foundationalist approach to 
understanding society and the social actor whereby both the social structure and the 
individual agent are deconstructed.  
 
Recalling my earlier discussion, Foucauldian analysis looks for a way to understand 
how subjectivities of various kinds are formed within networks of power. A 
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Foucauldian genealogy could perhaps aid the development of an analysis capable of 
accounting for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework  
providing a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges and 
discourses of whiteness without having to make reference to the transcendental racial 
subject that ventriloquism inevitably returns to.  
 
In abolitionism power is the possession of a subject who chooses when, where and 
how to use it, hence whites can choose to simply defect from the privileges of 
whiteness. Sovereign prohibition, in Foucauldian terms, seems to underwrite the 
conception of power in abolitionism and this may be too limiting as subjectivity is 
assumed to be necessarily prior to the exercise of power. For Foucault, certain 
subjectivities are produced in networks of power. Power is more than a subjectivity’s 
capacity to prohibit an action; more than that which prevents people from doing 
something. Power - particularly in modern industrialised societies - can also operate 
non-subjectively. While this is not the space for the elaboration a Foucauldian 
genealogy of whiteness, it is worth noting that Foucault’s insight could perhaps help 
to rethink the abolition of whiteness in non-subjective directions.  
 
The approach to racism in abolitionism perhaps inadequately accounts for and 
insufficiently examines the institutionalised patterns of cultural value and social 
subordination which effectively (re)produce ‘race’ and inferiorise and exclude 
racialised minorities from social, political and economic equality (Fraser, 2003). 
Abolitionism argues that racism and racial inequality cannot be understood without 
grasping the formation and maintenance of white racial identity - reminding us that 
the denial of white privilege is the foundation of colorblind racism. But just what is 
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the effect and meaning of this treason? Racial ventriloquism seems to allow for a 
quick-and-easy disavowal of whiteness. Is it conceivable that the racial treason 
represented by a white family moving into a non-white racialised area could 
facilitate the gentrification of the neighborhood? Racial ventriloquism cannot resolve 
the social reality that in a racially stratified world the appearance of being white is 
likely to still confer privilege in numerous and significant ways irrespective if those 
privileges are wanted.  
 
How then will abolitionism tackle the complex and institutionalised patterns of 
racism which regulate interaction according to parity impeding cultural norms? 
Abolishing whiteness will not immediately dismantle the juridified forms of racism 
expressed in codified law or other institutionalised practices emerging from 
governmental policies, administrative codes and professional practices. Without 
deconstructing and or contesting the informal patterns of social subordination such 
as associational patterns, longstanding customs or crystallised social practices the 
project remains seriously underdeveloped. 
 
4.3.3 Anti-identity Identity Politics 
 
Abolitionism re-oriented self-critiquing identity politics onto whiteness. After an 
examination of the social (re)production of whiteness and its role in the maintenance 
of racial hierarchy Ignatiev and Garvey (1996) made the leap towards abandonment. 
In this section, I examine abolitionism as an anti-identity identity politics arguing 
that this concept enables us to grasp the political difficulties of deconstructing ‘race’ 
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and the allure of racial logics in deconstructive projects. Identity-based knowledges 
are generally founded on the construction of epistemic authority for marginalised 
subjects. White abolitionism, however, is oriented toward undoing the 
epistemological and geopolitical privilege that accrues to white subjects. It is an anti-
identity identity politics - unmasking, critiquing and even dismantling the object it 
names. How can white privilege be deconstructed and challenged without 
inadvertently augmenting the supporting logics of white supremacy? Also, how can 
whiteness be volitionally rejected if the advantage conferred operates regardless of 
the subject’s consent?   
 
White abolitionists call for dismantling believing that studying whiteness will only 
glorify it further - the preference for re-articulation over erasure is a ‘failure of 
political nerve’ (Ignatiev, 1999:7). Roediger echoes; ‘It is not merely that whiteness 
is oppressive and false, it is nothing but oppressive and false’ (emphasis in original) 
(1994: 31). There is a postracial recognition here that any preservation of white 
identity is problematic as it re-inscribes white supremacy. This is a limited or 
singular postracial sentiment. It is not that ‘race’ is an essentially racist category – 
the product of racism and as such inevitably carries racist assumptions and 
structures. It is whiteness that is essentially, irredeemably racist.  
 
White abolitionism is not racial abolitionism. Can abolitionism be partial if ‘race’ 
works as a comparative and relational identity reliant on a contrasting ‘Other’? There 
seems to be a serious political problem in maintaining that ‘race’ is arbitrary and 
then contending that white racial identification is reprehensible but black racial 
identification is virtuous. Limiting abolition to whiteness misses the transformative 
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ethical potential of postracialism. In a testament to the powerful grip of racialism 
even on antiracism, blackness is treated as a prior identity justified in terms of its 
existence and difference instead of any anterior political principle and ethical 
criterion. Postracialism invites us to situate identities historically and subject them to 
political and ethical scrutiny. All racial identities ought to be interrogated as a 
‘position’ justifiable on political and ethical terms (St Louis, 2009). 
 
Whiteness according to Marxist labour history was a hegemonic wedge used to 
divide-and-conquer the proletariat, obfuscate the common materialist interests of 
working class whites and forestall the universal revolution (Roediger, 1994). 
Whiteness is a form of false consciousness that impedes working class alliances. 
This is an anti-identity identity politics vehemently against whiteness that longs to 
reinstall a ‘postracial’ working-class subjectivity to insure political unification and 
the success of class warfare. The assumption here is that cross-racial federations 
afford greater political representation and align more with the interest of the majority 
of ‘whites’. Equally assumed is that without the wedge of whiteness, working class 
solidarity will be easily achieved if not already-existing as some state of nature.  
 
This is a welcomed attempt to rethink a complex history of entanglement and 
racialisation. Although offering a historically compelling account of white 
supremacy, might this reduce white privilege into a bourgeois scam incapable of 
explaining a complicated reality? Could white racism have a greater complexity that 
cannot be singularly resolved through a class analysis? It would appear, for instance, 
inattentive to internal boundaries more precisely how whiteness is fractured by class, 
gender, sex, ethnicity, age and able-bodiness.  
148 
 
 
The abolitionist call to relinquish power and unlearn privilege can potentially take 
the form of a white re-sentiment which has the effect of appropriating the moral and 
political authority of the disempowered - the very critical strength of the other.
28
 
Abolitionism calls for the dis-identification with the ‘possessive investment in 
whiteness’ and implicitly an identification with those political positions designated 
‘nonwhite’ (Lipsitz, 1998). The mobility of the white subject stands in opposition to 
the implicit immobility of the essentialised ‘nonwhite’ subject. Despite humanist 
pretensions, it is the white subject who transcends the segregationist boundaries of 
knowledge and political affiliation while racialised ‘Others’ remain politically 
identified with the social margins. This reinforces racism by positioning whites as 
historical agents and political actors (Fields, 2001). Agency remains the preserve of 
the antiracist white subject who shapeshifts into blackness.  
 
Political construction particularises whiteness crafting an antiracist class politics for 
economically disenfranchised whites. Whiteness as a political and if not racial 
identity can be undone, abolished even by unravelling the material and cultural 
forces that have produced it. An unconscious trace of liberal whiteness is infused in 
this reclamation. Whiteness is unwound and the contemporary white subject obtains 
a powerful narrative of discursively black ethnic origins (Wiegman, 1995:3). This 
reclaimed humanist subject can deflect white racial membership by way of a socialist 
political affiliation. The hesitancy to full racial abolition highlights while ‘race’ may 
have a negligible theoretical efficacy as a sociological concept it has a significant 
political and ethical purchase as a practical social formation.  
                                               
28 See the introduction to Lipsitz, 1998 
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The preservation of a ‘prewhite’ ethnicity (read blackness) illustrates a recurring 
tension in postracial projects - the dismantling of whiteness simultaneously 
reproduces an essentialised, pre-social notion of blackness. Blackness becomes the 
authentic and radically democratic social identity capable of enabling the formation 
of a socialist state. In Race Traitor blackness is a unitary political category 
(implicitly progressive), a reified social definition and a culturally valuable grouping 
seemingly impervious to ethico-political scrutiny. The African-American is the 
quintessential American: 
The adoption of a white identity is the most serious barrier to becoming fully 
American…The United States is an Afro-American country…Above all the 
experience of people from Africa in the New World represents the distillation of the 
American experience (Garvey & Ignatiev, 1996: 18-19). 
 
 Postracialisms ask a more radical question; How might we conceptualise the 
deconstruction of whiteness - in the sense of people self-identifying as white - within 
the broader context of breaking down racial identifications in general? If race is 
virtually inseparable from the idea of a hierarchy among the ‘races’ can we challenge 
racialism by only challenging the desirability of one racial identification?    
 
Why does the production of a minoritised whiteness become the seemingly 
necessary precondition for an antiracist project? How can we imagine a postracial 
future beyond whiteness? Postracialist positions contend that achieving such must 
involve ‘an attack on the very notion of ‘‘race’’ and the obstinate resilience of racial 
identities’ (Ware and Back, 2001:4) or an idealistic project of ‘planetary humanism’ 
designed to undue ‘race’ through the concept of a cosmopolitan ‘strategic 
universalism’ (Gilroy, 2004).  
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that the three forms of non/postracial narcissism – Quaker, 
Baha’I and secular nonracialism, mixed-racialism and white abolitionism – offer a 
space for reflection on the challenge of escaping the ‘allure of race’ and the problems 
of how we constitute identity and live with difference. Postracialism offers a radical 
anti-foundationalist approach that responds to the inherent problems in 
constructionism namely the reliance on ontological security. Postracial interventions 
also raise interesting and dilemmatic tensions concerning modes of identification 
based on sameness. Explorations of narcissistic non/postracialism enabled an 
examination of the challenges in postracial projects particularly recovering histories 
of suffering and constituting an antiracist politics without ‘race’. The next chapter 
will continue to explore the insights and tensions of the postracial ambition through a 
critical survey and evaluation of the ethical critiques of ‘race’ since the inter-war 
period. 
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Chapter 5 The Ethical Critiques and Ethical Paradoxes of Postracialism 
 
 
In this chapter I explore postracialist attempts to escape the centripetal forces of 
‘race’ through ethical critiques. Methodologically this entails the use of Foucault’s a 
priori, which exhorts against the perils of presentism. We must be mindful in 
historical work that contemporary sensibilities about ‘race’ simply did not exist in 
past settings. The history I assemble demonstrates the reductionism of ‘homogenous,  
empty time’ and locates these thinkers in the contradictory lineage of postracialism 
(Anderson, 1983: 24). The analysis builds upon the Foucauldian ‘history of the 
present’ by problematising the present ‘truths’ of postracialism and through a wealth 
of unpublished material enables a re-examination of current debates. I assemble to 
such end multiple and incomplete paths of development from the archives. Archival 
data is analysed in relation to contemporary writing to explore the complexities and 
ambiguities of (proto)postracial projects.  
 
The chapter is structured by nine sections exploring postracialist critiques and 
engaging conservationist dilemmas. Section 5.1 details the ethical critique according 
to the constituent components I have identified. Subsequent sections unpack these 
themes in specific conjunctures. Section 5.2 examines how the ethical error of ‘race’ 
was contested by (proto)postracialism through ‘genuine sympathy’ - a radical 
extension of compassion that made racial divisions irrelevant. Section 5.3 
investigates the contradictory ethical implications of enacting postracialism 
particularly the risk of re-inscribing colourblindness and disregarding histories of 
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suffering and political struggle. Section 5.4 looks at how (proto)postracialist 
arguments disputed the given-ness of ‘race’ through constructionist arguments 
predicated on ethical sensibilities committed to antiracism. Section 5.5 re-examines 
Harrison through Marxist humanism and neo-Marxism to show the significance of 
ethics to Marxist critiques of ‘race’. Section 5.6 probes the question; can ‘race’ be a 
compelling ethical ideal and ultimately argues that it can if it is framed by postracial 
inspired ethical questions. Section 5.7 explores the ontological dilemma of ‘race’ – 
on one hand the psychic resources it provides and on the other the potential danger 
of remaining within the coordinates established by racism. Section 5.8 looks at the 
ethical challenges faced in grappling with ‘race’ in the affective register; can ‘race’ 
be kept without the axis of hierarchy upon which it has rested for centuries? Section 
5.9 investigates how the embrace of a vocabulary of contingency opened up ‘race’ to 
evaluation as a moral and political category (not) worth having. Revisiting Harrison 
through Durkheim I suggest that ‘common zeal’ signals important lessons and asks 
crucial questions for postracialisms.  
 
5.1 The Ethical Critique Sketched 
 
Recall from chapter three how Herder, Buffon and Darwin varyingly integrated 
ethical critiques into their arguments. This chapter focuses on the inter-war 
conjuncture and beyond when a robust ethical argument took shape in response to 
Nazism and European imperialism. The critique, I argue, is comprised of the denial 
of dignity and the (re)production of destructive sentiments, the naturalisation of 
hierarchies, the imposition of racial scripts on individual identities and the ethical 
problems involved in using ‘race’ in political mobilisations.  
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Postracialism(s) object to how the construction of racial types of being inevitably 
carries moral consequences. Racism and the categories it generates violate basic 
moral norms of equality and the recognition of dignity (Haddon & Huxley, 1935). 
Du Bois remark that, ‘The black man is the person who must ride Jim Crow in 
Georgia’ (Du Bois, 1940:153) is an unambiguous account of the ethical stakes of 
racism. Racial assignment locates people in a hierarchy of worth and capacity and 
unevenly distributes social and material goods along those axes.  
 
Inter-war critics rejected folk definitions chiefly how ‘race’ assumed a fixed and 
value-laden relationship between the physical and moral nature of human groups. 
Detractors were concerned with the violations flowing from folk understandings and 
the (re)production of attitudes that regarded others as inferior beings as well as social 
systems that denied dignity. Montagu (1997) inveighed against harmful racial 
stereotypes such as the savage nature of autochthonous Australians. Understood by 
postracialists (Gilroy, 2000) as the end result of racism, ‘race’, violates the central 
ethical idea of modernity: people should be treated the same unless there is a morally 
relevant difference between them.  
 
The consequences of these practices were manifold and difficult to understate. 
Destructive sentiments - bigotry, hatred and malevolence - were justified in the name 
of ‘race’. Colonialist racism extolled whiteness (implicitly male and propertied) 
while systematically denigrating racialised ‘Others’ (Stoler, 1995). Attitudes of 
contempt and scorn directed at those on the bottom of the racial hierarchy were 
morally permissible, if not normative. Racism equated non-white phenotypes with a 
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deeper deficiency (Frederickson, 1971). Racial supremacy rendered subjugation in 
the interest of expanding power and profits morally inconsequential because it 
deprived certain groups of full human status. Racist commonsense assumed an 
almost immutable status capable of explaining racially specific traits and offering a 
morally ‘neutral’ platform for rationalising unequal treatment.   
 
Objections also examined how reference to ‘race’ seemed only to reinforce its 
pernicious meanings - overflowing with ideas of inherent behavioural and 
temperamental differences. These connotations may have recently weakened but 
remain historically enduring (Barzun, 1937). ‘Race’ seemed to forever involve 
phenotypical allusion. Age-old stereotypes of the Japanese as treacherous legitimated 
a state of exception mass internment during WWII (Irons, 1993).  
 
Racial ideology naturalises social hierarchies making existing relations appear as if 
encoded in the nature of things. Sociological explanations become redundant in the 
tautology of racism. Disproportionate arrest and conviction rates of Latinos, the end 
product of racial profiling and over policing (Romero, 2006), become evidence and 
explanation of a racial predisposition. Racism creates a fundamentally unethical 
system disguising its (un)ethical assumptions by naturalising them in a hierarchy.  
 
For some ‘race’, so conflated and inescapably evaluative, should be dropped 
altogether (Montagu, 1997). ‘Race’ cannot be re-signified without traces of 
degradation and subjugation (Appiah, 1996). The intertwined history of racism and 
‘race’ is testament to how ‘race’ - at the core of doctrines of racial supremacy and 
manifest today in structural inequalities - is an essential means to an unethical end.  
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Fanon (1967) and Césaire (1955) have shown ‘race’ distorts the consciousness of the 
oppressor simultaneously brutalising victim and assailant. Postracialism attempts the 
restoration of a more humane consciousness to racist oppressors combating the 
deprivation of individuality and the alienation from species-life (Gilroy, 2004).  
 
Ethical critiques consider two questions: (1) How has race operated historically? I 
have answered this question above and in chapter three. And (2) How might ‘race’ 
work in the future? This second question welcomes creative reflection. The 
interrogation of what ‘race’ does and what we would like it to do or not do informs 
current critiques to which I will now turn. Present critiques maintain racial identities 
impede individuality (Appiah, 1996). ‘Race’ encourages the individual to envision 
life plans in narrow ways and to think of herself, her prospects, relationships and 
personal styles in accordance with ready-made racial scripts. These scripts prohibit 
the ethical demand for self-realisation forestalling the basic task of existence (Hill, 
2009). How can one create meaning for herself if her efforts are blocked by 
accumulated disadvantage or by pervasive doubts about her abilities? Postracialism 
rejects ‘race’ and the order it implements to produce and regulate individual subjects 
through preformed frames of interpretation (Gilroy, 2004:13). Some postracialists 
(Hill, 2001) aim to re-open the self and to transform being (racial) into a project of 
becoming (postracial self-invention).  
 
Postracialisms attempt to imagine ontology without the prescriptions of who to 
associate with, how to speak, what job to pursue etc. Pre-programmed racial 
identities are incompatible with a self who chooses the best ethical system in pursuit 
of the good (Hill, 2000:103). Broadly speaking, postracial ontologies set out to 
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replace the (false) guarantees and short-circuits of ‘race’ with commitments and 
values forged in dialogue and above all ethical analysis. It is a project intending to 
make identity less about living in accordance with prescribed norms and more about 
self-constitutive critique.  
 
Normative racial attitudes and values – not immune from scrutiny - are subjected to 
critical distancing. Cultures with oppressive value systems that denigrate the lives of 
Others would earn the ethical indictment of those outside and inside the community 
(Hill, 2000:58). Belief systems must supply ethical reasons for the continuance of 
such. Postracial critiques attempt to dismantle the circular reasoning of identity 
refusing to refer to ‘race’ as a coherent category despite people ‘locating’ themselves 
racially. Postracialisms challenge us to develop social positions within ethical 
parameters not limited to the illusory conditions of ‘race’. This newfound freedom to 
reject unwanted values necessarily entails a responsibility for injudicious ethico-
political commitments.  
 
Examining how ‘race’ operates in political movements St Louis (2002) has argued 
that the unity held through the arbitrary category is inevitably unsustainable. 
Techniques for managing this fragility can involve naturalistic claims intended to 
cohere social groups as racial collectivities. The ‘natural’ unanimity in racial 
categories is in actuality the result of strategic choices and evasions that privilege 
particular elements of the collective interest over others (St Louis, 2005b: 361). 
Historians remind us, for example, that the appearance of an undifferentiated front in 
the Civil Rights Movement was underpinned by a classical sexism (Barnett, 1993). 
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Pseudo-solidarities demand an unthinking affiliation, bypass dialogue and take-for-
granted the complicated endeavour of coalition building. 
 
Unearned solidarity can also validate the unsustainable belief in forms of collective 
belonging that utilise coercive techniques to internally police ‘authentic’ decorum. 
Group difference can become inflated with commonsense ideas about group 
specificity and difference reinforced. Those commonsense ideas are themselves 
disciplinary and regulatory forms. Epithets of inauthentic racial subjectivity illustrate 
this point. Terms like ‘Bounty’ in the UK or ‘Oreo’ in the USA assert a normative 
ideal of group appropriate behaviour that encourages conformity and appears to 
possess an authoritative justification for reprimanding deviations. Accusations of 
inauthenticity entail psycho-social consequences such as self-doubt, and feelings of 
inferiority.  
 
5.2 Genuine Sympathy & the Ethical Error of ‘Race’  
 
Racialist thinking made ‘race’ the relevant factor when determining moral value and 
obligation. Harrison probed how racialism ranked humanity in a scale of moral 
worth. ‘Isn’t it high time to ask of what value is that kind of sympathy which is 
ready to be alienated as soon as Negroes cease to be ‘niggers’ and insist on being 
men?’ 29 Racialism differentially ascribes worth using racial ascriptions in the 
rationalisation of oppression. ‘Genuine sympathy’ becomes an impossibility when 
racism sanctions an unethical disregard for people who belong (or are thought to 
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belong) to a particular (inferior) ‘race’30. Disregard is the withholding of respect, 
concern, or care from members of a particular ‘race’ (Taylor, 2004).  
 
Harrison’s sobering consideration of our moral system presses us to imagine 
difference without the ranking of morphological otherness and to critically 
reconsider the ethical consequences of racialised sociality. He signals a move from 
the strategic emphasis on plausibility to the open question of preferability. Do we 
want ‘race’? And considering the spurious beginnings of ‘race’ which Harrison was 
familiar with 
31
, this point seems warranted and possible. Might genuine sympathy 
enable new modes of belonging beyond exclusive membership?  
 
Genuine sympathy, a potentially potent political and moral language for resistance to 
racism, attempts to re-orient the human beyond imperialism’s exclusionary codes. 
This is not a non/postracialist attempt to move quickly beyond the destructive 
delusions of racism. Insistence on ending dehumanising alienation suggests it is 
conceived as a response to the damage produced by racial thinking. Genuine 
sympathy reminds us of the importance of interrogating the conceptual status of 
‘race’32. Debating ‘race’ is worthwhile because as Harrison shows racism 
significantly depends on the persistence of the racialised mindset.  
 
Genuine sympathy might prove limited in the potential neglect of racism. Racism 
cannot be reduced to a critique of the conceptual status of ‘race’. Inauthentic 
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sympathy alone does not subjugate ‘Negroes’. Genuine sympathy may lack a focus 
on how systemic actions like labour discrimination corrupt a non/postracial 
humanism. In short, racism is more than just thinking about ‘races’. It is also a 
materially coordinated set of institutions. Inadequate theorisation risks conflating the 
disappearance of racism with a transformation in how we conceptualise each other – 
as postracial. If we act on the world in a racial way with racial consequences, ‘race’ 
will remain relevant (Leonardo, 2009). Social practices and institutional 
arrangements (re)producing racial stratification remain crucial to the pursuit of 
postracialism. 
 
Returning to the question of plausibility, genuine sympathy may seem an 
impossibility particularly where racism seems ubiquitous. Unconcerned with 
practical tactics, genuine sympathy is in this sense an opening up not a closing down 
of ‘race’. The implicit nonracialism enables an enhanced self-awareness and 
criticality towards the precepts of racialism. Its radical force lies in how it allows 
new questions as products of intellectual and material development to surface. 
Harrison does not suggest that the postracial has arrived or that ‘race’ has somehow 
become irrelevant. Alive to the injuriousness of race, he seems to intimate at 
contemplating the question; what should the future of ‘race’ be?  
 
Writing after the Plessy verdict supplied imprimatur to apartheid Harrison’s was a 
historical conjuncture where racism circumscribed the domain in which political 
speech operated (Thomas, 1997). Racism was an integral force shaping the limits of 
the sayable. A network of interlocking legislation (Chinese Exclusion Act, 
Gentleman’s Agreement, alien land laws) instituted racial hierarchy at the social, 
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political and economic level with deleterious moral consequences - degradation, 
persecution and suffering - for those not accorded full moral respect. In an era when 
speaking out could carry social, political and professional consequences Harrison 
asked how can we have an authentic sympathy with a category imbedded in moral 
error? Criticism could be identified with racial treachery or enemy status as in 
France during the Dreyfus affair (Cahm, 1996). 
 
Not long after Harrison’s reflections on genuine sympathy an international cohort of 
left-leaning scientists responded to Hitlerism by critiquing objectionable racial 
theories of difference. Leftist politics conflicted with racial theory - used to 
rationalise practices antithetical to socialism – and opposed racial thinking from 
ethico-political convictions namely hostility to class hierarchy and the British 
Empire (Schaffer, 2005).  
 
With population genetics and the new evolutionary synthesis capable of lending 
credibility to a racist or an egalitarian view, political beliefs and their in-built ethical 
commitments often settled the direction and tone of analysis during this period 
(Barkan, 1996). ‘The Germans have a right to rule others because they are a superior 
‘race’, and the Jews must be expelled because they are inferior. The same sorts of 
theories are used by the British in India and by many of the whites in South Africa 
and the Southern States of the USA (Haldane, 1939:178).’ Haldane’s Marxism 
directed attention to class stratification, eschewed hierarchy and indicted racism.  
 
Around this time, Harrison reflected on the dissonance between democratic promise 
and democratic practice: 
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Isn’t it obvious that the Klan is a god-send to our perspiring country; Isn’t 
America’s great need at present a little sober realism that will dispose of all this silly 
talk about democracy and equality and such loose-ends of fallacies that flap in the 
face of the god-given right of the Anglo-Saxon Nordic to rule in this land which he 
has made.
33
 
 
Extremist violence exposed the contradictions of racialised democracy. Seeking 
resolution to a problem described as soluble only through, ‘forces more complex 
than those of mere logic and argument’34 Harrison advocated a solidarity premised 
on love and the expansion of consciousness; ‘Every lynching-tree and Jim crow car 
is teaching us that we must stand by each other one for all and all for one in matters 
of money, mind, politics and religion’35. Cognisant of empty antiracisms, Harrison 
did not attempt a quick fix. He called for a democracy without racialised inequalities 
intimating towards identification at the level of the human. This theme has been 
reawakened in contemporary discussions (Gilroy, 2004: xi).  
 
The moral universe of colonialism continues, in new and old ways, in the War on 
Terror. In the War on Terror racism operationalises ideas of ‘race’ and nation to 
determine which bodies warrant moral consideration (Butler, 2003). Racism frames 
who is human and determines who is deserving of civil or political liberties. 
Obituaries memorialising ‘Western’ military deaths, for example, are sanctified in 
long narratives structured by nationalist and familial frames. Little, if any regard, is 
given to civilian deaths from drone attacks. Are these not the tragic consequences of 
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violence warranting ‘genuine sympathy’? A technical morality sanitises these deaths 
as the collateral damage of impressive military strikes (Butler, 2003:12).  
 
US Army Staff Sergeant Calvin Gibbs, convicted of leading ‘kill squads’ against 
unarmed Afghan civilians, exemplifies the persistent dangers of ‘race’. Commanding 
the Fifth Stryker Brigade, Gibbs recruited soldiers to murder civilians he called 
‘savages’.36 Gibbs confessed to killing civilians for sport, to mutilating his victims 
by taking fingers as war trophies and to constructing fake combat situations by 
detonating grenades and/or planting ‘drop weapons’ to make the victims appear 
armed.
 37
 ‘In my mind, I was there to take the antlers off the deer. You have to come 
to terms with what you're doing. Shooting people is not an easy thing to do.’38 
Hunting metaphors suggests that some lives can be deemed less than human. 
 
Pervasive cultures of racism and impunity in the military reinforce a disregard for 
civilians caught in battle zones. The differential allocation of which deaths warrant 
recognition maintains exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human 
(Butler, 2003). Might, as Harrison implied, a discussion of racism give the faceless 
faces (in the Levansian sense), and disrupt the dehumanisation authorising carnage? 
Postracialism may need to have the dismantling of racism (not only ‘race’) at its 
core. This presents a challenge as the condemnation of racist violence will need to 
involve (begin?) with the experience of the violence suffered. Harrison’s humanist 
logics are developed in postracialism’s suggestion that critical and historical 
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resources are needed to imagine and practice another future. This future beyond the 
cycle of disregard is a theme discussed in chapter eight.  
 
5.3 Ethics and the Problem of Engagement 
 
The autumn of 2001, for some (Zizek, 2002), was an opportunity for that imagining, 
for rethinking global community. The conjuncture seemed over-determined by 
nationalist discourses, extended surveillance mechanisms, the suspension of 
constitutional rights and the development of explicit and implicit forms of censorship 
(Cox, Levine & Newman, 2009). The racialised configuration of power (the 
normalisation of the ‘state of exception’, detention and the curtailment of legal 
protection) for some activist-intellectuals raised the question: Where is the public 
intellectual and what is she to do?  
 
Sociology and science can be redeployed as tools for exploring everyday moral 
problems. Proponents of this position hold the purpose of social science to be 
knowledge that ought to be used in and for interventions. Ethics is about action, 
inquiry and reflection; guided by the realisation in action(s) of the real and true 
goods attainable by humans and thus one’s participation in those goods. Ethics is 
about acting and living in a certain sort of way to realise the objective envisaged.  
 
The debate on the purpose of social-scientific work intersects with the debate on 
‘race’. In a parallel disagreement to Kant and Herder’s dispute on ‘race’, Herder 
argued that philosophy should be general and practical, devoted to serving the people 
politically and morally (Zammitto, 2002:173). Kant, however, sought to attain public 
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stature as an expert in Anthropology (Zammitto, 2002: 293). Buffon, Darwin, 
Haldane, Montagu, and Barzun were also devoted public intellectuals who addressed 
a general and educated audience and stressed the relevance of philosophy and 
science for human affairs. Each agreed that philosophical and scientific reasoning 
could clarify social issues and that it ought to be used to formulate and effect 
solutions to public problems. But in postracialism this translation becomes a 
dilemmatic project.  
 
Dismantling ‘race’ is tantamount to interrogating the very existence of racial groups 
and so risks the identities central to ontologies and political solidarities. Moreover, 
the concept of ‘race’ and the utility of ‘race’ analysis have been the mainstay of 
social theory and critique for decades. Discussions of inequality can hardly be 
articulated without confronting ‘the problem of race’. Postracialism interrogates how 
‘race’ functions as a sort of academic commonsense strengthening antiracist 
intervention through an understanding of how the language of ‘race’ is problematic. 
Postracial critiques demonstrate how ‘race’ is rarely interrogated in the questioning 
of racism. The reality of ‘race’ is readily denied and in the next moment taken for 
granted.  
 
The ethics of engagement presents two questions. (1) Postracialism for whom? In 
other words, are we talking to academics or are we also addressing a public 
audience. Posing this question is effectively answering it, since no one would argue 
for a secluded debate. And (2) postracialism for what? This question addresses the 
very mission of sociology. Should sociology be concerned with the ends of society 
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or only with the means to reach those ends (Burawoy, 2004)? Should intellectuals be 
an integral part of political life? 
 
Translating an ethical critique of racialism into an ethics of action is full of 
difficulties and complexities. In the process postracialism begins to look like 
highbrow intellectualism, out of touch with the realities of racism. Evan the director 
of a London antiracist organisation remarked in my interview: 
I think *** has had a very clear focus as an organization. We wanted to get more 
people from African-Caribbean, South Asian and Asian origin into jobs. So we 
haven’t taken a very theoretical analysis of that [race and racism]. We’ve just dealt 
with the realities - many people in these communities are not in work. So much of 
what we’re about is: how do we work with communities, work with politicians and 
companies to address that problem. In that sense we don’t embark on unpacking: 
What is race? And what is racism? 
 
Evan distinguishes antiracists working directly with social problems from 
researchers deconstructing abstract ideas. There is evidence to his suggestion that 
professionalization has contributed to the withdrawal of the intellectual from public 
life and her gradual disconnection from social movements (Evans, 2004). ‘The 
official does not engage in politics but rather in impartial ‘‘administration”’ (Weber 
1919: 95). The increasing complexity of economic and political life foreshadowed a 
new stratification.  
 
Bureaucratisation - grounded in the claim that its rationalism represented superior 
knowledge - brought a caste of academics into elite positions secured through 
specialised skills leading to an inflated sense of status and protectionism (Weber, 
1919). Might postracialism represent an ‘ethics on high’ disconnected from Evan’s 
merited reservations? His cautioning is a reminder that racism is the socio-political 
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force demanding an ethical response. While dismantling ‘race’ is important to 
contesting racism, it certainly will not end material inequalities (Oliver & Shapiro, 
2006). 
 
Postracial prescriptives can also have contradictory implications. Consider 
professionalization which established Ethnic and Racial Studies departments 
earnestly connected to progressive projects and political subjectivities. Can 
postracialism, in good conscience, advocate their dissolution knowing far-reaching 
impacts on employment and the academic ‘market’ of conferences and publishing 
will follow? The hard-fought ‘victory’ of socially reflective curricula could face an 
early demise. Postracialism begins to look not to dissimilar to conservative 
multiculturalisms which construct a common culture through delegitimizing 
‘foreign’ languages, persistently attacking non-standard English and undermining 
bilingual education (McLaren, 1995). An ethico-political program may be needed to 
insure that postracialisms will not descend into a colour-blind assimilationism where 
racial ‘Others’ are required to adopt a consensual view and learn to accept the 
essentially Euro-American patriarchal norms of the ‘host’ country. 
 
Postracialism confronts similar contradictions with multicultural education, a 
significant achievement despite the at times naïve overemphasis on curricular change 
and under-emphasis of the impact of structural racism and wider power relations on 
students’ lives. This under-emphasis  has resulted in the failure to ameliorate let 
alone contest patterns of discrimination and disadvantage (Gillborn, 1995; Troyna, 
1987). Critical multiculturalism challenges education’s neo-imperial romance with a 
singular ethnicity grounded in a ‘common’ experience of ‘America’ as social 
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relations of uninterrupted accord (McLaren, 1995: 126). Through an exclusivist 
nationalism white identity politics has oppressed racialised minorities (see Lipsitz, 
1998) by centring whiteness as unmarked but crucially generating norms and 
reference points.  
 
With the concept of ‘race’ critical multiculturalism has demystified the workings of 
power and privilege and has contested forms of domination that disallow the 
affirmation of differences. ‘Race’ has been relevant to material and social history. It 
is because of such that the postracial project of making ‘race’ irrelevant must reckon 
with the destructive consequences that are mapped out in multiculturalism. American 
multicultural programs question historical givens, notions of a commonly held 
culture and the supposedly unified and consensual history underpinning it (May, 
1999). White Anglophone backlash expressed in the ban on teaching ethnic studies 
in Arizona high schools represents a new cipher for culturalist racism underscoring 
the contribution of multiculturalism; how particular communal interests and values 
were represented as if held by all. The desperation to protect the privileged status of 
whiteness shows how multiculturalism contests the exclusionary whiteness of 
American nationhood and nationality. Multiculturalism rejects cosmopolitan 
alternatives (discussed in chapter eight) that deny people have deep bonds to 
historical and linguistic communities. It asks postracialism not to pre-emptively 
reject ‘race’ but to reconsider whether ‘race’ is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ on the ability and 
right of members to engage in self-critical distancing from their own cultural 
discourses, and hence also to recognise the potential validity of other discourses 
(May, 1999).  
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In the wake of postmodernism is has become almost de rigueur to dismiss any 
group-based identity as essentialist. While critiques of how racial collectivities can 
exclude and silence as much as they include and empower are significant, it may be a 
problematic jump to suggest that advocating for any recognition of group-based 
identity is indefensible. Compelling arguments for conservation come from critical 
multiculturalism. For example, a progressive education must risk the possibility of 
transcending the concept only by going through it and not over it. Failing to keep 
‘race’ in some qualified form - constantly interrogated and under erasure - could lead 
to the colourblind disaster of The No Child Left Behind Act (Leonardo, 2009). In this 
legislation racial disparities were reduced to nonracial explanations – understood as 
the unfortunate outcomes of group competition, uneven social development, or 
stubborn cultural explanations of racial inferiority.  
 
5.4 Ethics and Concept Formation 
 
Ethical critiques also challenge scientism, a crucial analytical move and a powerful 
rhetorical strategy establishing the validity of its claims not as culturally contingent 
ideas but in terms of timelessly observable properties outside morality. Critiques pry 
open scientific certitudes ‘the reality of human difference’ through appeals to the 
damaging consequences of racialism.  
 
Signification, the process which constructs and infuses ‘race’ with ethical 
significance, enabled alternative explanations. ‘Racial antipathy’ originated from 
chance reactions and was not an instinctive response to ‘difference’ (Royce, 1908) or 
the natural expression of innate dislike. Locke described ‘race prejudice’ as, ‘the 
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most virulent form of culture prejudice, largely a by-product of the imperialistic era 
and definitely correlated with the rise of colonial expansion’39. Locke linked racism 
to cultural prejudice and ‘race’ prejudice with colonialism. Racial prejudice was 
ethically problematic, embedded in a cultural value-hierarchy. Racism is contested 
not with competing truth claims but with ethical values where ‘race’ is part of a 
particular historical process not an inevitability.  
 
Historical analysis shows deep connections between violence, suppression and 
‘race’. Locke went beyond issues of scientific falsity in centring the denial of respect 
and dignity to examine what ‘race’ does and how ‘race’ is used. Historicisation 
interrogates naturalist rhetoric showing that racism is not a universal feature of social 
relations. Certain somatic features (real and imagined) were signified as natural 
marks of difference, a difference that became known as racial difference (Locke, 
1989:163-174). Critics disputed ‘race’ as a category with verifiable properties and so 
challenged the primary epistemological assumption of scientism
40
. Given-ness 
provided a false sense of immutable interracial similarity/difference. Royce and 
Locke dislodged naturalness and the inescapability of racialised visions. They also 
dismantled the exaggerated differences and moral distances embedded in ‘race’ 
which discourage a common humanity. Demonstrably not a ‘fundamental division of 
human kind’, the mental and characterological traits expressed in ‘race’ could be 
morally suspect.  
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Royce’s ‘concept formation’ held objects in the external world were not given, but 
constructed out of our sense impressions. This was not a neutral perceptual scheme 
but rather emerged in accordance with one’s evolving conceptual and interpretative 
frameworks (Royce, 1908). ‘Race’ was constructed through political and economic 
matrices and at most indirectly referred to the world experienced through sense 
impressions. The human sensorium had to be educated to the appreciation of racial 
differences (Gilroy, 2000). Acceptance of the constructed nature of ‘race’ was 
attentive to the dangers of its illusory objectivity. Barzun and Montagu argued that 
‘race’ science was not motivated by a dispassionate striving to understand 
physiological difference. Projects were mired in prejudicial value judgments and 
fundamental fascinations with racial difference.  
 
Locke and Harrison’s socio-political explanations contested the racist meanings 
attached to pseudo-scientific definitions removing racism from the inviolability of 
‘the natural’. Harrison understood ideological effects as flowing from actors who 
give meaning to and structure activity. The active agent was not ideology but the 
actor(s) practicing it, heightening ethical accountability. History was not reduced to a 
progressive unfolding toward a specifiable future where the present is a scripted 
progression (Hall, 1996). Harrison recognised the volition involved in (re)producing 
racism highlighting economic racism in white-only trade unionism
41
. His analysis of 
whiteness raised awareness of how privilege - commensensically understood as 
natural - was the product of centuries of social engineering and institutional 
practices. 
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Harrison examined how use of ‘race’ obscured the active construction of the social 
world by those who articulate racism:  
And the fact that black, brown, and yellow also exploit each other brutally 
whenever capitalism has created the economic classes of plutocrat and proletarian 
should suffice to put purely economic subjection out of court as the prime cause of 
racial unrest…The people of those lands begin to feel and realise that they are so 
subjected because they are members of races condemned as ‘inferior’ by their 
Caucasian overlords. The fact presented to their minds is one of race, and in terms of 
race do they react to it.
42
 
 
Harrison refused simplistic Marxist explanations of racism as a ‘divide-and-conquer’ 
strategy to buttress bourgeois power by obscuring real interests through racial 
divisions. He negotiated ‘race’ by examining its significance to material inequality 
and oppression. Racism was not inherent in the white psyche. Racism was an 
ideology stressing fundamental difference and entrenching inequality in firm 
hierarchies and so any group could (re)produce racism.  
 
Harrison intimated the intractable problem of essentialist racial subjectivities in his 
recognition of the moral odiousness of whatever racial prejudice one harbours. The 
power to harm others through racially prejudicial action is not limited to any racial 
group. His humanist orientation emboldened both oppressor and oppressed with an 
ethical maturity widening the ethical sensibility such that white supremacy became 
only one in a, ‘variety of depressing options in the unwholesome cornucopia of 
absolutist thinking about ‘‘race’’ and ethnicity’ (Gilroy, 2004:36). 
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This postracial sensibility encourages us to rework our conception of the political to 
reject non-negotiated political positions premised on ‘race’ and linked to mythic 
racial biology (Hall, 1996). Unitary racial identities and the political positions 
supposedly deeply ingrained within them are unsustainable fictions. Beyond the 
essentialised black subject is an imagined political actor, prepared to strategically 
employ ‘race’ for the expansion of equality. Harrison believed some form of racial 
solidarity could be a part of the project to work collectively to identify, correct and 
ultimately eliminate race-based injustices.  
 
5.5 The Problem of (Post) ‘Race’ in Marxism 
 
Marxist analyses suggest racism is the active determinant of disadvantage. It is not 
physical racial difference but the attribution of significance to certain patterns 
(imagined or otherwise) of difference to structure social relationships. ‘Race’-centric 
approaches disguise the production of difference presenting it as somehow inherent 
in the reality of observable difference (Miles, 1989). Emphasis on social production 
moves the debate beyond the social/natural antagonism potentially reframing the 
debate through the ethical consequences of racism. 
 
The ethical shielding supplied by scientism can be undone. Debating how racism 
assigned groups in ranked structural positions cannot be an ethically vacuous 
discussion. Weber – perhaps in response to the stubborn Marxist insistence on 
objectivity - argued that cultural (evaluative) interests give ‘purely’ scientific work 
its direction. The knowledge-motivated interest from which Marxists derive a desire 
to explain the socio-historical reality of racism involves the ethical. While the task of 
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social science is to research the reality and operation of meaning and its significance, 
there is no possibility of objective treatment for this task but merely a research 
selection by means of value ideas (Käsler, 1988). In other words, the value-ideas 
which govern the researcher and his epoch determine the object of investigation and 
how far this investigation stretches into the infinity of causal relationships. 
 
Humanists working in the Marxist tradition (Fromm, 1961) disavowed the vulgar 
dismissal of ethics in orthodox Marxism. Fromm (1961) argued that Socialism did 
not seek to realise an ideal human that was well-fed and well-clad but ultimately 
soulless. Marx, in Fromm’s analysis, sought liberation from the chains of economic 
determination and spiritual emancipation. Racism is in a way not too dissimilar to 
alienated labour preventing the realisation of the individual and inhibiting existential 
pursuits.  
 
Harrison’s desire to restore the agency and meaning stripped in racism compliments 
Marxist humanism’s pursuit of the full realisation of individualism. ‘Spiritual 
existentialism in secular language’ involved liberation from the pressures of 
economic needs to overcome alienation and restore man’s capacity to relate to 
himself fully (Fromm, 1961: 262). Harrison aimed to end the rationale and allure of 
palatable racisms by foregrounding the context and practices of racism. Similarly, 
humanist Marxisms present an active social conceptualisation connected with 
ethically responsible ends that stress universal proletarian uplift instead of pre-social 
divisions. They ground objective and materialist social conditions over the non-
reflexive natural world.  
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An ethics of distributive justice informed this conception in, for example, how social 
processes distribute material and social goods. Theorising racism was not neutral 
analytical labour: 
Therefore the race problem is the greatest problem of the world. It must be solved 
primarily and then the white proletariat can be freed. The European worker’s 
movement cannot have any success before the colored races receive their 
freedom...Therefore the aim of all races is common: down with white imperialism.
43
 
 
Proletarian exploitation paled in comparison to the material and existential 
immobility of the racially subordinated. Harrison’s ethical Marxism cannot be 
reduced purely to a concern with man’s material interests and comforts. He is 
interested in the real economic and social life of man and of the influence of man’s 
actual way of life on this thinking and feeling. The aim of socialism appears 
indistinguishable from the goal of dismantling racism - the development of the 
individual personality. Harrison implicitly asks how can genuine emancipation be 
realised – the transformation of alienated, meaningless labor into productive, free 
labor – if some remain sub-human, in Marx’s terms crippled monstrosities (Marx, 
1976/1867)). Harrison refigured Marxism with attention to the damaging 
consequences of racism. The meaning and role of labour and the restoration of 
human significance and worth could only begin once the dehumanization of racism 
ended. Racism like alienation causes the human to not experience herself as the 
acting agent.  
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Division and degradation make racism the ethical issue warranting an inversion of 
the Marxist dictum that the dissolution of the class structure would end racial 
stratification. Harrison did not hesitate to bring explicit ethical concerns into his 
discussion of Marxism: 
And thus the selfish and ignorant white workers’ destiny is determined by the 
hundreds of millions of those whom he calls niggers. The strong too often think that 
they have a mortgage upon the weak; but in the domain of morals it is the other 
way.
44
 
 
 Economistic analysis made ‘race’ an ideological effect disguising real economic 
relationships. Harrison broadened Marxism beyond determinism, locating proletarian 
emancipation as a secondary effect of the destruction of racism. He understood racial 
particularism to be needlessly divisive and ethically at odds with widely cherished 
ideas of utopian socialism, the affirmation of a shared and unalienated identity in a 
colour-blind society. Although he supported the strategic use of identity politics, 
Harrison expressed concerns with the dangers of essentialism and groupthink 
particularly how they might distract from pressing socioeconomic inequalities. His 
analysis is potentially consistent with the goal of bringing about a world where ‘race’ 
is no longer useful or appealing even to those historically disadvantaged by it.  
 
He advanced a program for ending racial injustice by tackling racism, erasing the 
colour-line and ending the self-doubt, feelings of inferiority, and self-alienation 
brought on by racialism. Socialism remained unrealisable until the abolition of 
racism’s deprecation of intellectual ability, moral character, and the undermining of 
one’s sense of self worth. ‘Race’ was understood as a morally invidious and 
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repressive social distinction that should be repudiated. This placed the emancipatory 
project as part of the subject-matter of ethical inquiry and reflection. It is a politics 
refuting the meta-ethical claims of universal emancipation showing how racism 
confounds proletarian emancipation. 
 
Miles (1993) represents a contemporary expression of Marxist postracialism. Miles 
sees any deconstructive strategy retaining ‘race’ as at best, misguided and at worst, 
committing the fundamental mistake of reification. His wilful failure to engage 
ethics stems from adherence to the Marxist emphasis on analytical reasoning and 
forms of rational measurement expressed as an overriding concern with the 
analytical and objective status of ‘race’ as a basis of action. Miles like Darder & 
Torres (2004) remains over-reliant on scientific knowledge demonstrating the futility 
of racial categorisation. ‘Race’, they argue, is nothing more than a commonsense 
idea, sustained by the unquestionable reality of somatic and cultural difference. 
Retained analytically to refer to the social reproduction and consequences of this 
belief, it necessarily carries the meaning of its use in the everyday world (ibid).  
 
An insightful critique, Miles inadequately addresses the ethical implications of ‘race’ 
reducing ‘race’ to the phenomenal. Writing with and against Miles, Gilroy heralds 
the meaninglessness of ‘race’ in new scientific fields. Attentive to political and 
ontological issues, Gilroy seems to share faith that biology can finally resolve the 
‘race’ question’. As chapter three demonstrates biology has never been the basis for 
the effectiveness of racism. In racist discourses biological difference was always 
arbitrary and could work just as easily with imagined as with real differences. An 
overreliance on scientific formalism misses the opportunity to illuminate the 
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commonsense foundations, analytical limitations and ethical evasions of racial 
biology discussed in chapter seven. The constructive curiosity of excavating the 
ethical problems of ‘race’ asks: If ‘race’ is constructed than why do we have the 
concept? And what do we need it for?  This couplet is explored in the next section 
which asks; does ‘race’ represent a compelling ethical ideal?  
 
5.6 Postracialism and the Utility (Necessity?) of Conservation 
 
Postracialism(s) invite us to consider that ‘race’ does not refer to or frame histories, 
relations and experiences all of which are produced in specific historical sites within 
specific discursive formations and practices. Might we be better advised to discuss 
those directly instead of opaquely through the lens of ‘race’ (St Louis, 2009)? This is 
the invitation to cosmopolitan histories re-imagined beyond racial specificity and 
cultural ownership.  
 
But there is a seemingly insoluble tension. The concept of ‘race’ is necessary for 
social-scientific analysis, social critique and the enforcement of civil rights laws 
especially considering past instances of racism still shape current social conditions. 
Hall (1996) reminds us that the resources of racial identity are not spontaneously 
generated they emerge from somewhere and out of something often movements 
dedicated to the collective fight for social justice. Weak forms of Black Nationalism, 
for instance, use a conception of black solidarity as a means to greater freedom and 
social equality and as an idiom to identify shared interests and a general will. 
Collective subjectivities in postracialisms, however, cannot be justified a priori but 
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must be predicated on an ethico-political analysis of how they are situated within the 
modalities of sameness and difference.  
 
This is broadly consistent with Harrison’s ‘race-consciousness’ a strategy to defend 
‘race’ without validating the myth of primordial origins. Harrison stressed that Black 
self-determination must be compatible with respect for intragroup differences. He 
also seemed to suggest that a shared Black identity cannot be the lone foundation for 
solidarity. Responding to the St. Louis riots he described the common experience of 
oppression made possible by racial ascription and lives diminished by 
institutionalized racism as providing the source for an enduring solidarity.
45
 
 
Racial categories as fixed entities deriving legitimacy from claims to a prior 
ontology are ethically indefensible (Hill, 2001) and unnecessarily divisive. ‘Race’ is 
not a sound basis for a social identity and can even sustain incoherent forms of 
solidarity. The postracial marks a moral shift restoring a genuine empathy. The 
critique of false essentialism is compelling but notably without actionable plans. 
Perhaps postracialism - whose strength derives from an unapologetically utopian 
vision - is unconcerned with such. Charges of ‘real world’ disconnect are addressed 
in the next chapter.  
 
The question, ‘How would we opt out of racial categorisation when it is such an 
entrenched position on the social landscape?’ requires answering even if the answer 
is a rejection of the question. To assume that we can jettison ‘race’ is to fall prey to a 
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kind of social voluntarism regarding social structures and identities (Blum, 2002). 
The higher ethical calling of certain postracial projects (Hill, 2001) is difficult in a 
world defined through racism. Are postracialist ethics a luxury not everyone can 
afford? How will postracialism put the modes of intelligibility that we adopt (in 
some instances to survive) as self-interpreting beings, under erasure? What would 
the intermediary stage look like? If ‘race-consciousness’ is a protective response, as 
Harrison argued, then it would appear that the focus on the damaging consequences 
of ‘race’ for the individual may be a personalisation of the structural problem of 
racism. Without attending to these questions, postracialism(s) risks confirming 
accusations of an inattentiveness to racism. 
 
Today the bonding agent for many identity based movements is not the claim to 
primordial origins or ancient homelands. Claims to spontaneous solidarity and 
instinctive unity certainly persist, but unification in the sense of shared political 
interests and commitments also comes through the fact of racial subordination and 
the collective resolve to triumph over it (Shelby, 2005). Racial solidarity even with 
all of its ethical and political problems remains a potent strategy for bringing about 
substantive equality and collective defence against oppression.  
 
For conservationists (Taylor, 2004) ‘race’ - not biologically ‘real’ - could be retained 
provided that it was governed by certain ethico-political principles. Social objectivity 
and political utility rule out elimination. A ‘weak constructionism’ appreciates how 
‘race’ is both real and unreal (Mills, 1989) and can be consistent with the goal of a 
genuinely antiracist postracialism. Locke’s recognition that the racial self is an 
artifice obscuring the vicissitudes of history illustrates this (Hall, 1990). Not fixed 
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essences outside time, for Locke, racial categories were historical, political and 
cultural categories. ‘Race’ was liberated from biological determinism refashioned to 
be patently social, based on common interests. The deeply ethical project used 
artwork to contest stereotypes and to demand full human status and recognition. 
Black political unity was used to bring about a more just society for all.  
 
5.7 Postracialism & the Ontological Dilemma 
 
Becoming in certain postracialisms (Hill, 2000; Eze, 2001) is the foundation for 
forging values and beliefs beyond the parameters of ‘race’. Re-imagined as a 
process, the self can scrutinise and reject undesirable values. Might the 
inaccessibility of institutional power to the racially subordinated make the surrender 
of racial identity particularly the mutual identification that constitutes a social ‘we-
ness’ and the special concern for and loyalty to those within the group represent too 
great a surrender in a hostile world? Toomer pursued a space free from racial ‘rules’ 
denying critical reflexivity accepting that such a bargain entailed the assumption of 
responsibility for injudicious commitments. He required compelling ethical 
justification from racial frames of interpretation. In this sense he was alive to how 
cross-cutting political issues (i.e. heterosexism) disproportionately and directly 
affected certain segments of a marginal group.  
 
The psychic, professional and social costs of renouncing racial identity discussed in 
chapter four highlight an ethical dilemma. Postracialism may represent an attack on a 
deep component of self-understanding and as such may be met with hostility and 
suspicion. Dismantling racial identities could be taken as an assault on hard-fought  
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commonalities that provide support, pride and solidarity in a stigmatising world 
(Blum, 2002). Usage of ‘race’ in forging political solidarities has functioned to 
restore some of the self-respect and self-reliance emptied in racist oppression. Is it 
ethically responsible to prescribe the jettisoning of racial identities when they serve 
as important psychological and political resources?  
 
The damaging effects of racism can also be compounded by poverty which can have 
severe consequences for one’s sense of self-worth. The complexity of racialised 
disadvantage - a multifaceted set of ideology, structural factors and unintended social 
consequences, not just racism - raises the question; Might we need to think about 
postracialism with the lens of structural disadvantage examining how wealth, 
opportunities and political power resultant from past discrimination shape(d) the 
landscape?    
 
How can contemporary postracialism sensitively address the issues raised in 
Toomer’s experience, especially how normative attitudes are accorded reverence? 
Also, how can the liberal individualist impulse underpinning this critique insure that 
it will not authorise a new violence, for example, sovereign actors whose personal 
interests may be fundamentally sexist? This is part of the problem in deconstructing 
collective identities; how do we theorise the individual without reducing her to a 
knowing and autonomous subject? While collective identities should not be immune 
from scrutiny, might liberal individualism be just a form of substitutionism?  
 
Postracialism not only attempts to eradicate collective injustices but also places 
ethical obligations on individuated action such as sexism which may proceed 
182 
 
unchecked by the normative criteria constituting social existence. Organising a 
politics around ‘race’ could slide into the blind-spots inherent in one-dimensional 
politics. bell hooks’ analysis of the OJ Simpson murder trial called attention to these 
dangers namely the preclusion of a complex accounting and understanding. Without 
a reflexive politics the risk of missing and or implicitly endorsing such injustices as 
domestic violence and patriarchy is a distinct possibility. Postracialism could be 
committing an error it is attempting to correct, the totalising effect of ‘race’ as a 
political category.  
 
St Louis (2002) builds on these insights arguing that right now a ‘nominalist 
constructionist’ perspective is theoretically viable, ethically responsible and 
analytically necessary. ‘Race’ is irreducible to either an impermeable symbolic order 
or a set of autonomous social relations (St Louis, 2002). Following Locke and 
Harrison, he reopens the future of ‘racial groups’ to various developmental 
possibilities derived from a social route modifiable through political intervention.  
 
But in failing to dismantle ‘race’, his work comes close to repeating the error of 
maintaining a category whose malignant effects he wishes to eradicate. Although 
socially alterable, what are the ethical consequences of remaining within racial 
categories? Might such an approach struggle to escape the (false) ontology created 
by racism? Might St Louis’ developed activist intellectualism abandon utopianism 
too readily in favour of a pragmatic idealisation? What will insure that this 
‘recreational’ variety will not succumb to the centripetal forces of essentialism? Also 
might this pragmatic approach represent a surreptitious racialism which re-inscribes 
‘race’ through a conservation couched in the language of ethics?  
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In such an instance the deconstructive project could be stalled and ‘race’ reinforced. 
Perhaps St Louis’ approach in seeking to preserve a version of ‘race’ does not 
adequately demonstrate how ‘race’ will be dismantled instead of retrenched through 
an ethical conservation. In short, a greater explication of the descriptive and 
explanatory capacity of this conception and its ability to theorise the complexities of 
materially and symbolically significant racialised social structures and relations is 
needed.  
 
Racial ontology calls attention to another paradox the simultaneous impossibility and 
necessity of (racial) identity (Hall, 1996). Impossibility indexes how essentialised 
identities are no longer ethically defensible. Necessity describes identities as 
historical and social ‘positions’ strategically adopted as political and psychic 
resources (ibid). Hall’s map shows only a crude postracialism could maintain that 
racial categories are worthless and illusory. Working with and against ‘race’ is 
working with complexity, appreciating how ‘race’ both imprisons and liberates, 
wrestling with the paradox of how it is both real and unreal.  
 
This is thorny terrain considering the emergence of the modern discourse is 
implicitly connected to 19th century pseudo-scientific rationales for the existence of 
discrete ‘races’. Can working within ascribed racial being fight racism if it remains 
within the categories produced to sustain racism? Does a responsible usage of ‘race’ 
within discrete ethical parameters still reproduce the category necessary for the 
perpetuation of racism? More precisely, what will this limited, constructionist usage 
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look like? St Louis’ intervention while needing more clarity represents sustained 
engagement with the onto-political complexities of postracialism.  
 
5.8 Postracialism and the Affective Register 
 
At the heart of the above discussion is the question: Is it possible to preserve racial 
distinctions but to explode the axis of hierarchy on which they have rested for 
centuries? For Locke end-values were not mediated by a process of logical 
evaluation. They were conditioned by basic feelings, attitudes prior to intellectual 
evaluation. To locate them solely in the conscious act of evaluation overlooks how 
the affective supplies an unconscious dimension. Emphasis on the affective 
dimension of knowledge involves an appreciation that all data, all experiences, occur 
within a context that necessarily includes an elaborate network of concepts, and 
associations that are cultural and normative in function - that is pervaded by emotion. 
‘Race’ has an affective register that enables racial identity to be emotionally felt.  
 
For Locke, knowledge was undergirded by ‘normative fiction’ from its most 
practical to its most theoretical employment in daily life. Normative fictions may 
guide our reasoning by exposing their affective foundation. Locke did not 
deconstruct such fictions, instead he thought it necessary to demonstrate their 
functional value, even necessity; ‘It should be possible to maintain some norms as 
functional and native to the process of experience, without justifying arbitrary 
absolutes, and to uphold some categoricals without calling down fire to heaven’ 
(Locke, 1935:329). Racial categories while not logically verifiable can be justified 
by the services they perform.  
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We might draw an analogy here between ‘race’ and myths which offer false 
narratives that help constitute and explain distinctive social relations. The 
explanatory account provided by a myth is often logically incoherent and readily 
disproven by science. Literal falsity is not the most important feature. Myths serve 
the purpose of dramatising ethical precepts and encouraging attachment to customary 
practices. Racial cultures can be invaluable collective goods that individuals can 
identify with, take pride in, actively reproduce and creatively develop. Racial 
identity can be an important source of self-esteem and group pride offering common 
narratives for the construction of healthy individual identities.   
 
Conservationists (Taylor, 2004) maintain ‘race’ should be kept in this mythic 
capacity in a manner similar to how an atheistic medical anthropologist might 
discuss the divine interventions of gods that she herself does not believe in. But how 
will conservation prevent slippage into the symbolic register which renders them 
resistant to rational analysis and ethical scrutiny? Postracialism also involves an 
audacious and imaginative move towards realising a future where identity myths as 
both psychic anchors and political resources are not needed. Although recognising 
that collective racial identity can create undue constraint on individual freedom and 
can be self-defeating, it is not convincing how an emancipatory racial solidarity can 
be disentangled from racial identity. It is this seemingly inescapable taint to which 
the postracial ambition responds with the imaginative move to racial abolition.   
 
Royce’s ‘enlightened provincialism’ - inhabiting one’s immediate social context, 
‘geographically and socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its 
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own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its 
distinctions from other parts of the country’ - sheds light on the problem of critical 
conservation (1908:61). Royce described his milieu as, ‘more ways and places in 
which men find themselves in the presence of alien races with whom they have to 
live in the same social order’ (Royce, 1908:4). In the context of immigration, public 
discourse was prefigured by white anxiety. Royce drafted this piece while President 
Theodore Roosevelt delivered his ‘On American Motherhood’ speech warning of 
white ‘race suicide’ if white families continued to reproduce at slower rates than 
other ‘races’. In a conjuncture of reactionary politics, Royce’s conservationism 
arguing for the legitimacy of racial sensibilities, rationalities and perspectives seems 
a response to widespread sentiment about the possible decline of global white 
supremacy. His defence draws on concerns about the homogenizing of cultural 
difference in the name of universal reason; an argument similar in structure to racial 
conservationists who contest Eurocentric metanarratives in an effort to make space 
for and revalorize the cultural and intellectual production of non-Europeans.  
 
Royce’s preservation of whiteness reminds us of some of the asymmetry with respect 
to the desirability of abolishing racial categories such that: 
The social-constructedness of ‘race’ in the racist state has very different meanings 
for groups differently placed with respect to these categories. The ontological 
freedom of categorical reconstruction may be generic, but what is politically possible 
differs for those differentially positioned, and not all the political possibilities for 
every group are desirable (Frye, 1992: 129-130). 
 
A central tenet of ethical critiques concerns the imposition of ‘race’ on the 
individual’s life project. Royce asserted that the most vicious of all immoral acts is 
to deprive another human being of the opportunity to dedicate himself willingly and 
thoroughly to a suprapersonal cause. The man who seeks self-realisation in accord 
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with a particular racial ideal, for Royce, has not probed deeply enough into life to 
find its true meaning (Fontaine, 1968). Racial identity can go imperial (Appiah, 
1996) limiting individual complexity, implying a moral distinction among those of 
different ‘races’ while also imposing a false commonality within. Scripted racial 
identities restrict individuality and detail the inability of ‘race’ to do anything other 
than reinforce embittered distinctions between racial groups (Appiah, 1996). Royce 
attempted to think through racial division by emphasising loyalty to a suprapersonal 
cause. But loyalty can be problematic even in liberatory struggles because it often 
requires that one refrain from deconstructing the group identity on which the 
community is based. 
 
5.9 Common Zeal and the Non/Postracial Ambition 
 
Scholars have scrutinised ‘race’-based mobilisations and exposed the 
authoritarianism in group loyalty suggesting that ‘race’ is a morally suspect category 
(St Louis, 2003). A politics configured in terms of racial loyalty can become little 
more than the instrumentalist practice of securing a preconceived community (Hall, 
1996). What modes of identity are endorsed and what modes of difference are 
excluded in a politics of loyalty? Conservationism can be problematic precisely 
because of the potential that can grow out of racial realism and naturalism. 
 
Not wrestling with how ‘race’ is articulated with cross-cutting categories how 
racialised women can be caught in a political tug-of-war between the demands of 
racial loyalty and the desire for sexual autonomy can be problematic. The legacy of 
La Malinche in Chican@ feminist writing is widely considered to be the symbol of 
188 
 
the female traitor (Alcala, 2001). Mythology defines her betrayal in sexual terms 
securing a legacy of unending suspicion on Chican@ sexuality. A commitment to 
political radicalism can be supplanted; sex remains the bottom line on which she 
proves her racial loyalty (ibid). Racial loyalty reproduced through sexual loyalty 
requires Chicanas not contest the heterosexist, patriarchal order. Heteronormative 
and misogynistic, loyalty is defined as female heterosexual fidelity to men. Any 
feminist critique becomes a betrayal of the ‘race’.   
 
Harrison approached this complexity through the vocabulary of contingency 
describing how social conditions create different states of mind. Among those was 
the ‘protective reaction’, or ‘race-consciousness’46. Neither inherently ‘good’ nor 
‘evil’, any assessment of its utility must be according to usage. Harrison, for 
example, endorsed the Universal Negro Improvement Association’s work to unite 
blacks in response to disenfranchisement and economic marginalisation (Cronon, 
1966). Significantly Harrison represented ‘race-consciousness’ as a new ethical 
problem space of questions forcing us to think through what is and is not possible 
within racialism.  
 
Harrison grasped his conjuncture by inquiring whether a new answer could be 
arrived at and whether in fact a new question had been contingently posed. The 
stirring of Black pride in Harlem explored what blackness and ‘race’ were in direct 
response to degradation, to social exclusion and the stripping away of human 
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dignity. If ‘race’ was to be kept despite its implication in racism, how would it be 
kept? What is/not a defensible ‘race-consciousness’? 
 
Answers came in May and July of 1917 during the East St. Louis riots. Thirty-nine 
African-Americans were murdered in a violent labour struggle. Harrison endorsed a 
racialised political militancy to ‘demand justice’ and to ‘make our voices heard’47. 
Five years later the Tulsa riots saw armed white looters, arsonists and even private 
aerial bombers attack an African-American community. Twenty-five were killed, six 
thousand placed under heavy guard in detention camps, forty city blocks looted and 
levelled, twenty-three churches and one thousand homes and businesses ruined 
(Brophy, 2002). Harrison urged Black people to develop ‘race-consciousness’ as a 
defensive measure, the only viable response to racist violence and the anti-black 
prejudice of the American Federation of Labour which condoned the pogroms.  
 
For Harrison ‘race’ had an objective reality arising from particular social and 
political histories. What ‘race’ does becomes the operative ethical question, and in 
this case the violence would be best contested through an identity politics. Collective 
racial identity offered a way to organise against the violence, to create smaller 
associations within a largely hostile civil society for the purposes of survival and the 
preservation of some dignity and self-worth in the face of racism with impunity.  
 
An ethically responsible ‘race’ consciousness would raise awareness of racial 
oppression and facilitate a collective response. Benighted by violence and de jure 
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apartheid, Harrison did not inquire whether a new answer (postracialism) could be 
arrived at. Instead he argued the constructedness of ‘race’ entailed a new question, 
contingently posed by the New Negro. How can ‘race’ be used responsibly to 
advance democratic aims? To answer, Harrison interpreted his conjuncture not only 
in social-historical terms but also in moral-political ones. He asked: Is ‘race’ a 
category that is worth having morally and politically? Harrison wanted to preserve 
the category but his concern that preservation could possibly reinscribe a 
surreptitious metaphysics is indicative.  
 
Harrison’s socialism - not the securing a preconceived community of the good and 
true - involved a complex ethics, (Scott, 2005). Racial consciousness was to be 
earned and always in struggle, never simply derived. Harrison’s ethics issued 
provisional claims and did not pursue the epistemological aim of converging on a 
final racial truth. Harrison may not have entirely undermined racialism be he did 
open a space for a reflexive politics that approached ‘race’ as a contextual, social and 
fundamentally negotiated resource. 
 
Harrison’s struggle to critique and preserve ‘race’ offers another interesting case 
study. Racism for him was strongly tied to the extraction of surplus value and so he 
placed analytical emphasis on exclusionary practices while also balancing concerns 
with reification. Hoping to avoid making ‘race’ into an active subject engendering 
consequences ‘by itself’, he recognised that economic, political and ideological 
relations must be understood in a specific, namely ethical sense. Racist housing 
practices such as restricted covenants - legal instruments that kept neighbourhoods 
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from renting and selling to non-whites - denied social dignity and retrenched 
inequality.  
 
In 1917 Harrison covered several Chicago bombings targeting the offices of estate 
agents who had sold homes to African-Americans in white neighbourhoods (Spear, 
1967). Racist violence highlighted a paradox. ‘Race’-thinking was demonstrably 
dangerous and could all too easily reinforce racism. However, racial collectivities 
enabled the construction of political and social networks to shield the racially 
subordinated against the failures of the state, in this case fair access to housing. For 
Harrison, Black politics had a significant role to play as a form of collective action to 
correct unfair social disadvantage by altering the constellation of benefits, burden 
and power within housing.  
 
Ethical critiques also demonstrate the serious dangers of positing the discovery of 
personal identity as equivalent to the forging of a political position that precludes 
negotiation (St Louis, 2002:656). Barzun, Montagu and Locke examined the ethical 
concerns of how ‘race’ dangerously afforded a pre-political solidarity while also 
raising the question of the ‘right way to unity’. Harrison’s sustained pursuit of unity 
as a worthy endeavour is noteworthy because of his concern with its misuse. 
Authoritarian-like technologies often used to produce consensus were of particular 
concern; ‘thoughts and ideas are unified only in the graveyard’48. Political solidarity 
can emerge but first, ‘hearts must be set ablaze with common zeal for a common 
object, equally desired and equally attained by all in common in every city and state 
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and nation’ (ibid). ‘Common zeal’ involved proletariatian uprising unified against 
white supremacy.   
 
Common zeal is in many ways analogous to Durkheim’s collective effervescence 
(1914) and particularly to its re-creative function. Durkheim defined it as, ‘an 
assembly of participants where the level of excitement is intense, but where those 
gathered together feel a bond of community and unity and as a result the members 
feel morally strengthened’ (cited in Pickering, 1984:385). Common zeal is a source 
of moral vitality, a strong communal experience providing the spring of an eternally 
fresh realisation of common, dearly-held moral principles and actions. It is the 
vehicle for the creation of new ideas and activities and for the re-creation and 
reaffirmation of moral life offering a model of social change and revitalisation 
(Pickering, 1984:388). Like collective effervesence, it is fundamentally collective 
giving rise to intense passions that bring those who share them into more intimate 
and dynamic relationships. Common zeal was an ethical enterprise capable of 
forging new ideas of morality (nonracial political solidarity) as well as new 
conceptions of society (a yet-to-be-realised society where ‘race’ did not have moral 
relevance).  
 
Both concepts represent radical moments as new sentiments norms and ideals 
emerge from intense communal exaltation, animated by a utopian spirit and by an 
openness and awareness of infinite possibility (Durkheim, 1914:35). Understood in 
this manner, common zeal could potentially serve the utopian project of 
postracialism. Not only do new ideas and ideals emerge but in the moment people 
can believe that those new conceptions, those new ideals can be realised. The 
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breakdown of social barriers and structures is possible. In Durkheim’s words: 
‘People live differently and more intensely than in normal times. The changes are not 
simply of nuance and degree; man himself becomes something other than he was’ 
(Durkheim, 1914:212).    
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown how ‘race’ is not biologically warranted but it is 
nevertheless socially real and is crucially a central part of self-conception and 
determinant of life chances. Mindful of this, the question of erasure cannot be 
reduced to the ontology of ‘race’ as real or not because moral concerns and moral 
positions are behind ontological ones. The very discussion of jettisoning ‘race’ must 
be grounded, as argued, in the history and contemporary manifestation of racisms. 
Indeed, the (hyper)focus on the ontological question could also divert much needed 
ethical attention away from pressing issues of racism and oppression. In the next 
chapter, I will turn to the issues of racism and oppression by examining 
postracialism in the context of antiracism.  
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Chapter 6 Postracial Futures: Imagining and Practicing Postracial 
Antiracism 
 
 
According to its exponents (Gilroy, 2000; St Louis, 2009) postracialism presents an 
analytical matrix capable of understanding and explaining the power of the diverse 
racisms of today. Although postracial critiques have contributed significantly to 
theoretical discussions, they have been criticised for their limited practical and 
political content (Shelby, 2005). The paucity of affirmative positions has led 
detractors to ask; what is the political content of postracialism? And (how) can it be 
aligned to a radical, antiracist political agenda? No coherent prescriptive programme, 
as yet, has been developed. The lacuna only reinforces an already heavily theoretical 
orientation. Consequently the project seems incapable of rigorously engaging the 
profane world of antiracist politics and confronting the material realities of racism. 
This inadequate engagement, however, signifies more than a failed attempt at 
engaged theorisation. The ‘failure’ is situated and perhaps more usefully explored 
through the complexity of the postracial paradox.  
 
Recall from the introduction that postracialism rejects racial concepts understanding 
them to support exclusionary practices such as the redlining of residential 
neighbourhoods. Paradoxically, the very racial concepts rejected under postracialism 
are needed in order to monitor the discriminatory lending and investment practices 
central to redlining. Longitudinal racial data is arguably entangled in reification and 
may reinforce the categories antiracism is attempting to challenge. Even so, racial 
data provides the necessary evidentiary basis for demonstrating patterned inequality 
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and crucially for developing corrective strategies and solutions. This is the 
foundational contradiction underscoring the apparent divorce between postracial and 
antiracist projects. The paradox notwithstanding, perhaps the disconnect can be 
remedied. Perhaps postracialism exceeds the province of theory. Can postracialist 
insights enhance the effectiveness of antiracism such that, ‘action against racial 
hierarchies can proceed more effectively when (it)…is purged of any lingering idea 
of ‘‘race’” (Gilroy, 2000:13)? 
 
This chapter rearticulates the objective expressed within Gilroy’s conviction as a 
question in an attempt to critically think through the possibilities of a postracial 
antiracism. The ambition is explored through data collated from a series of semi-
structured interviews conducted with representatives from five different London-
based ‘race’-equality organisations. All under the umbrella of ‘race’-equality, I 
interviewed three organisations working in social policy, one in direct activism and a 
think tank.
 49
 This body of interview data, which forms a substantial part of the 
source material for this chapter, is principally concerned with exploring the implicit 
suggestion that (if indeed possible) postracialism can be reformulated to enable a 
more efficacious antiracism. Interviews explored the theoretical and practical 
efficacy of ‘race’ and probed the possibility to encourage and make possible 
postracialist resistance to racism.
50
 The chapter is organised around themes that 
emerged during the interviews: the continued significance of ‘race’, postracialism as 
impractical, racial ontology, and finally postracialism and its conservative others. 
The chapter begins with section 6.1 outlining antiracism and engaging some of its 
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central dilemmas in relation to postracialism. 6.2 ‘the continued significance of 
‘‘race’’’ examines the postracial ambition in relation to racist violence and racial 
politics arguing that some form of ‘race’ is still needed. 6.3 explores the 
(im)practicality of postracialism in terms of its analytical capacity and the challenges 
of developing a postracial program. Section 6.4 investigates postracialism in the 
context of racial ontology exploring the limitations of racial being and the stumbling 
blocks in postracial ontology. Section 6.5 unpacks postracialism’s conservative 
others and distinguishes them from postracialism as theorised in this thesis. The 
chapter concludes with some remarks on the possibilities of the mutually beneficial 
dialogue between theory and praxis. 
 
6.1 Antiracism 
 
The prefix ‘anti’ would seem to define antiracism as a politics of negation that which 
is opposed to racist knowledges and practices. Racism, however, is not a singular, 
unitary combination of discriminatory doctrine and practice. Historically definitions 
focused on the centrality of biological characteristics - real or imagined - to the 
(re)production of ‘race’ and its role as a necessary condition for racism. But racial 
categorisations have been as much about culture as about nature and have always 
shifted between the two domains. Racist movements no longer rely on the 
commitment to biological difference. Some even dismiss racial biology as 
pseudoscience (Balibar, 1994). Specifying racism may address issues of conceptual 
inflation but it proves of limited value for conceptualising and addressing new and 
changing racisms such as culturalist racism where ‘race’ as a signifier is transmuted 
into a seemingly more acceptable discourse of cultural differences (Short & 
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Carrington, 1999). Culturalist racism cloaks essentialising discourses in the language 
of culture and achieves the effects of racialisation without specifically mentioning 
‘race’ or racial criteria (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).  
 
The Canadian Reform Party, since absorbed by the Conservative Party, espoused a 
‘differentialist’ racism based on a conviction of the fixity of culture - a perspective 
paradoxically ‘borrowed’ from the relativism of antiracism (Hewitt, 2005:137). New 
racisms resemble ‘progressive’ relativist arguments in four ways: (1) maintaining 
that ‘race’ is scientifically invalid, (2) that cultural differences are the defining 
features (3) believing firmly in the respect for difference and (4) the equal status of 
all cultures. This conceptual trading (racism reformulated in the language of 
difference) confounds the identification and combating of new racisms. Unlike 
earlier incarnations these expressions shun violence and overt racism  
finding expression through the more subtle and invisible aspects of cultural 
stereotyping and discrimination. The borrowing also suggests antiracisms have been 
complicit in reproducing a conception of culture as bounded and fixed and a 
culturalist definition of ‘race’ (Gilroy, 1992). Antiracisms from this framework 
appear poorly equipped to raise issues of social justice and political and economic 
power in the struggle against racial subordination.  
 
There are no political certitudes for what constitutes a ‘progressive’ antiracism when 
racists and antiracists adopt the same discourse of difference. Racism is a diffuse 
form. It is more pervasive and more insidious in its institutionalised expressions 
precisely because of its ability to elude certain antiracisms. Does the rise of new, less 
recognisable forms of racism portend the end of antiracism (Gilroy, 1992)? Can 
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antiracism be rethought in such a way to contest new forms of exclusion? Might the 
insights of postracialism help to reformulate antiracism such that it can better 
recognise and contest these new forms?  
 
Discourses of cultural racism from France to Australia have taken up core antiracist 
principles - equal respect for all cultures and egalitarian appeals based on citizenship 
(Hewitt, 2005). Beyond opposition to racist discrimination, what exactly are the 
aims, ambitions and practices of antiracism? Is it able to offer recommendations or 
solutions to the problems it identifies? ‘Anti’ signifies that the definition of racism 
shapes how antiracism is constituted. This entanglement produces a morally complex 
and politically messy scenario irreducible to sentimental accounts of heroes versus 
villains or progressives versus reactionaries (Bonnet, 1993). We also cannot speak of 
a unitary antiracism much less a discrete or stable one. Antiracism is a malleable and 
polyvocal discourse and practice. It is enmeshed with dynamic and heterogeneous 
racisms. Antiracism has been both a popular movement and an intellectual discourse 
that contests the unequal treatment (private and public) of racial undesirables or 
immigrants (Bonnet, 2000). This definition may do little to clarify the content of 
antiracism nevertheless it underscores its’ basic assumption; the ability to identify 
and to fight racism.  
 
Antiracism’s objection to racism, however identified, is commonly advanced in 
ethical terms as distorting and erasing people’s identity or resulting in a socially and 
politically unjust society. It is not clear what antiracism means either conceptually or 
at the level or practice because it is used in such a variety of ways. Antiracism 
cannot be unwittingly equated with egalitarianism and tolerance. Such equation fails 
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to appreciate the ambivalent ways in which antiracism and racism are woven into the 
West’s vision of equality and tolerance, a tradition of simultaneous inclusion and 
exclusion (Taguieff, 2001). Relativist antiracism prima facie presents a benign 
affirmation of cultural tolerance. Respect for difference, however, can quickly slide 
into the assertion of hierarchy and sustain cultural superiority where European values 
establish the norm and define the exotic. Contemporary expressions of xenophobia in 
the UK are consistent with the ‘right to be different’ discourse most often associated 
with antiracisms. The British National Party, for example, elevates difference to an 
absolute, fundamental trait and uses it as justification for non-mixing. The thesis of 
eternal foreignness which deploys biological and cultural arguments demands that 
‘foreigners go home’ so the authentic British folk can be surrounded by their own 
kind and their own value systems.   
 
Universalist antiracism asserts an all-encompassing humanity with the conviction 
that everyone should be accorded the same rights and opportunities towards the 
realisation of our fundamental sameness. But before we are enchanted by this 
universalist ‘fixing’ of the relativist dilemma, we need only recall that science is both 
the archetypal universal discourse and the origin of biological racism (Stepan, 1982). 
Revisionist attempts to locate biological racism as ‘unreason’ and/or to define ‘real 
science’ as patently antiracist, notwithstanding, universalism has had an ambiguous 
relationship with racial discrimination (Barkan, 1996). 
 
Critics suggest that antiracisms and their discrete moral and political appeals have 
been outside the analytic gaze shielded from criticism by a monopoly on the critical 
function (Taguieff, 2001). Sustained critique took shape in response to the 
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recognition of antiracism’s at best partial impact on established patterns of racial 
inequality and its’ failure to stop the development of or even combat new patterns of 
exclusion and segregation. Critiques reveal contradictory elements such as a 
dictatorial predisposition which shores up a fragile solidarity through authoritarian 
practices. Postracialist arguments interrogate the narrow categories of operation 
which evade ethical consideration and proceed unquestioned despite dubious 
alliances and assertions (Gilroy, 2000). Finally, postracialism invites reflection on 
the complicity of certain antiracisms in reifying ‘race’ and reproducing identities and 
solidarities forged from the categories bestowed by oppressors. In an ambitious vein, 
it expands the fight against racisms to de-naturalise and de-ontologise ‘race’. The 
sections that follow explore these postracialist insights in the context of antiracist 
praxis. 
 
6.2 The Continued Significance of ‘Race’ 
 
Throughout the interviews respondents expressed concern about the parallels 
between postracialism, the declining significance of ‘race’ discourse and 
colourblindness rhetoric. Interviewees recognised the postracial ambition as a worthy 
ethico-political endeavour but qualified the ambition. Distinguishing postracialism 
proper from its empty imposters by stressing the historical and continued 
significance of ‘race’ and racism Evan remarked: 
I’m determined to get away from ‘race’ because I would like to be doing other 
things. But unfortunately that’s not the reality. That doesn’t take me anywhere, 
let’s just stop talking about ‘race’. If I could see these inequalities disappearing then 
I wouldn’t wanna be running a charity that’s trying to close the gap. But the gaps 
are growing in some respects and not narrowing.  
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6.2.1 Postrace Society through Racialised Positions 
 
Ironically proponents of racial transcendence and the declaration of racism’s 
overcoming ground their claims through the support of racialised public figures. 
Ward Connerly, the self-described ‘black libertarian’ and former University of 
California regent, has been integral to repealing affirmative action programs across 
the nation. Connerly authored Proposition 209 which amended the California 
constitution to bar affirmative action in education, employment, and contracting for 
all state institutions. He originated similar legislation in Washington (1998), 
Michigan (2006) and Nebraska (2008). In 2003 his organisation the American Civil 
Rights Institute secured Proposition 54 on the ballot. The failed proposition, termed 
the Racial Privacy Initiative, would have prohibited state and local governments 
from using ‘race’, to classify current or prospective students, contractors or 
employees in public education, contracting, or employment operations. 
51
 Connerly’s 
rhetoric appeals to the democratic ideal of a ‘race’-less polity and an aspirational 
meritocracy: 
If U.C.L.A. would simply accept the will of the people that ‘race’ should not be a 
factor, either explicitly or ‘under the table,’ abandon their foolish attempts to ‘level 
the playing field’ based on ‘race’, and establish their credibility with the public as a 
fair and ‘race’-neutral entity, then they could admit whomever they want and carry 
the presumption of innocence about ‘race’ that needs to become the model of the 
future for pluralistic societies.
52
 
 
Connerly is part of a loose group of neo-conservative minorities including among 
others Bobby Jindal, the Indian-American Republican governor of Louisiana and 
Linda Chavez, the first Latina cabinet member who served as Secretary of Labour 
                                               
51 http://www.acri.org/ (accessed 18 February 2012) 
52 http://www.acri.org/chairman.html (accessed 18 February 2012) 
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for George W. Bush. These racialised public spokespersons invoke similar rhetoric 
and appropriate Dr. Martin Luther King’s ambition for an America where ‘race’ is 
morally irrelevant. Chavez, under the aegis of her organisation the Center for Equal 
Opportunity, argued that compensatory programs aimed at redressing racism only 
encourage dependence and undermine qualities of self-reliance and self-worth. In the 
UK Munira Mirza, arts and culture advisor to London mayor Boris Johnson and 
Tony Sewell, a former teacher and director of the charity Generating Genius, make 
parallel arguments about the declining significance of ‘race’. These arguments are 
presented as incontrovertible analyses when articulated by racialised minorities. 
‘Race’ becomes a cloak of legitimacy enveloping the speaker. The irony is glaring. 
The very usage of explicitly racialised spokespersons to substantiate the 
pronouncement of the defeat of racism exposes the emptiness of claims to an 
actually-existing postracial society. The obsessive concern with President Obama’s 
‘true racial identity’ as expressed in the so-called Birther movement makes the same 
point. How can a supposedly ‘postracial’ society be so concerned with the ‘race’ of 
its ‘postracial’ president? 
 
At the logical core of this thinking is a supposition that certain mouths are credible 
witnesses epistemically privileged to issue honest judgments on racism. Impassioned 
and hortatory, colourblindness appears a desperate attempt to disavow the glaring 
reality that racism inflects nearly every dimension of socio-political life. Alice 
described the inherent dangers in this specious verdict with reference to the British 
ConDem coalition government Race Equality Minister Andrew Stunnel: 
Our government is almost in open hostility when it comes to ‘race’. When we 
met with Andrew Stunel, whose minister for ‘race’ and his opening gambit is; ‘‘I’ve 
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adopted two mixed ‘race’ children. Therefore, I know everything I need to know 
about ‘race’.’’ And they won’t talk about ‘race’ as a single issue.  
 
 Stunnel bases his antiracist credentials and implicit assertion of a postracial world 
on inter-racial adoption. His claim has a particular resonance in the UK where cross-
‘race’ adoptions have been historically contentious (Gilroy, 1992). Stunnel’s 
political manoeuvring assumes the leftist critique that the neat separation of groups is 
untenable and undesirable. His chosen, ‘trans-racial’ family shows the falsity of an 
idealised racial family form as a repository and transmitter of authentic racial 
culture. Same-’race’ adoption is not needed because the already-existing postracial 
society means mixed-‘race’ children need not be raised by racially similar parents 
who can guarantee the transmission of the essential skills to survive in a racist world. 
Questions of how these mixed-‘race’ children arrived in foster care in the first 
instance are ignored. It also implies same-‘race’ adoptions are underwritten by a 
crude conception of ‘race’ and have perpetuated the conservation of racial identities 
and prevented the possibility of their transcendence (Gilroy, 1992).  
 
6.2.2 Trivialisation of the Grave Realities of ‘Race’ 
 
Respondents admonished postracial pronouncements espoused by Mirza and Sewell 
as insidious and empty rhetoric heightening the ethical stakes for postracialism. They 
pointed to the dishonesty of colourblindness and situated the magnitude of accepting 
such with grave examples - suggesting postracialism comes dangerously close to 
trivialising racism - fully revealed in racially motivated homicide. What does this 
proximity to trivialisation mean for postracialism? Respondents stressed that 
postracialism drifted towards a blindness to this suffering, risking apathy or still 
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worse denial. The racially motivated murders of Rolan Adams (1991), Rohit Duggal 
(1992) and Stephen Lawrence (1993) were mentioned as exemplifying the ethical 
myopia of postracialism and the serious social meaning of ‘race’. Alice remarked: 
Stephen Lawrence was killed because of the colour of his skin. And you can’t get 
away from that. That is what happened. 
 
Jindal, hailed as the ‘Republican Obama’53 for his postracial appeal, also denies the 
significance of racism. But can he do so in good faith? In 2005 the fatal 
consequences of racism came into sharp focus in his own state. In the days following 
Hurricane Katrina, the Anglo-American Roland Bourgeois shot and injured three 
unarmed African-Americans who were walking toward a temporary evacuation 
centre. Bourgeois maintains that he was defending his New Orleans neighbourhood 
from ‘outsiders’ and ‘looters’ (Lee, 2010). The US Justice Department charged him 
with committing a federal hate crime for the racially motivated shooting (ibid). 
Racist violence in Algiers Point can be situated within the larger picture of state 
violence, namely the Danziger Bridge massacre. In the massacre six unarmed 
African-Americans faced an assault weapon fusillade killing 17-year-old James 
Brissette and 40-year-old Ronald Madison, a mentally disabled man who was shot 
six times in the back. Law enforcement officials involved in the killings have since 
been convicted on 25 counts of civil rights abuses (Robertson, 2011). 
 
6.2.3 ‘Problematic, But Necessary’ 
 
                                               
53 http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4836972n (accessed 22 February 2012) 
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Postracialism, to reiterate, advocates the elimination of ‘race’ from an ethical 
position maintaining that the commonsense idea of ‘race’ helps (re)produce ‘natural’ 
and hierarchical differences which function to both explain and validate racial 
stratification. Rob, the director of the think-tank Runnymede, explained this thorny 
problematic. He described how ‘race’ is not biologically real but is objective in how 
it informs ways of thinking about and acting towards racial ‘Others’. 
The categorisations don’t work. They’re not based on anything biological, on 
anything outside of social creation. But the fact that it is socially constructed still 
makes it pretty real. Just because it’s socially constructed doesn’t necessarily make 
it less real. It makes it less independently verifiable outside of human experience. 
But to all intents and purposes people treat it as real, then it becomes real. It 
becomes real in terms of people’s experience of it.  
 
Overly materialist interpretations of ‘race’ as methodologically unreliable (what is 
‘race’?) and empirically insecure (not a real object) are criticised. Constructionist 
understandings which can similarly fail to appreciate the objectivity of social 
categories - the psychology of oppression (Fanon, 1967) and the subjective 
experience of racialisation - are also problematised. Guillaumin remarked starkly 
upon the paradoxical simultaneity of ‘race’. ‘‘Race’ does not exist. But it does kill 
people (1995: 107).’ Rob later outlined the contradictory status of ‘race’ and the 
challenges it presents for antiracist politics: 
It’s a difficult line to tred because you’re trying to say ‘race’ doesn’t exist but 
there are the outcomes that are racist. We need to take seriously these patterns 
which effect groups that are racialised in the way in which we imagine them to be. 
So as long as people still see ‘race’ as a driver for their decision- making then ‘race’ 
is real. 
 
He continues: 
We’re just getting to an understanding of the data from that mixed 
categorisation and its driving all sorts of things which reify ‘race’. Again we’re 
talking about mixed ‘race’ and we’re not okay with that. What do you mean? How 
do you mix them? It’s massively problematic. 
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Rob gives us a sense that ‘race’ is problematic for postracialism because it 
complicates the development of a politics. The task is, ‘a difficult line to tred’. How 
can you meaningfully talk about racism without reifying ‘race’? How can 
sophisticated understandings of racism be communicated to policy makers, or local 
authorities? Rob also demonstrates that ‘race’ is problematic for racial 
conservationism. From this ‘on the ground’ view it appears liberation from raciology 
cannot easily escape such an entanglement. If ‘race’ remains a ‘driver for decision 
making’ which global events (the French government’s expulsion/repatriation of the 
Roma community; the ongoing fixation on the burka and minaret construction 
throughout Europe) continue to testify to then the postracial ambition will remain 
problematic.   
 
6.3 Postracialism As Impractical 
 
Rethinking postracialism not as a utopian ambition but as a dilemma facing practical 
challenges refocuses the discussion. Postracialism - reconceived as the problematic 
project described by Alice and Rob - creates an ethico-political basis for reservations 
about the project. Interviewees described postracialism as impractical considering 
the prevalence of racism. A well-intentioned ideal, postracialism was ultimately out 
of touch with ‘real world’ concerns. As Alice states:  
How little some of those organisations were equipped to do anything 
around ‘race’. The fear to even talk issues of ‘race’. If you have organisations 
that perceive the situation in that way - then how we can talk about a society in 
which ‘race’ is not even an issue anymore? When it patently is still an issue. To 
me that’s top of the mountain stuff. If we get there, we can look out the scenery 
is lovely, we’re all there. We can have our little picnic. But the reality is that the 
vast majority of individuals and the vast majority of organisations are not at the 
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top of that mountain. Some of them haven’t even begun climbing, some are half 
way up. 
 
The mountaineering metaphor shows the profound and perhaps insurmountable 
problems the postracial ambition faces. ‘Race’, ‘patently is still an issue’. ‘Race’ is 
deeply embedded in the organisation of Western political and economic life. The 
question of (im)practicality centres on the possibility of realisation. Can 
postracialism ever be achieved if ‘race’ is so deeply socially embedded? Alice’s 
circumspection cites progressive charities blinkered to racism. She testifies to 
postracialism as an impractical form of struggle because there is much work to be 
done in the way of dispelling the false truths of ‘race’ and in demonstrating the 
pervasiveness and damaging impact of racism.  
 
6.3.1 Analytically Empty  
 
Interviews also explored the postracialist critique of ‘race’ as analytically 
inadequate. ‘Race’ cannot work as a critical analytical concept. The, ‘distorting 
prism implanted by the use of the idea of “race’’ as an analytical concept’ prevents 
the interrogation of the origin and consequences of the different historical forms of 
racism’ (Miles, 1993:21). Despite the intellectual labour to qualify ‘race’ as ‘social’, 
its conceptual significance continues to reify ‘race’, to treat it as a given and 
normative social formation. Analytical usage only reproduces the commonsense 
ideologies of the everyday world uncritically assuming the prior existence of ‘race’ 
(Darder and Torres, 2004).  
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Miles (1993) attempted to escape reification by advancing a revised version of 
racialisation, ‘a process of categorisation, a representational process, of defining an 
Other (usually, but not exclusively) somatically’ (21). Significantly, the approach 
moves away from employing ‘race’ as a determining empirical object in the 
production of racism. The research brought racism into the remit of Marxist theory 
enabling an exploration of political, class and ideological relationships in shaping 
understandings of racial conflicts (Solomos & Back, 1996). Miles - primarily 
concerned with the analytical and objective status of ‘race’ - identified a serious 
theoretical problem, the declining explanatory efficacy of ‘race’. He instead 
encouraged sociologists to rethink inequality through the social processes 
constructing ‘race’ reproducing it materially and symbolically.  
 
Abandonment of ‘race’ might be viewed as an epistemological and methodological 
effort to develop a more accurate description and analysis of social life. Perhaps 
racism and racialisation afford a better understanding of the discriminatory practices 
performed in the name of ‘race’. Postracialist antiracism(s) might then offer a more 
robust sociological analysis precisely because it does not suffer the clouding effects 
of racial categories. Runnymede seemed to be struggling with making the 
impractical insights of postracialism ‘practical’. The challenge in articulating the 
‘how’ of implementation is worth quoting at length: 
R- Which sounds sensible as long as you don’t lose your ability to talk about 
racism by not talking of ‘race’. 
Me-How would you imagine that would happen? 
R-Well I think we do it. I think we seek to say at all times that ‘race’ doesn’t 
explain anything but racism does by saying it motivates. And I must admit when I’m 
out there speaking this gets people kind of scratching their head. Puzzled looks. 
Because it would be easier to say look racism exists and as a result of being black 
you’re guilty. Well that doesn’t allow you to talk about some issues of what it’s 
attached to, to this kind of moving category of ‘race’. We come at this from so 
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many different angles. As a ‘race’ equality think tank we’ve looked at concepts that 
allow people into the discussion a bit more easily and that don’t reify ‘race’. We 
talked about belonging, it just feels better than ‘race’ relations. It’s horribly 
antiquated and reasserts ‘race’, and reifies it. We’ve done a project called This is 
Where I live to get people thinking and they talk about the racisms that they face as 
a function of their location. We’re doing Generation 3.0 looking at a generational 
discussion saying what have you told about the racism that you faced. Not 
necessarily what you passed on that might in a way kind of reify it. We’re quite 
careful about our ways in I think, we want to elicit truth and not do position 
thinking. 
 
Rob’s descriptions suggest how postracialism might have a productive contribution 
to antiracism. But it is an ambivalent relationship presenting challenges and 
threatening to make antiracism into an exhaustingly reflexive enterprise with little in 
the way of affirmative statements. Developing a language that does not reify the 
category is a challenging task. It is, as argued in chapter three, part of the long 
history of opposition to racial thinking and categorisation. The struggle to 
denaturalise, historicise and problematise taken-for-granted assumptions about 
human difference and social inequality is indispensable to the postracial ambition. 
Runnymede is wrestling with how the notion of ‘racial experience’ could smuggle in 
an essentialist agenda in attempting to cement solidarity and identity. What 
Runnymede seems to suggest is that the proposal (and the process) to abolish ‘race’ 
as a critical concept need not be a denial of antiracism as necessary practice.  
 
It also reminds us of the manifold problems encountered in the uncritical adoption of 
racialised terminology. Modood (1997) described how the ostensibly pan-ethnic 
project of ‘political blackness’ dominating 1980s British antiracism resulted in the 
exclusion of Muslims from the struggle. The primacy of ‘race’ - assumed as forming 
the fundamental basis of racial particularity and group membership - disturbs the 
normative sense of distinctions between groups. St Louis (2005b) examines a similar 
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situation in the US context where external and internal processes of racialisation 
operate such that racial sameness (African-American) is constituted through 
relational differences, in his example foreign-born blacks. The coherence of a racial 
group is placed under a great deal of stress then when the presupposition of its 
constitutive internal similarity and external differentiation breaks down. 
 
6.3.2 Usefulness to Antiracist Politics 
 
‘Race’ - despite its problematisation in St Louis’ example - is still useful to 
conducting antiracisms. From abolitionism to anti-apartheid, ‘race’ has been a potent 
political resource for resistance and change. Postracialisms raise fundamental 
questions about the nature of political action and highlight the ironic tension in 
‘strategic essentialism’; antiracisms often pretend ‘race’ is in fact a fixed essence 
knowing full well that it is not. Miles (1993) frames the question as the degree to 
which racialised politics are really distillations of class conflict and concludes ‘race’-
based mobilisations are destined for failure and ultimately incommensurate with any 
sustained political organisation around class.  
 
This framework leads to a class reductionism and drastically limits the scope of 
theoretical work on conceptualising racism and racialised social relations (Solomos 
and Back, 1996). A more nuanced understanding of racial politics might attend to 
how the meaning of ‘race’ is struggled over. ‘Race’ in this sense becomes an open 
political construction, whose shifting political meanings are contested. This enables 
an understanding of how collective identities articulated through ‘race’ function as 
powerful means to coordinate action and engender solidarity (Gilroy, 1987). 
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Several respondents defended the ‘race’-based mobilisations following the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence as exemplifying how antiracism can create new 
conceptualisations of racism. The mobilisation spearheaded by the victim’s family 
eventually led to the Macpherson Report. The report produced the ruling for 
institutional racism and recommended a series of measures subjecting the police to 
greater public control, enshrining rights for victims of crime and extending the 
number of offences classified as racist.
54
 The example shows how antiracism using 
racial categories can shape official government policies and positively impact how 
public institutions operate. Lila testified to how the Lawrence family engendered a 
comprehensive understanding of racism opening up the possibility of ameliorative 
strategies: 
In the Stephen Lawrence inquiry public sector employees were asked; what 
processes and policies do you have in place around racial discrimination? And they 
said, Well we don’t have any policies around racial discrimination. We don’t have 
any racial discrimination. And when asked, How do you know you don’t? Well 
nobody’s ever complained about racial discrimination. What is the procedure to 
complain? Well we don’t have one. 
 
Antiracism succeeded in challenging racism as pathological prejudice, aberration or 
ignorance demonstrating it to be an entrenched feature of state structures. It also 
extended the ethical impulse scrutinising educational and healthcare institutions and 
developed ways to expose inequality in arenas fundamental to the self-perception of 
western liberal-democracies (May, 2002). The mobilisation recently resulted in the 
protracted conviction of his murderers (Burns, 2012) and showed the critical futility 
of employing ‘race’ as a category and the concomitant realisation that, without these 
                                               
54 see http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/feb/24/lawrence.ukcrime12 (accessed 9 March 2012) 
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tried and tested concepts antiracism increasingly loses meaning (Lentin, 2000). 
‘Race’ was used to productively combat racism by attacking it at its structural core. 
Might a postracialist approach be incapable of grappling with the magnitude of racist 
murder? In such circumstances, the stand against ‘race’ would seem to fail to address 
a set of conditions of being or living. Although working within the orbit of ‘race’ the 
Lawrence campaign, ‘conjures a stand against an imposed condition…’ and insists 
that one not be reduced, at least not completely, to or by the implication marked by 
racial categorisation, by the devaluation and attendant humiliation (Goldberg, 
2009:10).     
  
6.3.3 Institutionalisation & Professionalization of Antiracism in State/Market  
 
Just as antiracism springs from diverse philosophical orientations so too does it have 
an ambiguous relationship to the different sites of its emergence. Antiracist 
movements have developed in both public political culture and government with 
divergent ideological and political strategies to tackling racism. SOS Racism, a vocal 
antiracist group in France, for example relies on government funding. In French 
political culture state subsidised antiracism is understood to be part of the democratic 
project - changing the state ‘from the inside’ - stopping ethnic ghettoisation by 
upholding Republican values (Lentin, 2008:315). Conversely, the Irish campaigning 
group Residents Against Racism explicitly refuses government support for fear of 
being beholden to the state. The relative proximity to public political culture seems 
to correlate with a commitment to the belief in the power of state instruments to 
provide solutions to racism.  
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Discourses espousing democracy, the rule of law, equality and tolerance as means of 
overturning racism generally have a close relationship to public political culture. 
Discourses of emancipation, empowerment, resistance and liberation seem to 
indicate distance from public political culture (Lentin, 2008). While this distinction 
can be useful we need to be wary of drawing value-laden binaries that can encourage 
the reification of organisations operating closely with public political culture as not 
overtly political or more disparagingly as ‘sell outs’. Such reductionism overlooks 
the complexity of these formations. In Britain during the late 1980s the notion of 
antiracism pressed by grass roots organisations became a symbol of wider debates 
about the role of policies initiated by radical left local authorities, trade unions, and 
other organisations to promote the idea that they were committed to a positive 
programme to tackle racialised inequalities (Ball and Solomos, 1990). Antiracist 
ideas emerging at the local level have historically played an important role in the 
development of policy agendas. The state/nonstate dichotomy is a narrow paradigm 
for understanding how antiracisms develop and interact within and across civil 
society.  
 
Small antiracist organisations often require state funding in order to survive. 
Reliance on government support can create parallel racial discourses. Interviewees 
described how an internal discourse had become a space for discussing ‘race’ 
critically and reflecting on the dangers of reification. However, in their formal work 
for the organisation they maintained a more neutral political stance in interest of 
funding retention. Yusef remarked: 
For me, the significance is the depoliticisation. It’s definitely around the 
professionalization of the industry. And the way in which people communicate with 
one another. Individually we do have conversations and quite vehement and 
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interesting conversations about a lot of subjects that are quite political. But in that 
work environment, in that work space, there’s something that happens there. 
There’s something that really does change the nature of the discussion and the 
argument and the way in which that goes. A telepathic recognition that now we’re 
in the workplace this is how we act. This is how we act if we’re having a personal 
conversation; this is how we act if we’re having an organisational conversation. 
 
Historically associated with anticolonial struggle and autonomous movements for 
change, antiracism has now been integrated by states in what is known pejoratively 
as the ‘race-relations industry’ (Solomos and Back, 1996:112). Since the 1980s in 
the UK there has been an expansion of an influential group of BME race-relations 
professionals whose careers depend on the state’s continued commitment to its brand 
of antiracism. Kundnani (2007) contends that these self-styled leaders of minority 
ethnic communities have colluded with government to ensure a culturalist policy 
ultimately contributing to the weakening of autonomous antiracist action. Taken on 
as a state concern this antiracism was largely stripped of its ‘race’/class analytic. 
Psychological and culturalist accounts of racism were favoured in 
professionalistation and the creation of state-endorsed antiracist activities.  
 
Racism was represented as an exogenous force thus dodging the centrality of ‘race’ 
to British history and contemporary culture. Assimilation into the state immediately 
raises issues around the freedom of organisations in civil society to determine the 
antiracist agenda. State assimilation can also significantly impact on the tone and 
substance of antiracist policy. Interviewees stressed the reliance on the category for 
securing funding and indeed its importance to the funding priorities of benefactors. 
Several of the organisations I interviewed received a significant amount of their 
funding from the state. They occupy a contradictory place and stand to contest both 
state sanctioned racism and the state’s antiracist posturing.  
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Interviewees maintained postracialism would be an impractical task because of the 
funding structure of charitable organisations. Benefactors want to see quantifiable 
results and empirical evidence does not work without categorical distinctions. Yusef 
described this quandary: 
The way we’ve worked in policy and the attempts to influence policy by 
empirical data it’s difficult to see how that language could go beyond ‘race’ because 
a lot of the points and arguments that are being made within the social policy realm 
they’re very data specific things. And a lot of the policy itself in Britain is around the 
empirical study. There has been a trend to get away from political arguments and 
economic and anti-capitalist arguments to move into this place where we’ve got 
this dataset that shows clearly that group z is treated in this way and that’s unfair… 
There has to be a proxy and it has to be coded in some way. 
 
He continued:  
In the UK it’s a very professionalised sector. When I was talking about playing 
the game - it’s a business now. It’s not activism. And it’s not the same type of 
antiracism as you would get from Unite Against Fascism those more activist groups. 
The way that it works - there’s always an argument and an influence to be made. 
And a lot of the influence, a lot of what they found useful in the past is that usage 
of the categories attached to statistics. So it’s an interesting way where you attach 
statistics to groups and I don’t know if a postracial argument could work with 
(chuckles) the approach taken in social policy.  
 
Postracialism - in the environment Yusef describes - may struggle to gain traction or 
attract benefactors. There is a certain reliance on the gestural usage of ‘race’. 
Additionally postracialism faces the challenge of deconstructing an established and 
professionalised bureaucracy sustained by racial categorisation. Similar to the 
contradictory outcomes in education, the project is confronted with the erosion of 
employment for those often excluded from labour markets. If a postracialist 
antiracism is adverse to formal politics it may have to find anchorage in an 
alternative conception beyond ‘the political’ as legitimate if only conducted within 
official structures. A purposefully antistatist postracialism based in civil society with 
216 
 
limited or no links to formal government or party politics could be charged with 
being impractical and or irrelevant. 
 
Another product of institutionalisation concerns the reinforcement of racialisation. 
Interviewees described how the incorporation of antiracism into government led to 
the inflation of ‘race’ and even encouraged reification. Minority groups, for example, 
self-racialised in order to gain recognition and or resources in the politically 
rewarding hierarchy of victimhood while the government also used racialisation to 
serve its own political and military ends. Rob remarked on this: 
Me- How do you see this bureaucratisation trend connected to the discussion 
before about working with ‘race’ but trying to deconstruct it? 
R-What it does is privilege categorisation. And so a series of groups try to get a 
categorisation believing that from that resources will follow. And just that process 
of fighting categorisation. The Arab categorisation in the 2011 census - now that 
wasn’t driven by communities believing that. Clearly that was about security 
services who want to know something. 
 
6.3.4 Challenges in a Postracial Programme 
 
The high level of abstraction in postracialism places in question its relevance to 
material inequalities. The urgency of eliminating ‘race’ for ethico- political reasons 
is a developed argument (Hill, 2001). Precisely how such elimination is to be 
achieved remains unclear. The crisis of raciology and the withering of racial biology 
could be interpreted as part of the glacial erosion of ‘race’. Most interviewees 
dispelled the idea of discrete biological units called ‘races’. Perhaps an awareness of 
the indissoluble unity of all life at the genetic level can engender a postracial 
conception of humanity. But how can this gradualist process unfolding in the human 
sciences impact popular understandings of ‘race’?  
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Racial mythologies have a stubborn durability in the popular consciousness. 
Postracialism offers no indication of how this translation might be fostered. The 
UNESCO Statements and educational campaigns come closest to a postracialist 
program. The declarations - like second generation human rights legislation  such as 
the International Covenant for the Elimination of all forms of Racist Discrimination 
requiring signatories to pursue policies to expunge racism - received little funding 
and limited support and circulation.  
 
Lila asked directly, ‘What does postracialism recommend for antiracism?’ The 
question ruptured the interview and forced a recognition that in terms of arguments, 
policies and movements countering the influence of racism, postracialism has little to 
offer. In my discussion with Rob it seems that this struggle is being negotiated: 
You have to say things that are surprising. You have to say things that are 
counter-intuitive. And there are ways of doing that which don’t reify ‘race’. It’s 
interesting in the pop-up shop we just put a wall of facts up. One of the facts was 
most of the children in the UK living above the 4th floor are Black or Asian. 
Essentially to get the reactions with people cause that’s what you want to do. It’s to 
spark discussion. You don’t want to say and therefore housing allocation is racist. 
That maybe isn’t the case. But you want people to say, how many Black and Asian 
children are there in the country? And how does that happen that people end up in 
that situation? Some people are like great they’re above the 4th floor that means 
they want to live above the 4th floor. But it’s kind of how do you get that discussion 
motivated. 
 
There are two constituent elements to this antiracism; (1) committed opposition to 
racist arguments and policies and (2) the invitation to new ways of thinking, 
recognising and living with cultural difference. Such a strategy remains limited to 
achieving strategic objectives, but the presence of the pop-up shop in a popular train 
station highlights the need for political debates about racism to come to terms with 
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wider debates about ‘differences’ and the consequences of developing conceptions of 
justices and equality which allow for the expression of cultural and religious 
identities (Connolly, 1991). It also takes on the key dilemma confronting antiracist 
politics; how to go beyond an oppositional political stance to the articulation of an 
alternative view of difference to those found in racist discourses. The development 
of a coherent strategy for mobilising against racist movements at the local or national 
level is no doubt challenging.  
 
The challenge is no less imperative considering the growth since 2005 of support for 
racist movements across Europe. Far right parties have gained electoral positions in 
the UK (BNP), Denmark (Danish People's Party), Holland (Freedom Party), 
Hungary (Jobbik party), Austria (Austrian Freedom Party), Italy (Northern League) 
and Finland (‘True Finns'). This challenge is complicated by the conceptual 
confusion, discussed above, having seeped into the debate about how to develop 
practical strategies against racism. Postracialism seems to have a complex 
relationship to ‘race’ and in a certain sense requires some qualified notion to combat 
inequality. Postracialism - to understand the changing dynamics of racial ideologies 
and political mobilisations or the possibilities for defeating racist movements - will 
need to grapple with the role of antiracism in this historical moment. 
 
6.3.5 Still relevant 
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Perhaps the most insidious claim in the British Con-Dem Coalition era is the 
contention that we have arrived at the postracial moment. Prime Minister David 
Cameron, for example, in February of 2013 defended his decision to not apologise 
for the Amritsar massacre - in which British colonial riflemen murdered 379 
innocent Indians - because it was unnecessary to ‘reach back into history’. The racist 
crimes of colonialism are neatly located in a bygone past that is not directly 
connected to the present (Watt, 2013). Racism has been acknowledged (adherents 
point to the Macpherson Report & the ‘Race’ Relations Amendment) and latterly 
overcome through legislative interventions. A wealth of empirical evidence 
demonstrates the persistent and continuing inequalities in housing (Beider, 2012), 
education (Gillborn, 2008) and healthcare (Nazroo, 2004). Taken collectively these 
material inequalities testify to the emptiness of claims to an authentically ‘postracial 
society’ or the ‘end of racism’ thesis showing the durability of racism and dispelling 
spurious claims to the achievement of social perfectibility.  
 
This rhetoric portrays a social world where ‘race’ is irrelevant to life chances and 
opportunities. It is a nefarious untruth in contradiction of centuries of racism, the 
consequences of which are visible through a series of socioeconomic indicators such 
as representation within the criminal justice system and rates of educational 
attainment. These neoliberal fantasies sanitise history of the formative and continued 
role of racism in shaping unequal access to social and material goods. A colour-
bound system is (re)presented as having been colourblind. Therefore, only 
colourblind remedies should solve ‘race’-based problems. Redistributive justice and 
the antiracist goals to desegregate schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces become 
irrelevant. Evan contested the claim that a postracial society has been realised:  
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We can’t be complacent about ‘race’. If we start to dismiss it and say it’s not 
relevant, I think that’s when it will come back and bite you. There are people 
out there who can use ‘race’ for political and economic ends and set us back 
giant strides which would be intolerable. 
 
Alice made a similar point citing empirical research: 
A concrete example is young Black people are more likely to be excluded from 
schools for incidents that their white counterparts won’t be excluded for. That’s 
racism. That has nothing to do with socioeconomics. That has to do with skin 
colour. The ‘race’ of that person is different to white, working class 
counterparts. There are issues that are going to be pertinent to ‘race’ and those 
are the issues that we try to draw out.  
 
Both interviewees describe the centrality of ‘race’ in aiding a progressive politics to 
expand equalities and in enabling a form of statistical monitoring to track inequality 
and discrimination. This brings us full circle to the paradox sketched in the 
introduction of this chapter. Alice details the complexity of analysis in antiracism 
noting that not every instance was reducible to ‘race’. An integrated and multiplex 
approach was needed. She and Evan both describe how neo-liberal postracialism 
actively conceals or worse still, denies the effects of racism.  
 
The concealment of racism threatens to render redundant the redistributive agenda 
established to ameliorate injustices. Culturalist racism operates to conceal the racism 
manifest in the War on Terror enabling a racist and violent discourse to be 
understood as not contradicting claims to the already-existing postracial society. The 
War on Terror - couched in civilizational oppositions - is not predominantly 
associated with racism (Butler, 2009). This is a curious paradox considering that 
explanations for terrorism rely on naturalised assumptions about Muslims that 
function in precisely the same way as racialisation. Former President George W. 
Bush’s explanation for the September 11th terrorist attacks presupposed Islam as 
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essentially antithetical to Western civilisation and violently envious of Western 
progress. ‘America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for 
freedom and opportunity in the world (Bush, 2001).’   
 
6.4 Racial Ontology 
 
Postracialist antiracism also faces pressing methodological issues. How might 
postracialism be pursued? Gunaratnam (2004) intimated a methodology inviting 
reflection on how research must address the specific relationships between analytical 
categories, subjective and social experience and material relations. For example, 
postracialist concerns with essentialism, if not attentive to the ontological realities of 
racialised being, might reduce racial identities to imposed ‘scripts’ creating 
methodological blindspots to the ‘situated voices’ of the everyday. Postracialism 
demonstrates that the conceptual fixing of ‘race’ remains untenable, only hampers 
analysis and reproduces stereotyping and racism. Postracialism illustrates the danger 
of categorical approaches showing how they reify ‘races’ as entities that individuals 
are born into and inhabit rather than recognising ‘races’ as dynamic and emergent 
processes of being and becoming (Gunaratnam, 2004). ‘Race’ is more than a 
dispassionate sociological category. ‘Race’ also involves the subjective attachment 
and investments of individuals. Racial categories are not confined to the discrete 
terrain of knowledge production. Racial categories impact our ontologies. The multi-
dimensional nature of ‘race’ challenges the development of an analytical framework 
to also address the relations and situated nature of identity.  
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A postracialism which seeks to address the complexity of ‘race’ and racialised being 
may involve, as Gunaratnam (2004) suggests,  a doubled approach - working with 
and against racial categories at the epistemological and methodological level. Rob 
spoke to the challenges and promises in this approach: 
I can’t think of a project that doesn’t invoke ‘race’. The question is how. The 
effort has to be not to reify it but then it needs to reified. So we will for example 
work with a group of people, the work we did on retirement with older people of 
Indian heritage. We invoke ‘race’ as a kind of research method. But in that group 
we give people space to define what they might have in common with the other 
people in that room. What they perceive to be about their ethnic heritage. This 
language is slippery. And not to presuppose that because we’ve got 15 old people 
from Indian background in a room that certain things will follow. I hope that we 
don’t fall into the trap of reinforcing stereotypes by working with particular groups 
of people. 
 
‘Race’ is used but it is disrupted from imputing a fundamental, constitutive quality to 
something. Runnymede is attempting to negotiate how even naming and examining 
‘race’ always runs the risk of reproducing ‘race’ as essentialised and deterministic 
potentially (re)constituting the very power relations being challenged. Of note in this 
approach is the ethical need for theoretical and intellectual projects to move outside 
of departmental territories to connect with local struggles and experiences. 
 
6.4.1 Volitional Rejection 
 
Only a disingenuous postracialism would suggest ‘race’ can be wilfully relinquished 
or readily abandoned. Such a reductive position overstates the significance of science 
and social agency. The assumption that because ‘race’ is without a biological 
referent it therefore lacks valid meaning is misleading. Chapter three demonstrated 
that the history of ‘race’ as a coherent scientific concept has always been beset by 
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crisis and an unending struggle of (dis)/proving its existence and/or significance. 
This historical battle over the meaning of racial difference is significant though 
admittedly the struggle has not done much in the way of combating or preventing 
racism.  
 
‘Race’ - in both the social and human sciences - is not real. It is generally accepted 
that it does not exist as an empirical object in nature (Graves, 2001). Biological 
unreality aside, ‘race’ remains a dominant normative idea. Believed to be real, acted 
upon as real, ‘race’ has practical effects and consequences. The history of predatory 
lending, blockbusting and urban renewal in American metropoles demonstrate the 
reality of ‘race’ and racism. Residential segregation and the construction of the racial 
ghetto are stark and undeniable realities (Lipsitz, 2011).  
 
The volitional exit from ‘race’ fails to consider the specific nature of practices 
involved in (re)producing particular forms of social difference. As Omi and Winant 
(1994) argued racial projects have given ‘race’ a deep reality making it integral to 
the social, political and economic spheres of liberal Western nation-states. The 
absence of an evidenced existence does not alter or undo the social objectivity of 
‘race’ which arises out of a particular history. The social objectivity of ‘race’ shows 
how it remains a significant ‘real object’ independent of individual perception. 
‘Race’ may be the history of an untruth but it is an untruth that has real material and 
symbolic effects. The challenge, according to postracialism, is to generate from such 
a past and a present, a future where ‘race’ will have been put to rest forever. 
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‘Race’ is socially-produced, subject to historical vicissitudes but equally a real object 
that cannot be confined to the dustbin of history through individual rejection. 
Prescriptive postracialist programs predicated on individual abdication can overlook 
‘race’ as existing and functioning irrespective of subjective perception. Individualist 
rejections of the privileges of whiteness (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996) or the 
essentialism of American blackness through daily acts of transgression are 
inadequate in the face of enduring social structures. The modern dream of becoming 
a free floating angel is little more than a fantasy (Hall, 1992). Liberal modernity’s 
idea that we could survive without any notion of attachment at all is perhaps an 
illusion. Evan expressed concern with this identity voluntarism: 
I’ve met people recently of African and Caribbean origin who don’t want to be 
called Black. And these are educated young people at the LSE. I felt like I was in a 
time warp. What I considered to be normal, straightforward was to them 
anathema. They don’t want to be categorised racially. So when I say how do you 
see yourself, they would say, I’m just me. And I find that, I respect that, it concerns 
me, because I feel well that’s all well and good - almost having like a colourblind 
view of the world. But when you get into the workplace, you are probably going to 
find that there are issues around difference. Issues which may hinder your 
progression…At some point it’s [race] going to be a factor. 
 
Excessive deference to raciology can lead to complicity in the reproduction of its 
effects. Despite the many practical problems demonstrated in the interviews perhaps 
an engagement with postracialism might still have value. Reservations with and 
rejection of postracialist ideas as impractical still shifted the focus for the duration of 
the discussion to the postracial. The interview offered a moment, albeit short-lived to 
investigate the different set of questions raised in postracialism; Do we want ‘race’ 
as part of our social life and social identities? And if so, why? Might we want to 
pursue the postracial ambition?   
 
225 
 
6.4.2 Antiracism and the Experience of Racism 
 
Antiracism not grounded in the experience of racism, critics (Lentin, 2011) suggest, 
can result in paternalism and tokenism. Antiracist leadership can become a vanguard 
of unelected representatives with unrealistic views of the risks they face. The British 
Anti-Nazi League exemplified this dilemma. The organization’s high-profile 
demonstrations in areas with a large percentage of disadvantaged racialised 
minorities often left open to violent attack by the far-right or police (Gilroy, 1987). 
Interviewees articulated antiracism as grounded in the experience of racism refusing 
the reduction to communitarianism, and accusations of racialised leadership to the 
necessary exclusion of others. Locating the foundation of antiracism in the 
experiences of racism was seen as fundamental. Evan drew on his experience of 
racism in describing this relationship: 
I got involved [in antiracist work] because my mother was a community 
development worker. I used to go along to some of the committee meetings 
and listen to the participants mainly from the Afro-Caribbean community. It was 
quite a small community; they had very few organisations. My mother helped to 
create the first one, the African-Caribbean youth council which was for young 
people. The issues back in the 1970s in my hometown were around police 
harassment, lack of educational opportunity, unemployment, housing, those 
kinds of issues. 
 
Lila also located her activism in her direct experience of racism: 
So when we talk about professional and or activist experience I think it would 
be easy for me to say I’ve been an activist all my life. I was born into a working 
class background. I passed an exam called the 11 plus and went to a girl’s 
grammar school. I wouldn’t necessarily say that was the first time I was faced 
with racism. But it certainly was in a very consistent way the first time I was 
faced with this idea that people were better than me. And that that was 
expressed through various experiences in the way some students behaved with 
me. And also the way teachers behaved with me. So you could say that certainly 
from then I became an activist because I resisted quite strongly. 
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In the neo-liberal era, the experience of racism is increasingly questioned and placed 
in competition with the experiences of other marginalised subjects. Tony Sewell, the 
former teacher and current social commentator, invokes this in describing how he 
was able to combat racism through resource restriction. ‘Suddenly, the boys found 
some inspiration and got down to work. There we have it: the trauma of 400 years of 
racism, slavery and oppression overcome by the desire for a soft centre (Sewell, 
2010: 33).’ Shifting the focus from structural racism, Sewell argues that poor 
parenting, peer-group pressure and an inability to be responsible for their own 
behaviour are the chief problems; ‘They are not subjects of institutional racism. They 
have failed their GCSEs
55
 because they did not do the homework, did not pay 
attention and were disrespectful of their teachers (Sewell, 2010: 33).’ 
 
6.4.3 Universalism and Postracialism 
 
Perhaps underpinning the postracial critique of a politics based on the experience of 
racism is the assumption that it will/result(s) in narrow communitarianism or perhaps 
authoritarian practices designed to shore up political solidarity. Postmodernist 
undertones seem to position any movement connected in some way to a community 
as problematic. Communities not connected to the material forces of production are 
also understood as insufficiently radical (Miles, 1993). Interviewees held the 
postracialist critique of ‘race’-based mobilisations to be simplistic denying the 
analytical complexity of this work which cannot be homogenised or understood 
simply as an incomplete politics. Are these problems, inconsistencies and conflicts 
                                               
55 Standardized tests administered generally for students aged 14-16. 
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not the general and universally experienced difficulty of doing progressive politics in 
our historical conjuncture? Lila described this problem well: 
This isn’t a problem with ‘race’. It’s a problem with everybody else. I guess it’s 
one of those ongoing things where people are saying, well is it ‘race’ or is it 
class. Well can’t it be both? We’re not saying that the racial explanation is the 
only explanation in the room. I suspect that people have different and 
competing explanations. But interestingly ‘race’ equality organisations get a 
much harder time for not being as inclusive as most other equality 
organisations. So I think for example, the SWP [Socialist Workers Party’s] take 
on ‘race’ would be well I’m not sure how they would articulate it currently but 
it’s important to know how it feels. It feels like yes we’ll deal with ‘race’ after 
the revolution. And frankly that’s not all that helpful.  
 
Lila concedes that the postracial ambition is a noble idea but she expresses that it can 
lead to the exclusion of subordinate groups from decision making within antiracist 
organisation. It can also - when minorities themselves are involved – lead to a 
subordination of the specific interests of the racialised to universal principles such as 
‘universal liberation’. ‘Universal liberation’, as argued earlier, often fails to take 
account of the relationship between the idea of ‘race’ and these very principles. 
Balibar (1994) argues racism and universalism are imbricated because the project of 
defining universal ‘man’ cannot be carried out without at the same time the 
definition of non-man. This cannot be thought without reliance on ‘race’ as a concept 
developed in parallel with Enlightenment ideas (Balibar, 1994).  
 
6.5 Postracialism and Its Conservative Others 
 
Hall (1996) - concerned with the potential of racial categories to ‘guarantee’ the 
rightness or wrongness of a politics - encourages us to enter into a politics beyond 
the false certitudes of ‘race’. His ethical reflexivity has been extended in the 
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postracialist project and has also in a moment of political sophistry been rhetorically 
appropriated by the ‘postracial’ agenda of Britain’s ConDem coalition government. 
Multiculturalism appears to face a death-sentence following Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s Munich speech in 2011. Cameron selectively appropriated the call for a 
heightened ethics positioning it as the progressive alternative to the unchecked 
relativism of pluralist multiculturalism. ‘So when a white person holds objectionable 
views – racism, for example – we rightly condemn them. But when equally 
unacceptable views or practices have come from someone who isn't white, we've 
been too cautious, frankly even fearful, to stand up to them (cited in Wintour, 2011).’  
 
Cameron’s sophistry gestures toward an expanded reflexivity and a greater ethical 
accountability for those holding racist ideologies. Neo-liberal postracialism - despite 
such rhetorical flourish - is all the more insidious in that it understands structural 
racism and institutionalised inequalities to have been resolved in the teleological 
progression to social perfectibility. Racism, if and where it remains, is the atavistic 
irrationalism of fringe radical minorities or the parochial ‘white working class’ 
whose inability to adjust to the cosmopolitan global order is reflected in their racist 
views.  
 
6.5.1 White Victimhood & the Generalisation of Racism 
 
Interviewees also described the appropriation of the experience of racism itself. In 
such instances racism was generalised and thus made into a thing which can be 
owned (Lentin, 2011:160). This was feared as a consequence of a postracial agenda 
that relativises the experience of racism and consequently assists in perpetuating it. 
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Respondents discussed the deleterious ethical consequences through the silencing of 
racialised experience. Alice remarked:  
We know that say young black boys and young working class white boys are not 
getting the education they need. They’re getting discriminated against in school but 
actually the reasons behind it may well be very different for young white boys than 
for young black boys. And for young black boys there may be an issue around 
racism. 
 
The rhetoric of and focus on diversity blurred the specificity of a variety of 
marginalised experiences compressing them under the amorphous label ‘diverse’. 
Alice points to the construction of white victimhood as exemplifying the dangers of 
relativising the experience of marginalisation.  
 
Lila also described how the figure of the ‘white working class’ functions in the neo-
liberal narrative. The concept enables a narrative in which formal racism has been 
eliminated from the nation but is still allowed to be spoken in response to concerns 
associated with this marginalised and demonised figure (Jones, 2011:100). The 
construction establishes the white working-class as a victimised and marginalised 
group whose racism is a reaction to their situation. The victim status is indignant as 
it possesses a deep-seated resentment of attention they are said to feel is given to 
every disadvantaged group but them (Bottero, 2009:7; Gillborn, 2009; Ware, 2008). 
The danger in this is how it conceals histories of antagonism and struggle. Variants 
of white working-class victimhood posit that ‘real’ racism is over and that the 
continued focus on the no-longer-oppressed minority comes at the neglect of other 
vulnerable subjects. Accordingly, antiracism needs to concede to charges of reverse 
racism and universalise the struggle against racism to adjust for this.  
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More reactionary versions contend that state multiculturalism has further neglected 
the white working-class already marginalised within capitalism. Enoch Powell  
(Solomos, 2003:61) graphically presented this argument but more recent attacks on 
equalities policy and antiracist education in the 1980s relied on similar logics 
(Hewitt, 2005:119). This multiculturalism-has-gone-too-far reasoning counters 
through an appeal to victimhood. ‘Working-class’ enables a claim to victimhood in 
economic terms while the descriptor ‘white’ thrusts blame upon government policies 
championing and rewarding ethnic minorities.    
 
6.5.2 Managing Diversity 
 
Another neoconservative variant concerns the construction of multiculturalism as 
segregationist, anti-cosmopolitan, imposed on an overly tolerant, guilt-ridden liberal 
society by illiberal, self-segregating minorities (Bruckner, 2010). Muscular 
liberalism (Prime Minister Cameron’s term) indicts passive antiracisms as providing 
cover for homophobia by facilitating the inherent illiberalism of unassailable 
minorities and abandoning the project of building a cohesive integrated society based 
on the respect for equal rights. The ConDem coalition has redefined the terms of the 
debate such that where/if racism continues it cannot be the failure of those who have 
openly declared themselves against it. Responsibility is laid at the feet of those who 
resist integration and engender disjointedness in our society. ‘Those who resist 
integration and engender disjointedness in our society’ is political code-speak for un-
integrated racial ‘Others’. Alice remarked:  
They [ConDem Coalition] talk about all these communities that can’t speak English. 
These communities that exclude themselves. And when the riots happened 
Cameron spoke of Britain as a broken society. The message is - and what it’s 
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sending out - is allowing a certain type of racism to re-emerge because they’ve got 
implicit instruction from this government because race is not on the agenda 
anymore. 
 
‘Too much diversity’ is scapegoated for the breakdown of our societies (Goodhart, 
2004). Multiculturalism is caricatured and held to be the rejection of common 
culture. The social democratic state purportedly cannot function without a vibrant 
common culture. Social cohesion remains impossible. Goodhart and his acolytes 
(Mirza et al, 2010) argue that the continued expansion of Britishness risks 
disintegration, a threat posed by the failure of ‘immigrants’ to adhere to national 
values or as Alice remarked ‘to not learn English’. This formulation has at times 
been bolstered by the discourse of ‘community cohesion’. It has - when aligned to 
the promotion of citizenship - often translated as the requirement for non-nationals to 
learn the British way of life or leave. Although the space for a robust discussion is 
not available here, it is worth noting that a politics of fear has in a certain sense 
turned racism into a depoliticised, dehistoricised and thus (assumed) almost 
naturalised fear of and incompatibility with the ‘Other’. The emphasis on cultural 
incompatibility positions racism as an aberration. Antiracism is not needed and is of 
limited significance in comparison to the global threat of terrorism (Tagueiff, 2001).  
 
Multiculturalism – accused of being permissive and soft - is held responsible for the 
tolerance of illiberal minorities unable or unwilling to integrate into their ‘host 
societies’ (May, 2002). Yusef described how the example of forced marriage 
implicitly contrasts the traditionalism of immigrants to an emancipated Britain. 
Forced marriage, as a cultural practice and a coded term, works as a cipher for ‘race’ 
constructing and essentialising specific groups. It also functions as an ‘index’ of 
changing racialised discourses that reflect shifting government attitudes to 
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community and national belonging. It is useful in thinking about changing racialised 
discourses to recall Solomos’ work which has shown how policies, ‘construct 
definitions of the problem to be tackled which exclude certain issues from serious 
consideration’ (1988:142). With the problem defined in and through the incorrigibly 
backward belief systems of immigrants and/or the ‘white working class’ other 
racisms are discredited. Structural issues of inclusion, access to education and labour 
markets are off the agenda.  
 
What does the ConDem government’s ‘crisis’ discourse on multiculturalism mean 
for antiracism and antiracist policy? Alice described the situation: 
We’ve got a government that talks about feral communities, parents not 
knowing where their children are. They lay the blame squarely on those 
communities. They are not taking any responsibility on what they can do to insure 
that those communities don’t feel like that. It’s absolving themselves of 
responsibility. When I can go to the ‘Breaking the Cycle’ launch which is about the 
whole shifting of the criminal justice system, prisons and probation service and I 
can say excuse me there’s a disproportionate amount of BAME communities within 
the criminal justice system. And the response is ‘yeah we know but we don’t know 
what to do about it’. That is the response that we get from government. This 
current government doesn’t really hold a lot of confidence in their understanding, 
knowledge or awareness of race. Race is dismissed. They just washed their hands of 
it. So how is that going to eliminate the disproportionate levels of BAME 
communities within the criminal justice system? If you’re not seeing policy and 
practice tackling some of these issues then not only are we going to see the issue 
continue but it will continue to grow.  
 
Interviewees consistently suggested that antiracism must continue to be anti-
postracism and must combat the persistence of racism as anachronistic. The anti-
‘race’ discourse of the Con-Dem Coalition government - racism has been overcome 
and no longer needs redress - has confounded antiracism. Equally the reconstitution 
of antiracism through state directed culturalist forms has enabled alternatives to be 
described as too politicised. For example, activists are caricatured as intent upon 
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‘racing’ the world in order to secure resources. The ConDem coalition’s refusal to 
engage with ‘race’, underpinned by the assumption that racism is aberrant to ‘our 
societies’, denies the very basis for doing an antiracism that is critical of the 
historical and current relationship between ‘race’ and state. The growing ‘consensus’ 
that Western societies are postrac(e)ism delegitimizes the critique of racism as 
inaccurate, alienating and counter-productive to the achievement of social cohesion. 
The role of racism in the constitution of modern Britain is all but lost. 
 
Lentin (2008) has argued that the replacement of ‘race’ and class-based analysis with 
culturalist understandings has been actively promoted by state and supranational 
bodies such as the European Commission. The recalibration of problems once 
specified as racism such as Alice’s noting of racism in the criminal justice system are 
now located under the generalised label of ‘discrimination’. In the UK the 
dissolution of the Commission for Racial Equality and its absorption into the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission is consistent with such reasoning. The 
joined up approach may enable an intersectional analysis but it can often result in the 
erasure of the histories of how these categories are constructed. Without those 
histories the prospect of tackling racial inequality is very challenging. It is worth 
noting that collapsing ‘race’ into a more generalised discriminatory framework has 
not resulted in more fruitful collective action to redress the shared experiences of 
inequality.  
 
In an age of austerity the culturalist agenda of diversity promotion is of course a 
more straightforward and, in resources terms, less taxing approach than tackling 
structural racism. Evan described this: 
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Yes let’s value diversity but let’s recognize that there’s substantial inequality as 
well. I want to talk about equality. But many people were happy to buy into 
diversity because it didn’t offend people. Everyone was different and everyone was 
equal in diversity. But for me that was very limiting and that did move away from 
racial inequality and race. So in the corporate world it may sound palatable and 
easy to talk about because you can talk about diversity and not talk about race at 
all. 
 
Opposition to racism requires that the objective status of ‘race’ be debunked. This 
pluralist conception of diversity, however, subverts this deconstruction It pursues a 
postracial programme because of racism’s irrelevance not its centrality. Racism as a 
specifiable and qualitatively different form of discrimination comes under suspicion. 
The struggle against racism, worse still, is re-framed such that programs of redress 
are equated with reverse racism (Goldberg, 2002). Only a human rights-based 
universalism can truly be antiracist because of the belief in the generalisability of 
racism. The belief that systematic discrimination can be surmounted by an increased 
level of intercultural knowledge is at best dangerously simplistic and at worst racism 
coated in empty rhetoric. Racism is not understood as structuring the political culture 
of the western nation-state. Refusing the language of ‘race’ does not avoid the 
production of racialised inequalities. ‘Race’ is rejected or seen instead as a source of 
further division.   
 
Nearly all of my interviewees in describing how their organisations defined racism 
contrasted their definition with this understanding of racism as on the political 
fringes or as the unwanted blemish of the far right. Through a relational definition 
they stressed how racism has been and continues to be significant to social, political 
and economic life. Moreover, in rejecting racism as the preserve of a 
‘fundamentalist’ minority they were able to centre issues of social justice and 
235 
 
political and economic power. They were also keen to situate racism in an 
intersectional analytic connecting racism to other political antagonisms, such as 
capitalism and sexism. In a sense eliminating the concept and category of ‘race’ is 
the wrong focus. The pressing concern ought not to be ‘race’ but its effects, 
primarily racism. Lila spoke to the problems in reductive definitions of racism: 
I think there’s different ways of looking at racism. You can look at far right 
racists groups who believe if you’re white you are superior to those who are not 
white and therefore you can subjugate those people and exploit those people 
systematically. And some people will look at race and think well I’m not racist 
because I’m not on the streets attacking Asians and Jews physically. I just treat 
everyone the same. 
 
 
The ConDem coalition government in keeping a revised multiculturalism on the 
agenda (focused on ethnoreligious difference, integration, gender etc.) is able to 
assert its own antiracist credentials. This hollowed out multiculturalism enables the 
politicians to stake a claim to cosmopolitan inclusion in multicultural Britain and its, 
‘shared national identity open to everyone’ (Solomos, 2003: 213-4). This professed 
commitment to racial equality acts as a means of shutting down antiracist critique.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has critically evaluated the possibility of a postracialist antiracism 
through Gilroy’s formulation of an antiracism purged of any lingering idea of ‘race’. 
Through interview material I have explored several key dimensions of the postracial 
problematic. I would argue - in spite of the practical problems and warranted 
hesitation expressed - that this dialogue and indeed the extension of postracial 
insights into activist work has been a productive engagement. Postracialism invites 
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antiracism to consider a different set of questions beyond contesting racist 
discrimination. And in so doing it disturbs the commonsense footing of ‘race’. But 
the dialogue is most certainly mutually beneficial. Interviewees clarified in explicit 
terms the pressing problems that postracialism is confronted with, especially the lack 
of a coherent political program and an examination of its conditions of possibility. 
The next chapter will critically survey and evaluate postracial bioscience, another 
site of the deconstruction of ‘race’.  
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Chapter 7 The Actual Existing ‘Postracial’? : Postracial BioScience and the 
Beginning of the End of ‘Race’  
 
 ‘Race’ is simply a poor proxy for the environmental and genetic causes of disease or 
drug response...Pooling people in ‘race’ silos is akin to zoologists grouping 
raccoons, tigers and okapis on the basis that they are all stripey (Kahn, 2006: 903). 
 
Science is about knowledge and power. In our time natural science defines the 
human being’s place in nature and history and provides the instruments of 
domination of the body and the community. By constructing the category nature, 
natural science imposes limits on history and self-formation. So science is part of the 
struggle over the nature of our lives (Haraway 1997:145). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
 ‘Race’ – as we saw in the previous chapter - has a certain political utility in spite of 
problems with reification. Postracialism advances a compelling argument for putting 
the category under erasure but, as argued, ethical and political considerations re-
frame erasure as a gradualist process of working with and against ‘race’. In this 
chapter, I will critically survey another arena where postracialism is ‘practiced’ or 
‘experimented’. Adherence to sets of rigid dichotomies between science and society, 
facts and values, and the biological and the social has been a continuing theme in the 
ongoing debate on the biological status of ‘race’. The history of ‘race’ as a natural 
category used in service of racist oppression through the appeal to biological 
differences, however, means that the intersections of the biological and the social in 
racialised categories are unlikely to be innocuous. This chapter explores postracial 
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bioscience defined by St Louis (forthcoming) as a robust scientific approach which 
without the hesitancy and contradiction of earlier critiques consistently deconstructs 
‘race’. I argue that postracial bioscience provides the affirmative basis for the ethical 
and political critiques examined earlier, extends beyond the empiricist assumptions 
of positivist paradigms and ultimately enriches epistemological, methodological and 
ethical understandings.   
 
The chapter begins with section 7.2 which is a ‘history of the present’ of postracial 
bioscience. The section with the aid of archival data traces some key moments in 
postracial bioscience. I do not attempt a comprehensive understanding of the 
historical record nor do I attempt a linear mapping of how the present has emerged 
from the past. This ‘history of the present’ is part of my methodological intervention 
to use history as a way of diagnosing the present. Section 7.3 ‘actually-existing 
biological difference’ argues that postracial bioscience offers a scientifically 
informed and ethically compelling account of human biodiversity. Section 7.4 
‘postracial causality’ refutes racialised understandings of disease aetiology 
contending that social-scientific explanations offer rigorous explanations of 
disparities.  Section 7.5 ‘postracial medicine’ shows how therapeutics and 
diagnostics rebut racialised frameworks and outlines the improved understandings 
and enhanced treatments made possible by postracial medicine and biomedical 
research.  Section 7.6 ‘the conclusion’ examines some problems in the project of 
postracial bioscience arguing that the ethical imperative to stop using ‘race’ is not so 
straightforward. Postracial bioscience is indeed haunted by the postracial paradox. 
Overall the chapter argues that postracialism must make science into an evaluative 
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enterprise as the question of human biodiversity is not one to be authoritatively 
answered by scientific discovery.  
 
7.1.1 What’s at Stake in Racial Biology?  
 
Moral and political climates have lessened inhibitions about using notions of racial 
difference in the decades following Nazism particularly when such statements are 
heavily qualified. Recent research in genetics asserts the scientific existence of ‘race’ 
bringing a ‘halo of legitimacy’ to racist stereotypes where with increasing frequency 
purely genetic arguments account for behaviours resulting from a complex 
combination of factors (Bourdieu, 2003: xi). Research purporting to demonstrate that 
genetic disorders are distributed differentially according to racial groups threatens to 
render social-scientific theorizing about the (in)significance of ‘race’ obsolete. The 
research arguably bestows an independent reality to racial categorisation 
simultaneously refuelling the age old logic of, ‘if genetic disorders are differentially 
distributed by ‘race’ and ethnicity, why aren’t other human traits and characteristics 
(ibid).’ ‘Race’, as a natural, timeless concept outside of human intervention, stands 
as one of the most persistent residues of racism. 
 
Social problems - educational underachievement, poverty and violence - in a climate 
of genetic explanation are increasingly attributed to ‘deficient’ or ‘problematic’ 
genes rather than to the social conditions in which people live (McCann-Mortimer, 
Augoustinos & Le Courteur, 2004). The mere existence of health disparities is often 
uncritically interpreted by biomedical researchers as proof-positive of innate 
differences (Outram & Ellison, 2010). Simplistic fallacies like those using ‘race’ to 
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infer genetic causality displace sociological arguments. The examination of 
structural, socioeconomic, political and cultural issues underpinning health 
disparities is redundant if social ills originate in our genes. Biological factors in 
disease aetiology and health outcomes are frequently overemphasised relative to 
social and environmental determinants causing a distortion in the perception of why 
disparities exist (the social relations of power) and often extending blame to victims 
(racial determinism) (Ahmad and Bradby, 2007).  
 
The uncritical acceptance of intrinsically significant qualities exhibits a foundational 
fascination with and belief in the profundity of phenotypical appearances and racial 
essences. Postracial bioscience is a holistic approach that pursues the unravelling of 
the precise relationship between racism and health with particular attention to the 
role of structural factors in generating, exacerbating or sustaining the impact of 
genetic variation on health. The undying fascination with naturalised racial 
propensities and racial heredity is pregnant with ethical implications. The 
assumption of deep physiological (read internal) characteristics that match external 
phenotypical differences is significant because of the social and cultural meanings 
attached to it. In the age of biology where popular interest in genetic science is at 
heightened pitch the real ethical question is not what race is, but what race does. 
 
Despite a large body of scientific evidence, political claims and moral hopes to the 
contrary the biological notion of ‘race’ has traction in certain quarters. Its persistence 
cannot be reduced to the stubborn survival of intuitive racism and ignorant curiosity. 
Contemporary racial biology weaves acceptable and formal scientific hypotheses in 
conjunction with commonsensical racial myths. It may be possible to engage the 
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problems and questions that arise from ethical evasions by unpacking this fusion of 
myth, fact and intuition.  
 
7.2 Postracial Beginnings 
 
 
7.2.1 Boas and Debunking Racial Determinism 
 
Boas presented an early example of a positivist epistemology whose systematic 
approach to human biological diversity stressed ‘specificity and accuracy’ and 
rebutted ideas of racial value.
 56
 His statistical approach, later paradigmatic in 
American cultural anthropology, used measurement and integrated environmental 
variables such as nutrition which he posited might impact the distribution of traits 
(Stocking, 1982:168). The study of immigrant morphology demonstrated the 
plasticity of types giving intellectual ground to contemporary postracial approaches 
that examine the role of lifestyle, diet, health and disease in comparative populations. 
Phren and colleagues (1999) contest determinist arguments about racial 
predispositions to certain diseases. Their research shows that breast cancer incidence 
rates are three times higher in American-Japanese women than in Japanese women 
living in Japan. Some discrepancy is attributable to differential detection rates but 
echoing Boas the study stresses that social and structural differences likely explain 
incidence rate differentials.  
 
Boas was well aware of the problems of accurately measuring and representing the     
                                               
56 Franz Boas Papers, American Philosophical Society (FBP, APS) Lectures 
‘The Races of Man’ 1896. 
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limitless variability of humanity; ‘For instance, if we study the biological problem of   
a race, then we are of course investigating phenomena which are determined partly 
by heredity and partly by environmental influences.’ 57 Boas debunked racial  
essences and problematised the usefulness of the concept. He also recognised the  
interactive role between biology and the external environment - a key pillar of  
postracial bioscience. Today geneticists stress the individual not the group and like  
Boas contend disease risk is the result of the complex interplay between an unknown  
constellation of genetic variants, environmental factors, and lifestyle (Rotimi, 2004). 
 
Boas - confronted with ever-changing racial boundaries - pragmatically constituted 
what ‘race’ was not (culture) and what it was (morphology). This definition was part 
of the professionalization of a ‘value-free’ anthropology and the introduction of 
scientific methods to the study of culture (Hyatt, 1990). It satisfied the practical need 
of cataloguing physical difference and enabled the ethico-political contestation of 
‘race’ hierarchy. Boas professionalised cultural anthropology in part by relegating 
racial taxonomy to physical anthropology. His scepticism enabled future reflection; 
Why do we have the concept? What do we need it for?  
 
The effort to expunge ‘race’ from social-science by assigning it an established place 
in the biological sciences had the unintended consequence of legitimating the 
scientific study of ‘race’. Scientific formalism stripped ‘race’ of its historical content 
and (re)located it in a dispassionate taxonomy. But the question, ‘Where in nature do 
we fit?’ could not be answered in sanitised biological terms. Connotations of unequal 
value and capacity and of inherent behavioural and temperamental differences 
                                               
57 FBP, APS Lectures # XX May 15, 1917 
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persisted. Cho and Sankar (2004) - alive to these histories - argue that the 
innumerable destructive episodes in the history of genetic research make it crucial to 
consider the ethical and social implications of researching human genetic variation. 
Several problems Boas identified inform postracial science: the lack of genetically 
distinct populations (spectrum of variability), the reification of fluid and relational 
categories into biological/stable ones (nutrition affects morphology) and the 
stigmatisation and preclusion of attention to the social causes of disparities (social-
constructivist critique).  
 
7.2.2 Proto-Postracial Bioscience 
 
Boas’ contemporary Alain Locke radically re-theorised ‘race’ as a cultural formation 
defined in various ways as a social group that shared a common history and occupied 
a geographical region (Locke, 1992). Locke - rather than only scrutinise the 
pernicious conclusions of racism - analysed raciology’s first principle; the claim 
‘race’ existed as a scientific category. The analysis gave way to a more complex 
concept threading cultural, political and economic explanations.  
 
Beyond Boas’ objective taxonomies, Locke’s proto-postracialism could not be 
discussed without reference to racism: ‘When the consciousness of science is fully 
integrated with the consciousness of human value, the greatest dualism which now 
weighs humanity down, the split between the material, the mechanical and scientific 
and the moral and ideal will be destroyed.’ 58 This ethically informed corrective 
                                               
58 Alain Locke Papers - Writings By Locke: ‘Notes’ Box 164-142 Folder 23 Notes from Europe 
1923 
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forms a foundation for imagining a postracial bioscience. It is epistemologically and 
methodologically precise (‘race’ lacks taxonomic significance) as well as ethically 
compelling (‘race’ is destructive to social relations).  
 
Locke foregrounds the discriminatory practices performed in the name of ‘race’ 
without the obfuscating effects of epiphenomenal racial categories. Locke - not only 
concerned with factual provenance (non/existence of ‘races’), acknowledges how 
racism contributes to the (re)production of the concept. A year after the lecture series 
entitled Lectures of the Theory and Practice of Race the Russian revolution refigured 
the American social landscape with hysteria and backlash. The Red Scare, the 
Palmer raids, the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, a wave of urban ‘race’ riots 
including those in Washington DC (Locke’s base) and xenophobic immigration 
restrictions formed a context of fear that quieted Locke’s critique of ‘race’ and his 
analysis of American racism. 
 
Proto-postracial reappraisal contributed to the development of critical theories that 
gathered force and depth during the 1930s as the biological veracity debates 
expanded. Jim Crow racism and the rise of Nazism stimulated proto-postracialist 
works like Haddon and Huxley’s We Europeans: A Survey of Racial Problems 
(1935) and Barzun’s ‘Race’: A Study in Modern Superstition (1937). Man’s Most 
Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of ‘Race’ (Montagu, 1942) forcefully stated that 
‘race’ was empirically unsecure, methodologically unreliable and its continued usage 
ethically dangerous. Hitler’s Germany made ‘race’ deeply problematic. Through 
scientific categorisation the category came to represent a visible physical 
characteristic held to signify the abilities, character and histories of people. 
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Pernicious applications in the Third Reich motivated Haddon, Huxley and Montagu 
to call for the discontinuation of racial terminology within scientific discourse 
advocating ethnicity be used in its place. ‘Race’ was over-determined by lethal 
meanings and no longer capable of rehabilitation.  
 
The long history of ‘race’ in genocidal projects has been articulated in contemporary 
postracialism by Gilroy (2004) who argues that raciology prefigures the discourses 
in which it circulates. Dangerous meanings appear unavoidably lodged in the 
category. ‘Race’ cannot be easily re-signified. Ethnicity - a collective social group 
grounded not in determinist biology but on shared social characteristics including 
cultural traditions and languages - was proposed as an alternative. Ethnicity often 
collapsed into ‘race’ with the confusing of physical differences with cultural, 
intellectual and moral differences.  
 
The conceptual and linguistic shift signalled in ethnicity represents an important 
chapter in an explanatory struggle. Ethnicity expanded the scientific imaginary to 
examine social, political and economic factors and paved the way for the 
contestation of the narrow focus on racial biology. In 2009, for example, the Institute 
of Medicine, an authoritative adviser on issues of health and medicine under the 
auspices of the US National Academies, published ‘Race’, Ethnicity, and Language 
Data: Standardization for Health Care Quality Improvement. The extensive report 
notes the limitations and dangers of ‘race’ (limited reliability and external validity) 
and recommends ethnicity to capture ‘real’ cultural differences that can impact 
differences in care and have clinical significance at both patient and system-levels.  
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Ethnicity, however, suffers from vagueness and it is often difficult to specify which 
differences it captures. Are wealth and income or citizenship status more significant 
than language or political allegiances? Slippage and confusion complicates the 
process of developing a critical account of ethnicity as an idea. And without that, 
developing a sociological account of racism is difficult. Determining which 
differences matter and in what circumstances is problematic (Carter, 2000). Proto-
postracial bioscience, taken collectively, asserted the common origin of humanity 
and denounced the notion of any inherent inequalities between racial groups. Proto-
postracial bioscience though replete with hesitancy and inconsistency still formed the 
groundwork for the UNESCO refutation. 
 
7.2.3 The UNESCO Rejection 
 
In the aftermath of the Final Solution UNESCO published a landmark statement 
refuting ‘race’ science. The rebuttal teamed a range of experts together in an effort to 
critically examine the ‘race’ concept, marking the beginning of the decline of the 
biological concept (Reardon, 2004:12). Post-war liberal optimism structured by the 
belief in the power of internationalism and indeed science itself to prevent death and 
destruction was at the ideological core of the project. The task was the moment for 
‘breaking the bioscientific tie of race, blood and culture’ which had enabled 
extermination camps and now threatened to destabilise a fragile post-war harmony 
(Stepan, 2003: 331). The reclamation of an authentically inclusive humanity to 
safeguard against future atrocity and to discredit the Nazi calculus of racial 
identification was indispensable to this postracial bioscience. Peace was best secured 
through the affirmation of a common species being which formed the backbone of 
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the international human rights legislation and for many was the hope for a new 
world.  
 
UNESCO’s effort to disseminate scientific facts and remove racial prejudice was 
beleaguered by transnational scientific and political controversies, and perhaps 
predictably, fell short of its ambitions. The conclusion that ‘races’ could be 
accurately understood as dynamic ‘breeding groups’ and that a clear distinction 
needed to be drawn between ‘race’ as a ‘biological fact’ and ‘race’ as a ‘myth’ left 
open the possibility of preservation in specialist usage (UNESCO, 1950).  
 
The incomplete character of the rejection was quickly seized upon. A cohort of 
reactionary life scientists claiming to respond to the ideological character of the 
Statement pressured for a second panel. Truculent disputes revealed how little 
consensus (beyond disapproval of the Holocaust) existed in the scientific 
establishment and resulted in a failed rejection. Within the year the physical 
anthropologists and geneticists had dismissed the Statement as polemical and 
reawakened the categories, premises, empirical records and authority of an older, 
supposedly discredited body of work once dedicated to measuring difference 
(Brattaain, 2007). The historical inertia of ‘race’ continues today to generate a self-
perpetuating system of racialised evidence.  
 
The second panel also scrutinized constructivist arguments suggesting that the 
Statement precluded biological scientists whose unbiased, expert research would  
have refrained from clouded analysis and empty idealism. Scientism remains a 
rhetorical strategy for racial realists who claim blind commitments to political 
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correctness or naïve claims to equality impede the recognition of real biological 
differences such as those related to intelligence(see Watson, 2007) and athletic 
ability (see Entine, 2000). The life scientists’ Statement on the Nature of Race and 
Race Differences rejected social-scientific explanations in its unwillingness to 
interrogate the validity of ‘race’ as a natural category and in the affirmation of older 
scientific traditions by differentiating between ‘non-literate’ and ‘more civilized’ 
people on intelligence tests (UNESCO, 1951). Resuscitation of these evaluative 
descriptors reinforces Cavalli-Sforza’s (2000) contention that the reliance on 
essentialist notion of ‘race’ (fixed biologically rooted differences) is often the sine 
qua non of racism.  
 
‘Race’ even with the memory of the Holocaust still immediate could not be laid to 
rest. A significant historical moment for delegitimizing the political and scientific 
force of ‘race’ remained un(der)realised. The refutation did create an ethico-political 
space where anti-‘race’ and antiracism could be legitimate intellectual positions. The 
first Statement, to be sure, received positive press coverage globally with hundreds 
of stories, editorial and radio features, as well as prominent features in American 
newsreels, public symposia and television programs (Brattain, 2007:1398). This 
public education campaign was a key part of the postracial endeavour to dismantle 
‘race’ and to develop an affirmative humanistic project through the widespread 
confirmation of our common humanity. 
 
The 1967 Statement on ‘race’, issued at the apex of the US Civil Rights Movement 
went further proclaiming, ‘The schools should ensure that their curricula contain 
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scientific understandings about ‘race’ and human unity, and that invidious 
distinctions about peoples are not made in texts and classrooms’ (cited in Montagu 
1972: 161). Primary education is a space where we might expect to see concerted 
effort to communicate contemporary scientific perspectives on the nonexistence of 
racial difference. University education in particular provides an arena for the 
transmission of scientific knowledge because it reaches students at a formative 
period, exposes them directly to the teaching of highly-credentialed scientists, and it 
does so through the face-to-face exchange that Rogers (1995) considered most 
effective in swaying firmly-held convictions. UNESCO postracialism relied on the 
assumption that racism was corrigible and that scientific facts were effective artillery 
in combating racism. The struggle over the ethical and scientific status of ‘race’ 
raises instructive questions for the development of a postracial programme; is 
education an effective antiracist tool? Can rational argument change a phenomenon 
seemingly moored in irrationality? UNESCO’s postracial experiment also faced the 
familiar ‘translation challenge’.  
 
The anthropologist Wilton Krogman circulated the Statement to his university-
educated neighbours. Krogman reported that although, ‘cogently written at a high 
level of scientific understanding’ his educated sample, ‘did not get it’59. As the 
rejection of racial biology is the bedrock for postracialism’s ethical and political 
projects, this warrants attention. Why didn’t they ‘get it’? Was the problem scientific 
comprehension? Or was it the unsettling of firmly held convictions about racial 
mythology? Labour and management relations leaders also warned Montagu that an 
                                               
59 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000733/073351eo.pdf (accessed 25 April  2012) 
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average worker would not get past the first paragraph, despite the text being written 
for a reasonably educated lay audience (cited in Brattain, 2007: 1406). These 
episodes are potential sites for reflection about a future project of re-launching a 
public education campaign. 
 
7.3 Actually-Existing Biological Differences 
 
7.3.1 Rethinking Difference  
 
Irresolvable contradictions, ambiguities and even postracial intervention have not 
presaged the death of ‘race’. Theodosius Dobzhansky, the evolutionary biologist and 
signatory to the 1950 Statement, in light of genetic evidence modified ‘race’ while 
preserving folkloric commonsense. He defined ‘race’ as, ‘a reproductive community 
of sexual and cross-fertilizing individuals which share in a common gene pool’ 
(1950:405). Uncritically importing language from the phenomenal world set a 
damaging inheritance upon genetic research. Crude usage of ‘race’ as a proxy for 
difference inevitably limits the utility of information obtained through the study of 
the real genetic variation that exists among populations with ancestry from all parts 
of the world (Soo-Jin et al., 2001). Postracial bioscience develops a more precise 
conceptual scheme with the analytical rigour to accurately explain and understand 
actually-existing genetic differences and to ultimately move beyond the obfuscating 
language of ‘racial populations’. In this section I outline several postracial 
approaches which offer more sophisticated and accurate accounts of biological 
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difference and direct focus on richer sociological accounts of the causal variables 
involved in (re)producing racialised disparities.  
 
Why, despite all the conceptual disorder and methodological inconsistency, do 
researchers insist ‘race’ exists? Can such a fuzzy category be a serviceable concept? 
Conservationists defended preservation amidst a crisis shortly after the defeat of 
Nazism illustrating some of the classic problems with conceptualisation. Racial 
theory regarded ‘race’ as an explanatory principle sui generis, which can itself 
explain various dimensions of human action and human inequality. Seepage into 
scientific research coupled with the social objectivity of ‘race’ made it difficult to 
break that intellectual inheritance - to constitute ‘race’ as an object of analysis, 
something to be explained with reference to other modes of human action. The 
elision between common-sense thinking and social-scientific thinking that seems 
endemic to ‘race’ makes the understanding and explanation of certain structural, 
objective and ontologically real features of social reality difficult to apprehend. 
 
The racial population represented a conceptual break with the physiological 
‘dividing lines’ of modernity. Genetics displaced the historical overemphasis on the 
visible and reworked difference through a threshold of visibility beyond phenotypes. 
The molecular lens undermines ‘race’ reducing it to something of an afterimage 
(Gilroy, 2000). Continued developments in biochemistry and population genetics 
have enabled a rigorous assessment of biological diversity which discredits the 
coherence of ‘race’. The distinctive attributes of populations often termed ‘races’ 
have no proven biological significance (Marshal, 1993:117).  
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Skin colour is in actuality a poor proxy for shared genetic heritage (Parra et al, 
2003). The social-scientific conclusion that ‘race’ is socially, political and legally 
constructed was confirmed by the Human Genome Project, the successful mapping 
of the chemical base pairs constituting our DNA. The identification of humanity’s 
genes showed high levels of genetic similarity and the impossibility of any sharply 
demarcated groupings (Bolnick, 2008:72). Postracial bioscience consistently 
confirms that there are no genetically pure populations, that variation in phenotypic 
traits cannot be assumed to reflect variation in genotypic traits and that using 
racialised categories as if they were genetic variables tends to reify these categories 
as immutable entities rather than recognising these to be context-specific and fluid 
forms of socio-cultural identification (Outram, & Ellison, 2010). 
 
7.3.2 Postracial Alternatives: Difference Without ‘Race’ 
 
The contention that external phenotypic traits do not posses greater validity in 
classification in comparison to internal ones created a quandary rendering formal 
racial taxonomy impossible (Reardon, 2004: 22). Postracial bioscience charts a 
methodological course out of this quandary. Wilson (2001) and his research team 
compared the relative effectiveness of two methods of identifying clusters of people 
who have distinct patterns of drug-metabolizing enzyme Single Nucleotide 
Polymorphisms (SNPs). SNPs are a type of genetic variation in a DNA sequence that 
occurs when a single nucleotide in a genome is altered. For example, Adenine (A) in 
the first sequence (ACGA) is substituted for Cytosine (C) in the otherwise identical 
sequence (CCGA). The research demonstrated that clusters identified by genotyping 
using microsatellite DNA (repeating sequences of 2-6 base pairs of DNA) are far 
253 
 
more robust than geographic and racial labels. Microsatellite DNA enabled an 
accurate technique for identifying clustering that has significant implications for the 
future of research in pharmacogenomics - where racial labels are ‘both insufficient 
and inaccurate representations’ of different genetic patterns (Wilson, 2001: 258). 
 
Wilson and his research associates showed how ‘race’ cannot work with the fluidity 
and multiple affiliations of population genetics. The research - in terms of advancing 
scientific understanding of how populations respond differently to drugs - also 
introduces empirical methods for assessing population structure and for mapping real 
differences. Crucially, it addresses valid methodological concerns without investing 
self-identified ‘race’ with biological significance building a scientific imagination 
oriented towards improving human health by reimaging biodiversity beyond the 
exclusionary codes of ‘race’. 
 
Postracial findings have not ended the dispute about whether ‘race’ can be justified 
genetically or by accrued health benefits to racialised groups, but it has made 
significant impacts. Reference to ‘race’ within health and biosciences has become 
seriously qualified. Kennedy (2001) describes it as a ‘probabilistic marker’ while Nei 
and Roychoudhury (1982: 41) remark that it is ‘generally highly statistically 
significant’. Its analytical force is significantly limited, if not invalidated, by 
qualification. Keeping ‘race’ in such qualified terms raises epistemological and 
methodological questions; can such a vague object be of use in addressing the root 
causes of health disparities? If genetic populations are changeable and subject to 
shifting migratory patterns that make them indefinable in absolute (racial) terms is it 
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dangerous to retain the language of ‘race’ implicitly suggesting a causal relationship 
or meaningful probabilistic correlation between genetic clusters?   
 
Postracial bioscience answers in ways portending new frameworks. Livingstone, 
argued that, ‘There are no races, there are only clines’ (1962:279). A cline is a 
geographic gradation of a species wherein, ‘the frequencies of some genes…change 
gradually in various geographical directions, so that the differences between 
populations are proportional to the distances between the localities which they 
inhabit’ (Boyd, 1950:204). A species may consist of different variations but these 
variations fade into one another and there are not sharp distinguishing lines.  
 
Geographically comprehensive samples confirm that human genetic variation is 
characterised by spatial gradients of allele frequency rather than categorical 
variation. Genetic patterns (described as isolation by distance) vary for the historical 
reasons of drift, selection and demographic history (Cavalli-Sforza & Bodmer, 1998: 
518). In short, genetic differences between populations are roughly proportional to 
the geographic distance between them. Clinal patterns do not imply that spatial 
transitions are completely smooth, or that there cannot be culturally or 
demographically induced differences even among very local groups. The observed 
quasi-continuous spatial pattern of human variation can be attributed to how new 
variation arises by mutation and how new alleles are geographically localised. New 
alleles spread through the slow process of positive selection and are suspect to 
stochastic aspects of birth, death and populational movement. Clines provide a non-
essentialist language for grasping the complex and constantly shifting nature of 
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human variation. Clines also show selective pressures and not ‘race’ to be the most 
important factor in the analysis of human variation.  
 
Not long after Livingstone, Lewontin discovered that human biodiversity is greatest 
within so-called racial groups suggesting racial groups were epistemologically 
vacuous. ‘Racial classification’ Lewontin wrote, ‘is now seen to be of virtually no 
genetic or taxonomic significance either (and, therefore) no justification can be 
offered for its continuance (1972: 396).’ Population studies reproduced his findings 
showing genetic variation is essentially continuous through space and that 
genetically distinct and internally homogenous groups are fictions. Outside of 
evolutionary biology, craniomteric (Relethford, 1994) and DNA evidence (Barbujani 
et al 1997; Jorde et al, 2000) show differences between members of the same 
population account for about 85% of overall genetic diversity. ‘Race’ introduces a 
quantitative distinction within a species despite genetic variability not being 
restricted to such discrete and consistent packages (Cooper & Freeman, 1999). This 
research becomes a space for the humanist affirmation of the indissoluble unity of all 
life at the genetic level leading to a stronger sense of the particularity of our species 
(Gilroy, 2000). 
 
This science imaginatively rethinks relatedness not in terms of what best to preserve 
in a museum (Human Genome Diversity Project) or what has commercial 
application (racialised pharmaceuticals) but in terms of human health and human 
well-being. Characterising genetic variation without recourse to ‘race’ helps 
biomedical research to better understand differential susceptibility to disease, 
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differential response to pharmacological agents and the complex interaction of 
genetic and environmental factors in producing phenotypes.  
 
Bhopal and Donaldson (1998) argue for the discontinuance of the ‘race’ concept 
amongst the scientific community. Such action, they maintain, will allow science to 
break free from a nomenclature developed for non-scientific purposes and to 
participate in conceptualising the actual basis of racial disparities. The scientific 
usage of social categories can be interpreted as an endorsement of their validity. The 
avoidance of loose terminology for these health-care professionals might influence 
everyday language and counter the predominance of ‘race’ in the everyday – a sort 
of gradualist program of dissolution.  
 
Nature does not authoritatively answer the question; what is the best way to 
represent human genome diversity? Postracial arguments without an epistemically 
guaranteed explanation are faced with the prospect of moving beyond the norms and 
assumptions of racial thinking. The privileging of certain theoretical interests, 
practical aims and value preferences over others is not to be dismissed as 
‘subjective’. Following Latour this is actually what enables the staking of a 
knowledge claim (Latour, 1999). It is crucial for postracialism to ask, what choices 
are available? What are the wider social, political and ethical ramifications? The 
project of developing nonracial conceptual frameworks for making sense of the wide 
array of biological diversity will be an inherently political and ethical one. 
 
 
7.4 Racism, Disease Aetiology and Racial Disparities  
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7.4.1 Racial Commonsense & Psycho-social Postracialisms 
 
‘The physical anthropologist and the man in the street’, wrote the second UNESCO 
panel, ‘both know that races exist the former from the scientifically recognizable and 
measured congeries of traits which he uses in classifying the varieties of man; the 
latter from the immediate evidence of his senses…’ (UNESCO, 1951). The 
conflation of anthropological knowledge with the intuitive perception of the ‘man on 
the street’ seems to suggest that phenotype reveals something significant about one’s 
biological inheritance. The equivalence of social objectivity and scientific 
confirmation show the close relationship between racial ideology and the scientific 
agenda. Lila made a similar linkage between the social facticity of ‘race’ and 
antiracist understandings of difference: 
I think that if one asks an academic, if ones asks a scientist or if one asks the 
mum on the street, and used that term race we would somehow accept that what 
we’re talking about is one’s colour. 
 
The panel and Lila concede ‘race’ has a literal ‘recognisability’ in the social world. 
They are appeals that suggest its epistemological coherence is admittedly lacking. 
Suturing racial commonsense to scientific objectivity seems to form an invincible 
racial realism. It is the irrationality of ‘race’ that has enabled it to endure rational 
scrutiny. The invidious work ‘race’ performs is enabled by these confused premises 
and ‘experiential’ claims which allow for objective scientists and ‘race’- equality 
practitioners to advance arguments based on anecdotal evidence as if it were so true 
as to be axiomatic. The circularity of racial realism prevents careful reflection on 
how the concept was used in their own thinking carrying forward a standing 
258 
 
assumption that innate racial differences actually existed. But why might science 
want to eliminate ‘race’? 
 
Montagu’s answer speaks to virulent scientific racisms which employed racial 
differences to argue against integration and equal social, political and economic 
rights: 
It (racism) declares that mankind is naturally divisible into ‘races’ which 
have originated independently of each other, and that these ‘races’ are each 
characterised by the possession of inborn physical and mental traits which together 
serve to distinguish them from one another. These groups are always inferior. 
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Montagu shows racism is a causal process (re)producing ‘race’ as a primary 
ascriptive marker of individual and group characteristics. ‘Race’ can serve to 
validate discrimination and incite violence. Focus on the social process of racism 
moves beyond scientific objectivism - narrowly confined to understanding properties 
and characteristics of racial knowledge - transcending the beliefs and consciousness 
of the individuals that develop and apply them.   
 
Psychosocial approaches (Clark et al, 1999), some of which group under postracial 
bioscience, also eschew scientific objectivism by focusing on the experiences and 
consequences of institutional and interpersonal racism. Research argues ‘race’ 
remains a potent social category with real consequences including unemployment, 
limited educational attainment and limited access to resources that would support the 
attainment of better health status. Intense residential segregation in the USA (Lipsitz, 
2011) relegates many racialised minorities to places without markets that stock fresh 
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fruits and vegetables and neighbourhoods that are not safe to walk in. The 
unavailability of quality produce and the impossibility of physical exercise results in 
nutritionally impoverished diets and sedentary lifestyles - a disastrous combination 
for health.  
 
Stress as a negative consequence of the experience of racial discrimination or 
harassment can take the form of depression and anxiety - both associated with 
adverse health outcomes. Oths et al (2001) accounted for low birth weights by 
investigating how entry level service jobs in fast-food restaurants and factories 
placed workers under high demands and provided them with little autonomy in, for 
example, being able to take a break. Examination of the social realities of racism 
enables the explanation and description of racialised inequalities without relying on 
‘race’ showing how racisms have direct physical consequences and how such 
oppression can become internalised, damaging self-esteem and potentially 
compromising available social support (Krieger & Sidney, 1996). Focus on the 
damaging consequences of racism (for oppressed and oppressor) can enable the 
development of cosmopolitan ethical obligations that self-consciously set aside 
claims to racial particularity in favour of authentically inclusive pursuits (Hill, 2009). 
 
Research also documents the relationship of stress to lowered health outcomes. A 
recent study experimentally demonstrated a mechanism by which emotional stress 
(women giving care to chronically ill children) could actually cause cellular damage 
(Epel et al, 2004). Individuals experiencing racialised stress have shown similar 
cellular damage and have been connected to increased probability of pre-term and 
low birth weight delivery. Stress brought on by the experience of racism has also 
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been shown to negatively affect the mental health of preschool children (Caughy et 
al, 2004). 
 
The research I am consolidating under postracial bioscience demonstrates that 
biology cannot be reduced to a sequence of DNA molecules. The psychosocial 
dimensions of physical health are clear reminders that genes are only one component 
of our complex biology. Pyschosocial research also show that the regulation and 
expression of genes is subject to extensive modulation by other genes as well as by 
non-genetic internal and external factors. The usefulness of ‘race’ as a tool for 
understanding diseases is limited precisely because of the complexity of the disease 
process. Conversely, psychosocial models focusing on racism can offer insightful 
clues about the causal forces involved in unequal health outcomes. We may be more 
equipped to develop effective prevention and intervention strategies in understanding 
causality in more sophisticated terms.  
 
In this way the psychosocial approach to racial discrimination represents a 
theoretical advance over racial-genetic models. The paradigm integrates what is 
unique about the experience of racism and examines how that experience generates a 
particular configuration of stressors associated with health and disease. The approach 
- using ‘race’ as a social construct with objective consequences - enables an analysis 
of racial discrimination and the cognitive and emotional efforts to cope with that 
stressor. The model may, sociologically speaking, over-emphasise the individual 
deflecting attention away from the broader social and cultural field (institutionalised 
racism in employment and education) that generates inequalities in the first instance. 
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Social-constructivist approaches reject genetic determinism and attempt to remedy 
the individualism in psychosocial models. 
 
7.4.2 Social-Constructivism and Postracial Bioscience 
 
The use of ‘race’ in epidemiological research has been described as the practice of 
‘black box epidemiology’ (Anand, 1999). Stated differently, the exact causal 
mechanism behind the association remains hidden (black) but the inference is that 
the causal mechanism may be found within the association (box). Black box 
epidemiology restricts all explanation to the biological. In this explanatory haze 
‘race’ operates as a ‘sponge variable’ capturing a host of unmeasured factors that 
impact health but do not provide the information needed to address health disparities. 
It would appear that there is an ethical obligation to attempt to identify, measure and 
address these factors directly. Structural approaches undertake this task. Nutrition, 
occupation, unemployment, substandard housing and racism all have physiological 
effects. And in many instances researchers have not figured out how to accurately 
and effectively capture or measure these factors (Pappas et al, 1993). 
 
Postracial approaches (hoping to inform prevention and intervention strategies) 
examine structural forces in order to investigate and identify the exact causal 
mechanisms reproducing inequalities. ‘Race’ is more than a proxy for some 
unspecified combination of environmental, behavioural and genetic factors.  
The American Center for Disease Control reports that the difference in the 
percentage of white and black children who suffer from asthma is one percent. 
Hospitalisation and death from asthma, however, is three times higher for black 
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children. In the predominantly Black borough of East Harlem New York the rate of 
hospitalisation is two hundred and twenty three per ten thousand as compared to the 
forty six per ten thousand in largely white areas of Manhattan (Luz et al, 2006). 
Residential segregation is a leading cause for this difference which is of an entirely 
different magnitude from those associated with potential genetic differences. 
Research suggests that aetiologies related to disparities in asthma are attributable to 
environmental differences of toxic exposure, housing quality and access to health 
care (Noah, 1998). Reintroducing social-scientific reasoning into disease aetiology 
and treatment shows differences in health status have little to do with genetics but 
rather derive from differences in culture, diet, socioeconomic status, access to 
healthcare, education, marginalisation, and stress (Collins, 2004). 
 
Hundreds perhaps even thousands of disorders including cancer are misleadingly 
categorised as genetic (Duster, 2003:55). A renewed genetic determinism ultimately 
diverts both public opinion and research dollars from examining structural factors 
that account for patterns of disease variation. The diversion of money away from 
research on disease susceptibility, occurrence, aetiology, and treatment response is 
well documented (Krieger and Fee, 1994; Ossorio and Duster, 2005; Fausto-Sterling, 
2008). Spina bifida, for example, is a disorder with a genetic and environmental 
component. How the condition is defined has important implications for the 
development of screening and treatment programs. Spina bifida could be accurately 
categorized as an industrial-environmental disorder which would shift policy from 
carrier screening to cleaning up toxicity and most importantly controlling and 
stopping the production of toxins (Duster, 2003:56). Genetic characterisation instead 
directs policy to gene screening and other high-tech forms of handling the ‘genetic’ 
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problem when in reality an extra dose of multi-vitamins could cure it and other 
neural tube defects (Duster, 2003:58).  
 
In 1997 the American National Institute of Health broke with the long-lasting racial 
logic associating cystic fibrosis with Western Europeans publishing a landmark 
document recognising the risk to all populations. The state of California following 
the publication passed what might be described as postracial bioscience legislation 
which legally required all providers who deliver obstetric care to offer maternal 
serum alphafetoprotein (MSAFP) screening to pregnant women. The primary 
purpose of MSAFP screening is to detect foetuses with neural tube defects. It can 
also be used for detecting chromosomal abnormalities like Down’s-syndrome. The 
institutionalisation of prenatal diagnostic testing to all helps to insure a healthy birth, 
enables selective abortion of foetal anomalies and disrupts the powerful association 
of ‘race’ and disease. 
 
Genetic screening approaches, however, can compound racial stratification. Limited 
financial resources, for instance, may preclude access to testing and/or the ability to 
carry out any measures indicated by test results. Genetic testing, where obtained, still 
involves the risk of societal stigmatisation of the disabled. Furthermore, classifying 
spina bifida as a ‘racial condition’ is reification par excellance. If science can 
establish racially specific conditions then biologically discrete ‘races’ exist prior to 
their social formation. The continued assignment of environmental conditions to the 
genetic highlights the challenge of multi-factoral causality. Genes and the 
environment are in continuous interaction with environmental factors being able to 
alter genetic expression. Despite the absence of identifiable genes, more genetic 
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(read racialised) emphasis is generally placed on heart disease, cancer and a host of 
other diseases where environmental factors may contribute to initiation and 
progression (Duster, 2003:97).   
 
The enthusiasm for genomic solutions reflects the optimism generated by the rapid 
rate of progress made in molecular genetics and corresponding beliefs about the 
failures (and suggested futility) of social programs and social solutions. 
Significantly, the belief that genetic causes are more tractable than environmental 
ones finds reinforcement in neoliberalism. Framing racialised disparities in social-
structural terms would equally frame ameliorative strategies. Neoliberalism rejects 
addressing social inequalities through redistribution and the expansion of social 
welfare programs which could potentially realign present socioeconomic structures 
(Harvey, 2005).  
 
In societies polarised by wealth distribution overall levels of population health are 
correspondingly lower for the simple reason that those at the bottom of the income 
distribution will have lost more health than those at the top have gained (Lynch & 
Kaplan, 1997). Inequitable income distribution may also be associated with a set of 
social processes and polices that systematically under-invest in human physical 
health and social infrastructure. This underinvestment may have health 
consequences. Nations that tolerate high levels of income inequality, for instance, 
often have fewer initiatives in public health, education about smoking, diet and 
exercise. Also, such countries tend to have less strict environmental pollution 
standards, provide less support for cultural festivals, civic performance and art shows 
and have higher concentrations of cigarette and alcohol advertising (Kawachi, 1997). 
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Such widespread disinvestment has serious implications for the health of the 
population. Wilkinson (1996) has collated a large body of evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the extent of income inequality in society determines its average 
health status: the greater the gap between the incomes of the rich and poor, the worse 
the health status of citizens. In a cross-sectional examination of nine member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
he reported a strong correlation ( r =0.86) between life expectancy and income 
inequality as measured by the proportion of aggregate income earned by the least 
well-off seventy percent of the population.   
 
Biological interventions offer alternatives consistent with current Euro-American 
neoliberal policies. Neoliberalism in general terms seeks to reduce government 
deficits while avoiding tax increases by such measures as the attenuation and 
elimination of social programs and the relaxation of standards that regulate industrial 
hazards, while tolerating an ever-increasing polarisation of wealth (Gannet, 
1997:409). Genetic interventions are perceived as more easily managed now that 
scientists have the technological capability to manipulate the genome - certainly 
more easily managed than less readily yielding social entities such as institutional 
racism and economic stratification. It would appear there is an urgent moment for 
postracial bioscience to stake a claim against the neoliberal denial of racism. 
Challenging neoliberal denial may require a critique of capitalist reproduction. In the 
US where healthcare is heavily privatised it seems impossible to engage health 
inequalities without examining the economic forces shaping and making healthcare a 
marketplace commodity.   
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Postracial bioscience shifts focus from ‘race’ and biology to racism and 
societypursuing studies and treatments directed toward mitigating behaviours and 
environmental causes of disease that offer substantial and proven benefits. In the 
UK, Karlsen and Nazroo (2002) using National Survey of Ethnic Minorities data in 
multivariate models have shown a strong independent relationship exists between 
health and the experience of racism, perceived racial discrimination and class. 
Racism is a key structural determinant of inequalities in health causing negative 
physical and psychological consequences. Institutional racism (not ‘race’) leads to 
the identification of racial groups, their reification as biologically and culturally 
discrete and the consequent exclusion and social and economic disadvantage. In 
cases of complex behaviour and health patterns such as depression, high blood 
pressure, diabetes and asthma data suggests that racial differences are best explained 
by institutional racism primarily attributable to large racial disparities in family 
wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 2006; Conley, 1999). 
 
‘Race’ is a deeply flawed concept and its persistent usage prolongs the delay in 
seeking real causes, lending more scientific validity to the ‘race’/health connection 
than is warranted. Reliance on naturalised concepts also erects a conceptual barrier 
to developing a research programme exploring the complex ways in which social 
inequality and experiences of racial discrimination interact with human biology to 
influence patterns of disease (Braun, 2002). Consequently, racial categories are 
inscribed with biological meaning, thereby obscuring cultural, social and 
environmental factors also affecting health and behaviour. Postracial bioscience is 
not interested in an imperfect surrogate for ancestral geographic origin which is in 
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turn a surrogate for genetic variation across an individual’s genome. It extends 
beyond weak and imperfect proxy relations to the root causes of health and disease. 
 
 
7.4.3 Racism as Cause 
  
Some postracial bioscience has issued calls for an alternative analysis  
examining the potential biological mechanism through which life experience can 
affect health (Braun, 2002). In general terms these approaches study the dynamic 
nature of the relationship between humans and their social and physical environment 
and the effects of this interaction on the expression of genes. The sophisticated 
approach departs from ascribing an exaggerated biological meaning to a string of 
nucleotides. The analysis has immense potential to provide cogent explanations for 
differences in the prevalence of disease or disease-related mortality. Aetiological 
explanations would examine the disease experience of individuals in the context of, 
not separate from, their social and physical environment. Examples include looking 
at how low-fat diets or diets rich in a variety of nutrients might influence health in 
complex ways modulating levels of hormones or other biologically significant 
proteins which in turn could regulate gene expression (Rose, 1987).  
 
Dr. Dean Ornish and his colleagues at the University of California have conducted a 
series of studies showing how changes in diet and lifestyle can powerfully influence 
our well-being (heart disease, prostate cancer, depression, diabetes) how quickly 
these changes may occur, and how dynamic these mechanisms can be (1992). Dr. 
Neil Barnard has similarly shown the power of nutrition (particularly vegan and 
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vegetarian diets) in treating and managing type II diabetes (Barnard et al, 2009 & 
Barnard et al, 2006). It becomes quickly evident that a range of life experiences 
including the experience of racism compromise health through physiological 
mechanisms that are not heritable.  
 
A study using national vital statistics to obtain mortality rates for major groups in the 
largest US cities recognised that hypertension is the primary pathway leading to 
higher cardiovascular disease risk among African-Americans. Using residential 
segregation - for Lipsitz (2011) the principal mechanism through which racism is 
enforced - as an indicator measure, ecological analyses of American metropolitan 
areas demonstrated that both racism and economic inequality are consistently 
associated in variation in risk of cardiovascular disease. Group level analysis showed 
social inequality and racism to be bona fide causes and even advocated that they be 
named in prevention strategies (Rodgers, 2000). Just as the identification of smoking 
as a cause for lung cancer reduces the need to obtain exhaustive information about 
mechanism, knowing that social processes are potentially modifiable components of 
a pathway to disease should warrant their designation as a cause and an opportunity 
for intervention (Kaplan, 2000). The postracialist emphasis on racism (not ‘race’) 
demonstrates how underlying exposure leading to group differences can be 
conceptualised as a social process. Causality is located in historically contingent, 
economic and cultural patterns like wage inequality and racism, not a gene, trait or a 
choice that can be assigned to an individual.    
 
Conservationists in biomedical research reiterate that ‘race’ is a good predictor of 
health outcomes while conceding it to be only a ‘rough proxy’. In order to 
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understand why ‘race’ functions as a rough proxy we must look beyond the surface. 
We must look at ‘race’ in the context of racism. Racism is the social force which 
governs the distribution of risks and opportunities in our society. It is expressed in 
differential access to goods, services and opportunity and structurally codified in 
institutions of practice and law. It is manifest in material conditions and in (in)access 
to power, quality education, sound housing, gainful employment, appropriate 
medical facilities and a clean environment. Institutionalised racism impacts health 
through both socioeconomic status and access to healthcare as well as disparate 
treatment within the care system.  
 
The Social Determinants of Health and Equity housed in the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention has also undertaken research to explore how racism is the 
root cause of inequality. Racism is useful for epidemiologists and other public health 
practitioners for generating hypotheses about the basis of ‘race’-associated 
differences in health outcomes, as well as for designing interventions to eliminate 
those differences (Jones, 2001). 
 
It has been argued that it is necessary to disaggregate racial populations in order to 
more directly assess disparities, to target effective interventions and to alleviate them 
(Ver Ploeg & Perrin, 2004). The overreliance on ‘race’ produces research lacking a 
sufficiently nuanced measure of socioeconomic status (SES); impeding 
understanding of the complex relationships among ‘race’, poverty and health 
disparities. The development of widely used measures of discrimination that can 
directly capture the impact of racial discrimination on health rather than rely on a 
proxy could dramatically improve the specificity of future research. An analysis of 
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18 different area-based socioeconomic measures to determine the best measures for 
monitoring socioeconomic inequalities in health has shown some promise toward a 
‘postracial’ metric of inequality (ibid). The usage of census tract poverty levels 
powerfully detected expected socioeconomic gradients in health, allowed maximal 
geocoding and linkage to other area-based data and was feasible to implement within 
state health departments.  
 
Adjusting for this one measure substantially reduced excess risk observed in 
African-American and Hispanic populations relative to white populations and for 
half the outcomes more than fifty percent of cases would have been averted if 
everyone’s risk were equivalent to those in the least impoverished census tract. This 
could allow powerful area-level measures of SES to be included in genetic studies 
with little additional expense and enable a fuller elucidation of the role of social 
location in the aetiology of disease. Empirically driven approaches to population 
stratification are methodologically superior and far less harmful than using a ‘rough 
proxy’.  
 
 
7.5 Postracial Medicine: Promises, Problems & Contradictions 
 
7.5.1 The Personal Is Postracial 
 
Postracial bioscientific approaches ask: is ‘race’ useful in interpreting, treating and 
diagnosing patients? Investigations (Outram and Ellison, 2010) have shown that 
when used to inform diagnostic and treatment decisions ‘race’ offers little in the way 
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of evidentiary assessment. The amount of information gained by using ‘race’ in 
deciding who should be diagnosed is minimal with any benefit being offset by the 
tendency to exaggerate the association. Additionally ‘race’ has the tendency to 
decontextualise difference and to obfuscate power dynamics that create inequalities.  
 
Certain postracial biosciences have attempted to do away with the category and to 
improve the precision of genetic categories with subtler distinctions based on 
ancestry or genetic markers to increase the utility of the resulting data (Whitmarsh & 
Jones, 2010). Geneticists have successfully constructed technologies for finding 
disease-related genetic markers without employing the notion of ‘race’ accounting 
for population differences due to different ‘ancestries’ rather than assessing 
differences among racial groups (Fujimura et al, 2010). Genome wide association 
(GWA) studies provide alternative means to conduct searches for genetic markers 
associated with complex diseases without relying on the muddling category. GWA 
studies specify populations not based on ‘race’ but rather on genetic ancestry which 
produces a finer resolution of the actual-existing population than would socio-
cultural categories.  
 
While ‘race’ does not provide useful information concerning disease aetiology, 
knowing the unique genetic profile of an individual - a profile unquestionably 
influenced by ancestry - will assist a physician in streamlining the search for the 
right diagnosis for a set of symptoms (Patrinos, 2004). The belief that human genetic 
diversity can be accounted for through simple static partitions has limited our 
understanding of diversity and hindered efforts of developing effective programs of 
individualised medicine. Postracial positions, for instance, suggest continued usage 
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has unduly narrowed the range of diagnoses and potential treatments applied to 
individual patients. Witzig (1996) describes the case of an eight year-old boy 
phenotypically European who presented with acute abdominal pain and anaemia. His 
body temperature was only 37.9 centigrade and so surgery was considered. Moments 
before surgery, a hospital technician found red corpuscles with haemolytic 
characteristics on a smear. The scheduled surgery was cancelled, and the boy was 
treated for sickle-cell anaemia. Using ‘race’ in the medical context can lead to 
essentialism encouraging clinicians to ignore multiple lines of descent as in for 
example testing a patient for sickle-cell but not cystic fibrosis. How ‘race’ structures 
the medical gaze highlighting certain conditions for certain racial subjects to the 
exclusion of conditions associated with other racial groups is an obvious formula for 
racial misdiagnosis. 
 
Beyond racial medicine is pharmacogenomics - a new era of personalised medicine 
where pharmaceuticals would be specifically designed to work with the unique 
genetic makeup of individuals. Pharmacogenomics introduces a new approach to 
drug development capable of reducing the cost and increasing the safety and efficacy 
of new therapies (Kahn, 2007). Its promise (and ambition) rests in its 
implementation as postracial individualised medicine given the likelihood that 
variation in drug responses will vary more within racial groups than among them. 
Individualised medicine identifies individual risk factors and treats the specific 
aetiology of the individual (Tishkoff & Kidd, 2004). These diagnostic tools can be 
used to individualise and optimise drug therapy yielding new insights into the 
pathogenesis of human disease and revealing new strategies for their prevention and 
treatment.   
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In the context of global capitalism it is important to situate the drivers of the search 
for medically salient racial variations fuelled as they are by the pursuit of profits and 
lucrative intellectual patents. It would be remiss to not note the commercial 
aspirations of the pharmaceutical companies and the biomedical industry where 
genomic approaches to diagnosis, drug development and marketing have attracted a 
flood of venture capital. In a profit-driven economy difference not sameness drives 
advances in drug discovery and development in pharmacogenomics research 
(Rothstein and Epps, 2001). 
 
The notorious BiDil, a drug ‘developed’ for African-Americans experiencing heart 
failure, is a case in point. Developers - initially rejected by government regulators in 
the 1980s - retrospectively dredged the data (49 samples) to secure a patent for BiDil 
as a racially specific drug (Kahn, 2005). The racialised label extended NitroMed’s 
patent protection for another 13 years without competition. Company stock 
skyrocketed on the news, more than tripling in value in the following days. Projected 
annual revenue streams are around $2 billion and expected to rise with a massive 
marketing campaign to third party payers, individual doctors and the public at large 
(Kahn, 2004).The patented drug costs about six times as much as the readily 
available generic equivalents. BiDil was reinvented as an ‘ethnic drug’ with legal 
and commercial forces displacing biomedical concerns.  
 
7.5.2 Postracialism and Institutionalisation  
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The marketing and advertising of pharmaceutical companies is particularly 
meaningful in the US because it is one of a handful of countries where the direct 
marketing of prescription drugs to patients is lawful. Social categories in such an 
environment become indispensable to the marketing strategies and research agendas 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Will the patenting and licensing of ‘racial drugs’ 
likely protect patients and advance their health in a country where access to adequate 
healthcare is starkly racialised (Dressler, Oths, & Gravlee, 2005)? And are clinicians 
and patients likely to be served well by the advertising and profit priorities of 
pharmaceutical corporations? It is perhaps too economisitic to suggest that the sole 
motivation is the capture of a ‘racial consumer market’, but reflection on the 
economic imperatives of the pharmaceutical companies is most certainly warranted.  
 
The ‘free market’ is not the only space where racial categories are embedded. Since 
1997 all subsidised biomedical research in the USA is legally required to use racial 
categorisations in clinical trials (Rose, 2007). Conceptual uncertainty and 
contradictory evidence aside, racial classifications are embedded in the routine 
collection and classification of data from genetics to sociology. In 2003 the US Food 
and Drug Administration recommended that American racial categories be 
‘harmonised’ in other words globalised - the designation African-American changed 
to African (Schultz, 2003). The embeddedness of ‘race’ in research as a welcomed 
form of proxy assistance in delimiting groups which differ statistically in their 
genetic composition raises the question; is the creation of an authentically postracial 
science a practical, possible and perhaps more contentiously desirable pursuit?  
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The humanist project at the core of certain postracialisms would seem to suggest that 
postracial bioscience has a deep commitment to and concern for the optimisation of 
patient care. A worthy pursuit, the optimisation of patient care is threatened by the 
lucrative investment potential of pharmacogenomics which could direct funding 
away from prevention programs, health promotion work and screening programs - 
the backbone of the prevention agenda. The use of ‘race’ even with all the 
qualifications in biomedical research and medicine remains dangerous. The potential 
for a mere tool to very soon end up as a theoretical paradigm is well documented 
(Gigerenzer, 1991). And as Hacking (1983) has argued hypothetical entities have an 
insidious tendency to become real when they are used to investigate something else. 
Classifications that are arbitrary and contingent social constructs are made real in the 
very process of using them within the investigation and/or analysis. This process of 
reification prevents the development of accurate explanations and descriptions of 
phenomenon, in this case human biological diversity and its relationship to disease 
and therapeutics. Barzun presciently warned of this in 1937; ‘One of the penalties of 
toying with the ‘race’-notion is that even a strong mind trying to repudiate it will 
find himself making assumptions and passing judgment on the basis of the theory he 
declaims’ (1937:44).  
 
Local and national grass roots advocacy is also driving the entrenching of ‘race’ and 
raising a multitude of complex ethical dilemmas. Under the auspices of the 
American Diabetes Association, Awakening the Spirit: Pathways to Diabetes 
Prevention and Control advocates nationally for diabetes education programs in 
tribal communities. The campaign invokes a homogenising imagined past with 
implicit reference to the noble savage whose vigorous labours prevented ‘diseases of 
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civilisation’; ‘Years ago, Native Americans did not have diabetes. Elders can recall 
times when people hunted and gathered food for simple meals. People walked a lot. 
Now, in some Native communities, one in two adults has diabetes.’61 
 
Awakening the Spirit intertwines social and biological registers of difference. ‘Race’ 
remains an independent risk factor but it is no longer the explanation. Sociological 
explanations (socioeconomic status, access to healthcare etc.) are incorporated into 
the paradigm. Does the move away from genetic determinism portend an analysis 
capable of enhancing our understanding of diabetes? Or might this multi-factoral 
framework represent a more insidious form of racism - obfuscating a biological 
notion of ‘race’ through the language of population genetics and camouflaging it 
further through social context?  
 
In Awakening the Spirit Native American identity is imaginatively reconstituted as a 
biosociality (Rabinow, 1992). Disease susceptibility becomes part of the 
collectivity’s identity and a framework for making claims about the group. Hybrid 
articulations of ‘race’ forged through identity politics thoroughly blur the lines 
between objective and subjective knowledge. The problem is no longer the 
imposition of categories and practices of objectification. Awakening the Spirit shows 
how racialised groups use techno-scientific knowledge and language originally 
created in the service of subjugation for the purposes of attainting corrective 
resources and giving autonomous accounts of collective identity. What becomes of 
an antiracist postracial bioscience when the categories it is combating are being 
                                               
61http://www.diabetes.org/in-my-community/programs/native-american-programs/awakening-the- 
spirit.html (accessed 23 March 2012) 
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successfully utilised as important symbolic and material resources to promote the 
health of underserved social groups and ultimately to save lives? Is the autonomous 
organising and construction of a space where Native Americans can make their own 
decisions about participation and campaigning to be put under erasure because of its 
complicity in the reproduction of ‘race’?  
 
Perhaps this usage of ‘race’ and genetics represents a politically and ethically 
defensible means for reinterpreting existing political identities and creating new 
ones, for forming communities and participating in civic life. Racial identities, this 
example reminds us, are more than positions in a social structure. They also 
represent agential identities. Awakening the Spirit encapsulates that agency as a 
mobilisation against the negative physical and psychological consequences of racial 
discrimination. It is this complexity of ‘race’ as more than a dispassionate scientific 
category which raises very challenging, perhaps intractable problems, for the 
postracial project.  
 
Awakening the Spirit also conscripts essentialising and neoliberal discourses in 
pursuing a cure. ‘On a spiritual level, Native people understand we are responsible 
for taking care of our bodies first. Positive lifestyle choices can help our families, our 
communities, and ourselves.’ 62 This cosmological argument has some logical 
parallels to what Rose (2007) has called ‘biological citizenship’. Native Americans 
when (re)constituted as biological citizens are not just passive recipients of social 
rights but are obliged to take individual responsibility for social problems. Being a 
good biological citizen means exercising biological prudence for one’s own sake, 
                                               
62 http://www.diabetes.org/in-my-community/programs/native-american-programs/awakening   
 -the- spirit.html (accessed 23 March 2011) 
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that of their families, and that of their own lineage. Can such an individuated 
solution which uses ‘race’ pragmatically within certain ethical and political 
coordinates be amenable to postracialism or is it irreconcilable with the recovery of 
‘the human’? More importantly can it help to close the widening health disparities 
gap? 
 
The postracial paradox returns to haunt mobilisations like Awakening the Spirit but it 
also looms over healthcare outcomes. Usage of ‘race’ it has been argued is, ‘morally 
urgent and indispensable’ (Krieger, 2010) in understanding preterm deliveries which 
can only be theorised by collecting data on both people’s self-reported experience of 
discrimination (implicit/explicit) and on racial disparities in health outcomes and 
harmful environmental exposures. Postracial bioscience cannot simply ‘go 
postracial’. ‘Race’ is crucial in racialised societies for any analysis of disparities in 
health or for identifying, exploring and addressing the consequences of injustice 
based on notions of racial groups as genetically distinct. Researchers must employ 
the socially created category to determine how racism harms health and in order to 
distinguish between and compare the health status of populations likely to be harmed 
by or to benefit from racial injustice. Examining racism involves the postracial 
paradox - using ‘race’ as a social category reflecting social relations namely the 
impact of racism on health while struggling not to reify and essentialise it (Kaplan 
and Bennet, 2003; Mays et al, 2003; Braun et al, 2007). This is the complex duality 
of working with and against race.  
 
It is worth reiterating that while socio-political constructs may be appropriate for 
monitoring health disparities, they are certainly not appropriate for use in genetic 
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studies investigating the aetiology of complex diseases. Racial categories do not 
allow researchers to measure and monitor racial disparities in health status, access to 
quality of care and outcome - the health consequences of systemic disadvantage - 
and do not provide sufficient nuance to inform efforts to address them. The use of 
scientifically imprecise variables in genetic studies as a stand-in for measurement of 
genetic heterogeneity or differential exposure to measurable environmental or social 
exposure is methodologically unacceptable.  
 
Monitoring the impact of racial discrimination and structural inequalities on health is 
a crucial social responsibility but it is not useful in aetiological studies of human 
disease focused on disentangling complex gene-environment interactions. Insofar as 
genetics research considers social and environmental influences and their complex 
interactions with key genetic variants, the field may actually have the potential to 
help biomedical and public health research break out of the ‘race’ conundrum and 
provide valuable information that could actually prove useful in addressing racial 
disparities in health identified by public monitoring efforts. We might in this sense 
think of postracial bioscience as capable of addressing the postracial paradox 
outlined earlier.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
The scientific field cannot be left uncontested given the social authority of science 
and how naturalised notions of ‘race’ have rationalised the gross abuses carried out 
in its name. Restating the evidence disproving the biological ‘race’ concept as well 
as illuminating its conceptual imprecision is vital to postracial bioscience. Postracial 
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bioscience deconstructs ‘race’ opening up space for an integrated science which 
examines structural inequalities and social processes like class stratification and 
racism.  
 
History is replete with examples of the harm that can be done to people associated 
with biologized categories in research, clinical practice and the market. The role of 
racism in structuring wealth distribution and access to adequate healthcare reminds 
us that some are already disproportionately bearing the risks of biologization. Simply 
moving beyond the scientific concept is not at all equivalent to eradicating the 
symbolic effectiveness of ‘race’. Throughout this chapter, I have argued that ethical 
questions need to be raised in the conceptualisation of scientific research. Postracial 
bioscience is in part a space for meditation on how the scientific community 
understands and uses ‘race’ in designing research and in presenting findings. The 
way science is designed and carried out fundamentally affects how it can be used. 
Although far from achieving a consensus, the wide range of critical and prescriptive 
insights I have discussed as ‘postracial bioscience’ (St Louis forthcoming) have 
succeeded in stimulating debate on the usefulness of ‘race’ in epistemological, 
methodological and ethical terms.  
 
 Postracial bioscience shows that keeping racial categories does not serve the 
purpose of reducing health disparities in the context of genetic research. Reducing 
disparities requires understanding the social and structural forces of racism and 
inequality in addition to the complex gene-gene and gene-environment interactions 
that together comprise disease risk severity. Self-identified racial membership will 
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not offer understanding of why racial disparities in health exist and how to remedy 
them.  
 
The postracial paradox however, means that postracial bioscience must 
simultaneously work with and against ‘race’. Perhaps a postracial bioscience could 
be imagined as a critical investigation in, for example, the basis of observed ‘race’-
associated differences in health outcomes. ‘Race’-associated differences function not 
as causal explanations but as important indicators to be mined. The overreliance on 
‘race’ impedes the advance of scientific knowledge, limits efforts at primary 
prevention and contributes to ideas of biological determinism. Postracialism focuses 
not on screening and treating racially targeted populations but rather understanding 
and preventing the onset of disease by addressing root causes. With all the clinical 
and genetic heterogeneity it is crucial to not lose sight of the fact that the major 
objective is to treat, cure and prevent disease. The fundamental goal of medicine is to 
relieve pain and suffering which most often take the form of common complex 
diseases such as heart disease, cancer stroke and diabetes. For the past fifty years 
these diseases have been the leading causes of death in the USA and the UK. These 
conditions unite human beings and render racial categorisation meaningless at both 
the scientific and social level precisely because they are not specific to any one 
group (Roses, 2000). 
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Chapter 8 Beyond Racial Difference: Postracial Cosmopolitanism  
 
 
The previous chapter showed how scientific critiques investigated the 
epistemological disorder and methodological inconsistency of ‘race’ evaluating how 
‘race’ often leads to spurious racial ‘sentiments’ and how it was used in deadly 
political projects. Following WWII the scientific community gradually expanded to 
include historically precluded groups, that is to say women and racialised minorities. 
The transformation in the composition of the community marked a shift in the 
content of discourses on ‘race’. During this period empirically evidenced arguments 
were marshalled to rebut claims of group ‘inferiority’ on egalitarian principles 
(Barkan, 1996). This chapter extends the previous discussion through an 
examination of the critique of ‘race’ based on egalitarian principles. I explore 
‘postracial cosmopolitanism’ through both theoretical literature and qualitative data 
arguing that in spite of limitations it offers an ethically laudable re-imagination of 
living with difference.  
 
This chapter - theoretically informed and empirically engaged - critically reflects on 
postracial cosmopolitanisms through a discussion organised around eight sections 
based data-generated themes. 8.1 outlines and explains how I am using postracial 
cosmopolitanism. 8.2 investigates cosmopolitanism as a critique of racial 
communitarianism showing the under-examined assumptions in such a politics. 8.3 
explores cosmopolitan contradictions in relation to lived racial experience. 8.4 looks 
at the fetishisation of agency in postracial cosmopolitanism showing how the 
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agential focus misses the opportunity to examine the social production of 
subjectivity and the collective labour of movement building. 8.5 surveys the neglect 
of ‘race’ in cosmopolitan politics. 8.6 probes how the recovery of the human 
inadequately attends to existing power relations. 8.7 outlines the imaginative visions 
of postracial cosmopolitanisms and explores their contribution to theory and praxis. 
8.8 considers the practical hurdles involved in practicing postracial cosmopolitanism. 
The chapter concludes with a statement of the value of postracial cosmopolitanism. 
 
8.1 Postracial Cosmopolitanism Sketched 
 
Cosmopolitanism(s) is marked by considerable conceptual and theoretical diversity. 
It is variously conceived as a socio-cultural condition (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002), a 
vision of global democracy and world citizenship (Brown, 2000), and also refers to 
socio-cultural processes or values manifesting a capacity to engage cultural 
multiplicity. For my purposes cosmopolitanism is an anti-communitarian 
philosophical position urging us to live in a world governed by overarching 
principles of rights and justice (Beck, 2002). At the core of cosmopolitan thinking is 
the firm belief that moral principles and obligations are not to be based in specific 
groups and contexts. Cosmopolitanism is then a project of creating a worldwide 
human community committed to common values.  
 
Cosmopolitanism has witnessed a recent revival as a ‘new’ leftist politics (Held, 
2000). Historical circumstances behind the recovery include the rise of anti-
globalisation movements, a growing awareness of common risks like climate change, 
the atrocities reached by essentialist identity politics in, for example, the former 
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Yugoslavia and the ethical impasses of a strictly negative critique of the 
Enlightenment. Generally speaking, cosmopolitanisms combine the critique of 
partial Enlightenment universals with the pursuit of the emancipatory ideals of 
traditional universalism (Anderson, 1998).  
 
The postracial cosmopolitanisms in this chapter might be thought of as attempting to 
constitute a post-identity politics of overlapping interests and heterogeneous publics 
that challenge conventional notions of belonging and identity (Vertovec and Cohen, 
2002). Postracial cosmopolitanism strategically calls upon a global commonality 
(‘the world as a single place’) to dismantle racialism (Robertson, 1992:132). The 
postracial and cosmopolitan converge in the shared goal of enabling the individual to 
not have her life scripted by any one community (racial or national) enabling her to 
draw selectively on a variety of discursive meanings.    
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism challenges the basic assumption of the ‘race’ concept 
that the individual exists insofar as she forms the sum of the racial group. Gilroy 
(2004), for example, defines ‘race’ as a, ‘discursive arrangement, the brutal result of 
the raciological ordering of the world, not its cause’ (37). Raciological ordering 
subsumes the individual into discrete collective identities impeding autonomous life 
projects and creating racialised ethical systems. Hill (2009) similarly develops the 
moral cosmopolitan who, ‘refuse(s) blood identity [read ‘race’] because it shuts 
people outside the domain of the ethical and a fortiori, the human community (3).’ 
Appiah (1996) too criticises collective identities not to deny their legitimacy but 
rather to expose their threat to individual freedom and community. Zack’s future-
leaning identity of ‘racelessness’ (1995) also rejects ‘race’ as ‘an oppressive cultural 
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invention and convention’ (1992: 10) pursuing an ‘identity found on freedom and 
resistance to oppression rather than acceptance of tradition’ (1993:164).  
Strong individualist elements - detachment from shared identities and emphasis on 
affiliation as voluntary – thematically connect the positions consolidated under 
postracial cosmopolitanism. 
 
Appiah also argues for an ‘ethical universal’ that transcends social fragmentation and 
bridges across racial categorisation (2006). The ethical universal endeavours to 
exceed the exhausted nation-state model (how flows of goods, capital, people, 
information, ideas, and risk across borders alongside the emergence of social 
networks and political institutions problematise the nation-state) while also 
mediating actions and ideals oriented both globally and locally. Germanys’ 
regulation of the toxins causing acid rain exemplifies this. The acid rain devastating 
the Black Forest is obviously not tethered to a territorial jurisdiction, although at the 
moment it is most often regional than properly global. Appiah suggests the ethical 
universal can represent variously complex repertoires of allegiance and identity. 
Striking examples can be found in popular music as in K’Naan’s ‘Take a Minute’ 
(2009) where borrowing, cross-referencing and influences pass between Africa, 
North America, Great Britain and the Caribbean.  
 
‘Race’ involves a logic of ‘naturalness’ that denies the condition of hybridity in an 
idealisation of racial homogeneity. ‘Race’, for postracial cosmopolitanism, does not 
have the complexity to grasp the diversity of subject positions and social experiences 
that it compresses into unitary categories. Postracial cosmopolitanism recovers 
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Enlightenment universalism by holding Europe(ans) accountable for its/their ethical 
and political failings through deconstructive critiques of national and racial 
categories. Postracialism becomes the ambition because of how ‘race’ betrayed the 
idea of a common humanity in its usage to justify terror and exclusion and to assert 
Europe’s self-appointed position as the civilising influence on the world.  
 
This inclusive neo-universalism is uninterested in a return to fixed identities and/or 
to a pure past. It is an embrace of the already available postracial and postnational 
cultural possibilities. Richard Wright and Fanon’s oeuvres are examples of a 
‘distinctive cosmopolitan culture’ (Gilroy, 2000: 288). Wright and Fanon as Black 
outsiders to the West relentlessly questioned nationalism. Their adamant opposition 
to racism everywhere resisted raciology. Postracial cosmopolitanism recognises the 
importance of attachments as historical and social positions strategically adopted as 
political and psychic resources (Hall, 1992). It insists that what is also needed is a 
variety and multiplicity of attachments. In other words, people need access to 
variegated cultural meanings in order to live meaningful lives (Hall, 2002).  
 
Cosmopolitanism involves the ability to stand outside those cultural meanings and 
identities; to reflect on and to dispense with them when they are no longer necessary. 
Critical reflexivity is indispensable in our globalised world where societies are 
increasingly multiple in their nature. The capacity to reflect on, dispense with and 
take on value systems is critical for living in a world composed of communities with 
different origins, drawing on different traditions, obliged to make a life together 
within the confines of a fixed territory (Hall, 2002).  
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8.2 Beyond Communitarianism? 
 
Postracial cosmopolitanisms reflect on how belonging might be expressed in a world 
of constant movement, forced and free (Hall, 2002). Postracial cosmopolitanism 
understood dialectically is a response to communitarianism - a reflexive distancing 
from one’s cultural affiliations, the cultivation of a broad understanding of other 
cultures and a belief in universal humanity (Robbins, 1998). Alice reminds us that 
communitarianism is not confined by the fault lines of power. It permeates 
hegemonic and subjugated groups:  
A classic example, I was at a conference doing a presentation on a 
project about girls and women that are gang associated. A lot of Afro-
Caribbean and African women were presenting. The woman that went up 
before me from a large organisation was talking about, ‘This is how black 
women should present ourselves. We shouldn’t look like we’re angry we 
shouldn’t move our hands around.’ It was almost like saying we have to 
modify our behaviour in order to fit in the society and the organisation we 
work in.  
 
Alice describes how racial identities are imposed from without and actively (re)made 
from within by the racialised themselves. Normative behaviour prescribes black 
women should not look angry but should typify professionalism. Identity becomes a 
referential sign of a fixed set of practices and shared traits (Scott, 1995). The 
conception of Black women as a unitary and stable community sharing certain 
experiences and allegiances reifies and essentialises identity. The fixing of an 
identity originally constructed as a site of resistance that then becomes the 
foundation for asserting political truths incurs the problems entailed by the 
essentialist subject. Individual differences are denied. Identity cannot be recognised 
as fluid and constructed. ‘Members’ are policed internally by the enforcement of an 
idealised identity and externally by the state in the presentation of a falsely 
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homogeneous front (Brown, 1995). The possession of particular identity functions as 
a pre-requisite for political participation. 
 
Rooted identities - antithetical to nonessentialist cosmopolitan self-creation - are 
untenable because they rely on a notion of an innate self. Identity becomes an 
already accomplished historical fact denying how identity is never complete and 
always in process (Hall, 1990). The ability to register the multiplicity of issues, 
processes and problems that bind people together irrespective of what ‘race’ they 
belong to is also limited. Postracial cosmopolitanism encourages the recognition of 
the interconnectedness of political communities in diverse domains and the 
development of political imaginations capable of identifying and understanding 
collective problems that require solutions locally, regionally and globally.  
 
Climate change, for example, signifies an issue of justice on a global scale because; 
‘Nearly all human societies and activities are sensitive to climate in some way or 
other. This is because in large measure where people live and how they generate a 
livelihood and wealth is influenced by the ambient climate’ (Adger et al, 2003: 181).  
Species-wide vulnerability to the catastrophic consequences of global warming 
offers incitements for reconsidering questions of human difference. Climate change 
can be thought of in these terms as an invitation to a planetary politics that 
transcends the particularity of ‘race’ (Gilroy, 2000). This, however, is an open-ended 
possibility. Climate change could also reinscribe existing racialised patterns of 
global inequality and risk exposure. The harshest effects of a warming planet 
(extreme weather events, destruction of ecosystems and the ensuing economic and 
military fallouts) will likely devastate Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank has 
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already forewarned such in its description of the region as ‘particularly vulnerable’ 
because of its, ‘dependence on natural resources, high levels of poverty and weak 
infrastructure’.63  
 
Another cosmopolitanism lurks in Alice’s conference narrative. It is a double 
consciousness that allows social agents to reason from the point of view of others. 
This ‘mutant cosmopolitanism’ (the imagined or real need to conduct a feminine 
blackness) is the result of political culture’s failure to guarantee the freedoms of all 
citizens. Racial communitarianism, is, in other words, partly consequent from 
racism(s). Communitarianism calls attention to the myth of a neutral state abstracted 
from cultural values. Cosmopolitanism’s commitment in political culture to state 
neutrality with respect to the particularity of any culture appears to make it 
assimilationist (Hall, 2002).  
 
Assumed neutrality smuggles with it the autonomous and disembodied 
Enlightenment subject who signals a reductive understanding of culture. 
Cosmopolitanism envisions ‘the self’ not as dialogically constituted by the existence 
of the ‘Other’ but simply related in cultural meanings. Mutant cosmopolitanism, in 
contrast, introduces the relational subject constituted by the social influences of her 
milieu. ‘Mutant’ identities cannot be accommodated by liberalism because they 
combine illegitimate elements (i.e. gender) which violate the tenets of the liberal 
polity. Mutant cosmopolitanism suggests postracial cosmopolitanism demands 
racialised subjects surrender their racial identities and adopt subject positions they 
                                               
63 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21772
010~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html (accessed 23 February 2013) 
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know to be impossible. But must the subject experience herself as a coherent self in a 
discourse?  
 
Perhaps cosmopolitanism does not appreciate traditions as something more than 
authoritative imposition. Traditions - not of necessity doctrinal - can provide a 
framework within which argument and exploration can take place (Hall, 2002). 
Could this communitarianism be a strategic response to the new circumstances 
(evolving racisms) in which it is embedded? Could it be capable of revising itself in 
light of those conditions? The communitarian model can neutralise critical 
evaluation because it is a critique of the exclusionary history of liberalism whose 
‘universal’ subject was shown to be the propertied white male of liberalism.  
 
Ironically, mutant cosmopolitanism reveals why it is not the solution to the problems 
it identifies. Mutant cosmopolitanism reveals that for liberalism identity is central to 
politics and that conforming to a particular identity is a requirement for political 
participation. Mutant cosmopolitanism responds by reworking this requirement by 
radically redefining the citizen through an array of identities that participants could 
assume (Hekman, 2000). But like the liberal tradition, it makes a particular identity a 
prerequisite for political participation.  
 
Under this banner strict rules govern what collective identity is to be. Rigid 
behaviour guidelines and the silencing of dissent threaten the very community it 
attempts to bring into being. Cultivating a collective racial identity for the purposes 
of forging bonds creates undue constraint on individual freedom and is likely self-
defeating (Appiah, 1996). The well-intentioned Project RACE examined earlier 
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inadvertently redraws the very configurations (racialism) and effects of power 
(‘race’) that they seek to vanquish (Brown, 1995). Project RACE does not transform 
the organisation of the activity (racism) through which the suffering is produced and 
without addressing the subject constitution (‘race’) that domination effects. 
 
Project RACE remains tangled in an identitarian political imagination failing to 
query whether legal ‘protection’ for ‘race’ discursively entrenches the identity it 
denounces. Might protection (achieved through racial reclassification) codify the 
very powerlessness it aims to redress? Might it discursively collude with the 
conversion of a historical effect of power into a presumed cause of victimization? 
Postracial cosmopolitanism instead boldly asks us to generate futures beyond racial 
particularity rather than to merely navigate or survive them.  
 
8.3 Cosmopolitan Contradictions: Emotions, Ontology and ‘Race’ 
 
Generating those futures begins with a critique of authenticity as foreclosing self 
construction (Hill, 2001). Liberal individualism (the rights-bearing subject who 
devises her own aims, directs and is accountable for her own actions) argues the 
individual is unmade by racial communalism. Charles Taylor - breaking with over-
determination - writes: ‘We are creatures of ultimately contingent connections; we 
have formed certain habits. But we can break from them and re-form 
them…[R]adical disengagement opens the prospect of self-remaking (1989: 170).’ 
Does ‘radical disengagement’ adequately address the complexities presented by 
racial subjectivity? Can it adequately make sense of how knowledge claims are made 
and justified?  
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‘Radical disengagement’ stresses a cognitive agency masking the variability of the 
practices from which knowledge is constructed. Thinking about the connection 
between (types of) knowledge(s) and power may usefully inform how the place of 
knowledge in ethical judgments is understood in postracial cosmopolitanism. 
Feminists (Code, 1993) remind us that the cosmopolitan ambition involves more 
than the exercise of reason to transcend particularity. The complex interplay between 
emotion and reason can be lost in detached cosmopolitanisms with the connections 
between power and knowledge obscured. ‘Race’-based movements are frequently 
sites where participants (re)produce identities invested with moral significance 
(Srivastava, 2005).  
 
This is significant because one’s sense of oneself as a good person may depend on 
whether she thinks her actions align with that identity. Distinct discourses of conflict 
resolution and shared values about raising public awareness of profiling have 
produced moral identities in the ongoing ‘I am Trayvon Martin’ campaign struggling 
for justice for the murdered African-American teenager.
64
 Historically, the emotional 
aspects of solidarity have been vital. Fraternity, for example, has an emotional 
content connecting concepts of kinship, friendship and love (Hobsbawm, 1975). 
Abstract principles of justice inattentive to the emotional dimensions of politics may 
be insufficient to motivate people to contribute the time and resources necessary for 
meaningful social change. Often the shared experience of racial injustice creates the 
strongest motivation to act and the most enduring bonds opening up possibilities for 
empathy and understanding.  
                                               
64 http://justicetm.org/about/ (accessed 25 February 2013) 
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Recognition of common vulnerability to racist violence following the 1982 murder 
of a Chinese-American mistakenly assumed to be Japanese – then scapegoated by 
the United Auto Workers for the loss of American jobs – sparked Asian-American 
pan-ethnic identification (Espiritu, 1992). The mobilisations bridged a multilingual, 
multicultural community with different world views and produced moral identities 
providing the basis for mutual identification, engendering a sense of special concern, 
reinforcing a commitment to common values and creating stronger social bonds to 
overcome barriers to collective action. This emotional/ethical nexus complicates a 
cosmopolitanism predicated on rational scrutiny and the inviolate sovereignty of the 
knowing subject. A strictly cognitive cosmopolitanism could potentially contravene 
its own humanist sensibilities and undue progressive expressions of collective 
solidarity.  
 
Conservationists articulate ‘race’ as an ‘interpretative horizon’, a situation from 
which the self comes to know, understand and reason about the world (Alcoff, 
2006:100). ‘Race’, for conservationists, captures collections of experience that while 
varied are also similar within and distinctive to racial groups. Transcendence of 
‘race’ is undesirable and impractical because racial identities strongly affect our 
interaction with the world. Does postracialism(s) seriously consider the embodied 
experience of beings marked by race? Others’ interpretations of our visible markers 
impact our subjectivity (Alcoff, 2006: 92). Alice describes how ‘race’ is sustained 
within an affective order: 
I’ve become very conscious if I walk into an area where I’m the only 
Asian person because I have faced racism. It’s something that I constantly 
have to think about regardless of whether I’m going to face it or not. 
Because it’s not going to go away. People don’t have racist written across 
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their forehead. You don’t know when you might have to face it. You are not 
in a society where you can forget who you are very easily. You are in a 
society which has shaped and designed how you feel. It may not have 
wanted to have done that but it has done that. 
 
Postracial mandates for racial abandonment could cause a damaging psychological 
discord. Alice reminds us that the lived experience of oppression involves political 
relationships and demands sensitive ethical engagement. Identities are significant not 
only as identities but in terms of the social issues and politics that they represent and 
promote. Racial identities have been transmuted from pejorative objects into sites of 
self-affirmation. The creative agency exercised in those transformations has been an 
effective antidote to the alienation engendered by racism (Shelby, 2005). While 
eliminating ‘race’ may open up cosmopolitan pathways, it may also undermine 
indispensable sources of hope and strength.  
 
Eradicating a resource that restabilises individual and collective subjectivities would 
seem inconsistent with the ethics of cosmopolitanism. Can racism be fought without 
racial ontologies? If they are necessary fictions can they be lived under erasure and 
within defensible boundaries? These are searching questions to understand how 
‘race’ is present in social experience as well as its effect on how subjects know the 
world. Theories of racial embodiment identify the larger social relations structuring 
racialisation and attempt to make sense of how ‘race’ is constitutive of bodily 
experience and epistemic relationships (Alcoff, 2001:271). Alcoff sets out to ‘make 
visible the practices of visibility’ in order to understand the context that knowledge 
of ourselves and others emerges from (2006:194). This phenomenology, however, is 
an inverse formulation.  
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Visible difference is constituted by the ascription of meaning instead of existing 
prior to that process. Taking ‘race’ for granted assumes what is the consequence of 
social relations as natural. ‘Race’ becomes a determinate force, requiring social 
relations to be organised in a specific form. Such conservationism cannot appreciate 
the historicity of this process and freezes it with the idea that the naturalness of 
somatic difference ineluctably constitutes eternal collectivities. Racialism is not a 
universal feature of social relations. Postracialism asks; Why do we have a concept 
of ‘race’? And, what do we need it for? 
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism refuses any practice to be a priori indemnified against 
critical inspection. How might this work against Alice’s practical consciousness? 
Absolutist standpoints reifying subject positions and defending their politics as part 
of an inviolate identity are ethically untenable. But how might, as St Louis (2009) 
suggests, we open up a postracial space requiring subjects to think through and 
justify her ethico-political commitments? Democratically negotiated commitments 
are an admirable answer to racial determinism but offer little to those navigating a 
world where ‘race’ is phenomenally real. Where is this space? What is its 
relationship to personal experiences?  Lila described this paradox: 
Me- Postracialists suggest that ‘race’ disables the experience of a common 
humanity by falsely maintaining racial divisions… 
L- Okay, stop there. It’s not falsely maintaining racial divisions. There are racial 
divisions. That almost seems to be based on a premise that racial division are falsely 
maintained. But they’re not falsely maintained. They’re real. And that’s the lived 
experience. They are real divisions and in people’s real lives on a daily basis they 
experience those divisions. 
 
 
Lila reminds us of the psychic constitution of social reality and the significance of 
subjective identification.  ‘Race’ may be empirically slippery, analytical imprecise 
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and perhaps not the best political resource but this is inconsequential in the everyday 
lived reality of ‘race’. Without a way out of this impasse, postracialism asks; If the 
prevailing socio-political conditions (re)produce the seeming necessity of ‘race’, 
might it be worthwhile to identify and contest the practices giving ‘race’ the 
appearance of necessity?  
 
 
There’s a dangerous tautology to ‘race’. Because people ‘position’ themselves 
racially does not mean that we can, or should, refer to racial identity as something 
coherent (St Louis, 2005). Many people believe in, refer to, and live by racial 
categories, however tendentious their provenance,. Postracial cosmopolitanism 
considers to what extent they are useful concepts and categories.  How might they 
(re)produce invidious distinctions? Cosmopolitanisms emphasise voluntary 
affiliation along with a desired detachment from ‘unreflexive’ shared identities. The 
renunciation of ‘race’ may represent, ‘the only ethical response to the conspicuous 
wrongs that raciologies continue to solicit and sanction’ (Gilroy, 2000:40) but 
cosmopolitanism’s individualism raises a set of ethical questions Lila described:  
And what tends to get lost in all of this [debate on 
eliminating/conserving ‘race’] is the experience of discrimination itself. So 
while we’re busy debating, arguing and discussing ‘race’ and whether it’s 
helpful or not, racism is still going on. People are experiencing that 
discrimination and that’s not being addressed or tackled in that whole 
narrative around ‘race’. 
 
Postracialism can represent a project unsympathetic towards the existential 
dimensions of racialised life. Its abstract jargon appears irrelevant to the experiences 
forged in life worlds in part constituted by racial self-understandings however 
scientifically inadequate or ontologically problematic (Outlaw, 1990). An awkward 
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elitism situates universalism in relation to the intellectual who can have a politically 
disastrous form of detachment from important affiliations. Might postracialism be 
blind to the wider meaning of racial categories? Common histories of oppression 
have formed the basis for group solidarity without relying on thick racial identities 
that assert claims about what racial identity is and ought to be. 
 
Perhaps this is a pitfall of the varying degrees of detachment/engagement in 
cosmopolitanisms. The self-conscious articulation in the context of intercultural 
contact and exchange risks blindness to more immediate social realities like 
environmental racism. Racialised identities cannot adequately anchor politics but 
figure significantly as conduits for political concerns represented in the identity 
(Harding, 1993). Postracialism asks; how and why does ‘race’ constitute experience? 
The approach incorporates standpoint theory’s concern with subjectivity and extends 
the epistemological investigation to merge with moral-political inquiry into racism.  
 
‘Race’ becomes a site for asking causal and critical questions about the social order 
and for informing a new humanism not deluded with the ‘god-trick’ of abstraction 
(Haraway, 1989). No work can be done without a radical refusal of essentialism at 
the theoretical and political level. The focus is not where the boundaries are or what 
consequences they have. The very existence of the boundaries must be challenged. 
Racial experience (situations from which the self comes to understand and reason 
about the world) has an upside-down causality. The concrete reality of ‘race’ makes 
it a permanent component of social reality. ‘Race’ - conceptually speaking - is highly 
naturalized grounded in what appears an incontestable (in)visible biological truth.  
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The most disconcerting paradox of ‘race’ is that although it does not exist, it still 
feels like it is natural, essential. Crucially, it is not because something is experienced 
that it exists (Ang, 2000). It is not because discrimination is based on skin colour that 
‘race’ is real. Refusing racial thinking is necessary if we are to contest the effects 
and consequences of racism. Racial inequalities can be redefined in terms of an 
oppressive political and economic structure and the structure of oppression brought 
into full view. The focus on racism may better illuminate how cultural and economic 
power is preserved. Racial identities may also be opened to critical and 
transformational analysis.  
 
 
8.4 Fetishisation of Agency 
 
What does a postracial self look like? Hill writes:  
He is now free, like a solitary snake, to seek new territories. There he may 
expand his omnivorous identity, there he will infuse it with his own peculiar vision, 
moral sensibilities and commitments…Raising his head above the plains of the 
community, he catches sight of the larger world ahead and charts a course straight 
ahead (2001:36). 
 
The postracial self is predicated on individual freedom attained through rational 
choice and the moral rejection of racial being. The postracial self is contrasted to the 
racial community, a reified identity based on a unitary plural subject (Zack, 1993). 
The recovery of the agency of marginalised subjects is valorised in such a way that 
even if these cosmopolitanisms do not essentialise agency, they seem to idealise it, 
abstracting from the actual lived experience and generalising from normatively 
approved ones.  
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Agency, however, cannot be established without a cultural vocabulary. The concept 
is always culturally situated. Agency cannot be understood either prior to or apart 
from the community life each person is born into and whose rules and descriptions 
she lives by and shares with others (Critteden, 1992). The abstraction in postracial 
cosmopolitanism loses sight of agency as a social product formed in the matrix of 
community. The disengaged self is without a horizon of evaluation, thus without 
both identity and boundary. Personal autonomy (the ability to stand back reflectively 
from communal values) seems to allow the cosmopolitan to stand so far back as to 
step into some abstract awareness, some position-less position.  
 
Cosmopolitanism dismantles the ‘big picture’ that provided coherence to grand 
philosophical systems. On the other hand, it seems to install an exceptional 
individualism complete with a human unconstrained by any social bonds and free to 
choose from a limitless supply of roles, values and attachments. She ceases to be a 
self at all when separate from all particularity. Stated differently, social relationships 
are the very conditions for securing personality, social cohesion and moral 
coherence. Postracialism shows cohesion in racial form often leads to essentialism – 
people can be categorized into groups whose intrinsic differences mark off the 
boundaries between them.  
 
The social forms the horizon from which we reflect and evaluate as persons. In this 
sense, fetishized agency can result in a dual alienation. Exaggerated agency can 
alienate us from society by defining ourselves independent of and without 
obligations to it. We deprive ourselves in that definition of the capacity to know or 
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interpret ourselves in our richest sense (Critteden, 1992). The fetishisation of agency 
misses the postracial opportunity to examine how larger social forces and economic 
systems may make racial identities strategically necessary. If identities are fluid, can 
there be a stable basis for their creation? Could their supposed psychic necessity be 
(re)produced by political or economic conditions? In short, the fetishisation of 
agency inhibits the crucial task of examining the social production of subjectivity. 
 
This insufficient examination of the social production of subjectivity coupled with 
the over-emphasis on agency exposes another dilemma. Conservationists (Mills, 
1998) resist postracialism in part because of the recognition that ‘race’ is (re) 
produced through widespread and long-standing social structures. ‘Race’ is 
ontologically subjective but nevertheless (re)produced in political structures, 
(re)made in routinised sociopolitical practices. All of which exist as social facts 
independent of individual action.  
 
‘Race’ in spite of the aim of autonomous moral re-creation cannot be dismissed 
through individual rejection or unilaterally altered. Postracial cosmopolitanism (Hill 
2001) risks becoming an atomised project of deconstuctionism where cosmopolitans 
are privileged decision-makers electing for transnational identity. The Race Traitors 
discussed earlier relied on a similar investment in an exceptional individualism 
capable of rejecting the privileges of whiteness and dismantling hierarchy through 
individual acts. Postracial cosmopolitanisms based on a liberal individual rejection 
of racial belonging appear tenuous and perhaps futile endeavours when confronted 
with enduring structures of exclusion.   
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Conservationism (Stubblefield, 2005) risks reification and naturalisation in arguing 
‘race’ reflects the natural tendency of humans to classify according to appearance 
and reflects cultural differences between members of groups we call ‘races’. The 
political value of racial solidarity challenges agential individualism. Social relations 
and social contexts are deeply relevant to ‘the what’ and ‘how’ of the social agent’s 
knowing. If interpersonal experience is fundamental to the development and 
possession of beliefs and knowledge, where does this leave the epistemological 
individualism of the cosmopolitan?  
 
Feminist scholarship can help us think through this problematic in its illumination of 
how historically specific socio-political relationships and situations - including 
gender and political advocacy - have actually made certain feminist knowledges 
possible (Harding, 1993). The crucial point is that communities construct and acquire 
knowledge. The knowing we do as individuals is dependent on some ‘we’, on shared 
knowledge, standards and practices. To avoid solipsism, how might the appeal to the 
atomised forms of labour so central to the cosmopolitan vision(s) be connected to the 
demanding political work of movement-building? Racial solidarity can risk 
downplaying internal diversity. However, racial categories do offer a useful resource 
for building a mobilisation committed to improving the material life prospects of 
those racialised as inferior. ‘Race’, in part, continues to offer a site for constructing 
social identity and collective solidarity in spite of its severe analytical and ethical 
limitations because no effective alternatives have been advanced (Gunaratnam, 
2004).  
 
8.5 Race and Politics 
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Claims that ‘race’ is a mere illusion are condescending and fail to capture the impact 
of social identities in our lives and their import to the organisation of our social 
worlds. Reducing ‘race’ to myth ignores its political significance. ‘Race’ despite 
essentialism and reification has long been a locus for justice campaigns. African-
American identification, for example, played an important role in the social 
movement groups, community organizations and arts activists advocating on behalf 
of those displaced by Hurricane Katrina and neglected by federal, state and 
municipal governments in the recovery and future planning of the city. Students at 
The Center, for example, generated forms of community knowledge and involved 
young African-Americans in community-based art making and art-based community 
making (Lipsitz, 2011: 235).  
 
Rob described the biological futility of ‘race’ and its simultaneous necessity to 
achieving equality: 
Well given the proviso that racism exists which is beneath all the work, we 
are then in a situation where we’re looking at some stop and search research 
showing that the black man is 7 times more likely to be stopped and 
searched than the white man. Now if you were to only hold the position that 
‘race’ is a social construct; that ‘race’ isn’t real because there’s no biologically 
verifiable basis for it, then it would be quite difficult to look at some of the 
impacts of discrimination based upon ‘race’ and racism. 
 
‘Race’ lacks analytical and explanatory value. Rob also expressed concern that ‘race’ 
is not a sound basis for social identities or for membership in political movements. 
Some postracialists (St Louis, 2003) argue that racial identities and the forms of 
solidarity they sustain are incoherent even morally problematic. Racial particularism 
is widely held to be needlessly divisive and at odds with commonly cherished liberal 
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ideas of integration and the affirmation of a nonracial shared identity. The reality of 
racism and its damaging effects bring out the tension Rob describes. In this 
conjuncture racism makes ‘race’ (in some form) necessary for social-scientific 
analysis, the enforcement of civil rights and perhaps also as a basis for political 
solidarity and group self-realisation (Taylor, 2004).  
 
The multiplicity of lived experiences is a recurrent dilemma in coalitional politics. 
For centuries universal emancipation(s) have theorised class to be the only vehicle 
for understanding social organisation, social struggle and political subjectivity. The 
analytical and theoretical privileging of the means of production made ‘race’, when 
not reduced to the ideological, always-already secondary to class conflict. Aimé 
Césaire described the aporia in Marxism:  
What I want is that Marxism and Communism be placed in the service of black 
peoples, and not black peoples in the service of Marxism and Communism. That the 
doctrine and the movement would be made to fit men, not men to fit the doctrine or 
the movement…I would say that no doctrine is worthwhile unless rethought by us, 
rethought for us, converted to us (1957: 111). 
  
Césaire imagined liberation not from an abstract universal space but from concrete 
realities specifically the philosophy understanding the colonised as sharing the same 
‘universal’ ontology as their rulers but remaining trapped in anachronistic 
development, not yet capable of realising the true possibilities of autonomous 
humanity (Hall, 1996). Fanon (1967) described this as the amputation of full 
humanity because colonialism forcibly created a space in which bodies were 
recognised as almost, but not quite, human. What it meant to be fully human, and the 
claims to autonomy and dignity it accorded, was seen to be missing imprisoning the 
colonized in ‘infrahumanity’ (Gilroy, 2004).  
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The cosmopolitan individual liberated from the tribalism of ‘race’ has implications 
for antiracism. Stubblefield (2005) underscores the stakes: ‘If we are going to 
progress toward the elimination of white supremacy, we cannot afford to get hung up 
on the ontological question. Moral concerns are behind ontological ones (11).’ 
Stubblefield eschews cosmopolitan impartiality (treat others regardless of those 
properties that do not refer to actions or choices they have made and regardless of 
our relation to them). She argues ‘race’ should inform our moral obligations to others 
and to ourselves. The normative anchor of universalism is insufficient because it 
deliberately excludes aspects such as ‘race’.  
 
Conservationism advocates a moral critique of ‘race’ (white supremacy) and a moral 
defence of ‘race’ (non-white racial identities) suggesting some notions of ‘race’ are 
good and some are bad. The language of binary oppositions may limit the 
development of an ethically reflexive politics and the total dismantling of racialism. 
The diversity of social experiences and cultural identities composing racial identities 
shows ‘guarantees’ can be ethically perilous. As argued earlier, postracialism 
understands racial categories as the result of racisms. The defence of black identity 
is, in a way, the incomplete rejection of white supremacy, a powerful force in the 
creation of the former.  
 
Postracialism seeks an antiracism that does not prompt identification with categories 
fundamental to racist discourses. Postracialisms - recognising the dissonances in the 
moral critique/defence of ‘race’- attempt to rethink resistance not only as breaking 
with practices of oppression but crucially opposing the language of racism, including 
the racial categories in which resistance is expressed. Incomplete deconstruction can 
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reinforce the belief that humanity is constituted by different ‘races’. The conditions 
for the reproduction of racism are sustained within the practices of anti-racism with 
the reification of ‘race’ incorporated into antiracism. The Forum Against 
Islamophobia and Racism has, for example, pressured the British government to 
incorporate Muslim identity into the Race Relations Act.
65
 The incorporation of a 
politically and morally problematic concept into political systems may naturalise it 
further strengthening its grip on our social relationships. 
 
Stubblefield suggests through the metaphor of ‘race’-as-family that we can enrich 
our understanding of obligations and enhance our understanding of how to 
overthrow white supremacy. It is a shift from what ‘race’ is/isn’t to how ‘race’ 
should be defined with an aim to capturing the role it plays in social life and pressing 
this in the service of emancipation. Making ‘race’ the foundation of moral reasoning 
risks reifying difference further and misunderstanding ‘race’ as an explanatory 
concept. Notably, Stubblefield offers little in explaining how granting ‘race’ moral 
priority can be justified in ‘socially responsible ways’ (2005:158). Black feminists 
(Hill-Collins, 1986) caution racial moralities were historically underpinned by ideas 
of strong families that re-inscribed patriarchal power relations. The Chicano 
movement was often stabilised by a cultural nationalism that relied on patriarchal 
gender roles (Moya, 2001).The intersections of ‘race’ and power and the ethico-
political dangerousness of ‘race’ create intractable dilemmas for conservationism. 
 
Will deconstruction weaken the fight for justice by eroding categories which have 
been organisational sites for creating greater freedom and equality? Postracialism has 
                                               
65 http://www.fairuk.org/news.htm (accessed 15 February  2013) 
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a profound ambivalence. Without ‘race’ building negotiated democratic coalitions is 
perhaps more possible. On the other hand, the renunciation of certain ontological 
assumptions about the nature of ‘race’ as a category (often reducing solidarity to an 
automatic thing arising spontaneously) leaves antiracists with the daunting task of 
forging a solidarity that cannot simply be found.  
 
Racial solidarity as a resistance strategy has been successful. The American Indian 
Movement used ‘race’ to raise awareness of discrimination, to demand self-
determination, and to press for access to clean water, healthcare and mineral/oil 
rights on reservations. The movement resulted in the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Act of 1975 which ended state-sponsored ‘assimilation’ programs, granted 
educational autonomy and ‘improved’ reservation life (Nagel, 1995). But what 
model of political solidarity do these movements presuppose? What models of 
community and belonging do they work with? What sort of aspiration for democracy 
are ‘we’ working for?  
 
Jettisoning an important collective identity might also erase significant political 
histories. Can postracial histories be sensitively written without denigration? 
Postracialisms seem to threaten the intra-racial obligations forged in hard-fought 
battles - obligations that continue to be important in ongoing struggles. Lila 
described how experiences of oppression can (trans)form communities:  
You are actually denied service, or you’re denied a job or access to 
education or healthcare because of race. Race comes into the fore. If you’re 
getting denied because of your race because it’s not happening to you as an 
individual, because it’s happening to you as a collective group of people then 
there is a potential there for a collective voice to come together to say well 
this is racism. Because you can see a very clear reason as to why you were 
denied a particular treatment or service or education because of your ‘race’. 
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In some ways it also defines your ‘race’. You might not have thought of your 
‘race’ or yourself in that way. 
 
Racism makes ‘race’ into a generalising concept preventing the recognition of the 
individual. Lila foregrounds how this prefigures, to an extent, the response - racial 
solidarity as a basis for eliminating inequalities. Lila appreciates the limitations of 
identity politics but discrimination makes ‘race’ a vital emancipatory tool. Her focus 
on exclusion articulates solidarity as predicated on the experience of and joint 
commitment to resisting racial oppression.  
 
Her analysis presses the question; what are the complex forces that constitute 
racism? Might an oppression-centred conception of solidarity, attentive to the 
unreality of racial biology and aware of the perils of identity politics be consistent 
with a gradualist postracialism? The focus on oppression seems consistent with the 
rejection of the abstract ‘human’ view outside historical contingencies. 
 
8.6 Recovering ‘the human’ 
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism may lack a political program but the questions it raises 
force antiracisms into ethico-political self-scrutiny. Can racial solidarity exist 
without racism? Can racial identification be kept positive and non-discriminatory? 
Can ‘race’ be kept without the seemingly inevitable polarisation of racial groups and 
the ensuing conflicts? Alice expressed qualified agreement with postracialism 
recognising that internal heterogeneity destabilises racial categories and perhaps also 
the very notion of ‘race’: 
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Postracial that means actually looking at the individual rather than 
looking at that particular group. I always remember when I did my 
psychology degree what was interesting was when they looked at the 
difference between men and women there was more diversity within the 
groups of men and women than between men and women. The difference 
between the two sexes was smaller than the differences within the sexes. 
And I think of ‘race’ in terms of that. There’s more difference within racial 
groups than there’s between racial groups. And that’s how I view it within 
the work that I do. That actually is the diversity that we’re talking about. 
 
Alice dissolves a key element of how ‘race’ is constituted socially as a comparative 
construct. Internal complexity counters the over-determination of group identity 
paralleling Lewontin’s genetic rejection examined earlier. Difference is theorised in 
order to not reduce complex social and political processes to an abstracted 
communitarian identity. The problematisation of stable racial identifications is 
remarkable because it unsettles the normative sense of distinctions between groups 
as forming the fundamental basis of racial particularity. What happens to collective 
racial identity when as Alice notes, ‘There’s more difference within racial groups 
than there is between racial groups’? What happens when the premise of internal 
similarity and external differentiation dissolves? Alice points to the weakening of the 
concept and meaning of ‘race’ and the potential to open up postracial social analysis 
and political engagement. Her example signals that our thinking of ‘race’ could  shift 
from existing taken-for-granted approaches to assessments of the work ‘race’ 
performs, how its more dogmatic character frames our expectations and imaginings 
of the future. 
 
Postracialism (Gilroy, 2000) understands ‘race’ to be inextricably part of the 
hierarchical division of humankind. This position refigures the purpose and the value 
of sociological knowledge shifting from the epistemological towards placing 
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sociological knowledge in the service of humanistic concerns. Placing sociological 
knowledge in the service of humanistic concerns is to be achieved through the 
recovery of humanism alongside a critique of the inherent exclusivity of earlier 
Euro-centric formulations (Butler, 2000; Gilroy, 2004). It attempts to imagine ways 
to construct new non-reified marks of social identity and belonging; to (re)construct 
a ‘human’ predicated on species life combining individual particularity and general 
humanity through the development of a strategic universalism (Gilroy, 2000). The 
recovery of histories of suffering that resonate throughout humanity is central. 
Tragedy is refigured not as cultural property but as a universal human event. 
Replacing exceptionalism with empathy and understanding is a brave humanist 
move. 
 
Fanon and Césaire also critiqued colonialism not only as unique historical 
experiences but also as moments for (re)imagining universalisms. In A Season in the 
Congo, Césaire’s character of Patrice Lumumba described anti-colonialism as, ‘The 
battle we are fighting isn’t for ourselves, nor even for Africa, but for all Mankind’ 
(Césaire, 1968: 79). Césaire and Fanon combined the critique of the partial 
universals of the Enlightenment with the pursuit of those emancipatory ideals 
associated with traditional universalism. Both offered critical and constructive 
engagements insisting on the necessity of asserting a humanism in opposition to the 
duplicitous exclusions of those imposed by the ‘West’. 
 
Recognition of our universal bodily vulnerability, it is argued, opens up the 
possibility of securing broader solidarities beyond ‘race’. These arguments 
interrogate humanism while also appealing to a renewed universalism as a necessary 
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and urgent response to a world where racism still draws the lines of (infra)human 
and still alienates us from ourselves and our fellows. These are powerful statements 
for authentic universalisms, good faith invitations to a radical solidarity. Cynical 
responses characterise the (re)turn to the universal as edicts delivered from high in a 
world where cross-cutting social cleavages create differential experiences. Lila spoke 
to this tension: 
That wasn’t the injustice that the community brought on themselves 
that was the injustice that was enforced on them. Some of the choices are 
limiting but they are not limited by the group themselves they’re limited by 
external factors. We’re talking about situations in which people have very 
little choices about some of the boxes they’re placed in.  
 
Postracial cosmopolitanisms perhaps inadequately understand the relations between 
social identity and political agency. For that is, in an important sense, not merely a 
theoretical problem. Racial identities often rearticulate hegemonic representations of 
inferiority; moral deficiencies become venerable traits. Lila describes how identity is 
structured in a field of power relations such that racialised ‘Others’ are only able to 
establish their identity negatively. Defining the self through what one is not remains, 
to a degree, within the prior and imposed definition of what one (wrongly) was. Her 
description of ‘situations in which people have very little choice’ is testimony to how 
being is structured by external circumstance and indicative of how oppositional 
identities become political tools and ontological resources.  
 
8.7 Reimaging Living with Difference  
 
 
The deeper you get into it, the faster you can reproduce that logic. Just 
in the sense of essentialising those identities when identities as we know are 
quite fluid especially across history and across space and time. It’s a little 
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coup de grace  dance that you do in trying not to essentialise but sometimes 
having to do that (Yusef). 
 
Cosmopolitanisms do not herald the once-and-for-all cure for racism but rather 
articulate a radical re-imagining of living with difference in opposition to fixed 
identities and absolutist cultures. Cosmopolitan identities are fluid, existing only 
within and through geographical, cultural and social crossings. It is identity 
understood as a noun of process (Gilroy, 2000:253). Diasporic identities do not 
remain tied to ‘race’ or nation. They are able to disrupt essentialism, maintain 
individual freedom and provide a robust alternative to the fixed identities of the 
contemporary world.  
 
The eminently modern diaspora the Black Atlantic illustrates the possibility of 
abandoning essentialism altogether (Gilroy, 1993). Postracial cosmopolitanisms 
convincingly demonstrate that nationalist paradigms cannot theorise cultural history 
when confronted by intercultural and transnational formations. The Black Atlantic is 
an explicitly transnational and intercultural perspective challenging how cultural and 
political histories are thought about. Its ‘complex circuits’ escape any simple 
formulation cohering a, ‘webbed network constituted through multiple points of 
intersection’ (2000:131). Diasporic identities, unlike sameness are not ready-made. 
In a cosmopolitan third way, they enable a creative dialectic between collective and 
individual identity. The recognition of the uniqueness of each individual juxtaposed 
with the solidarity produced by collective identity is an imaginative approach to the 
enduring pluralist dilemma. 
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Diasporic identity is something to struggle for not only because of the harmful 
character of racial thinking but also for the sake of humanity. The real ethical force 
of cosmopolitanism (Appiah, 2009; Hill, 2001) is how essentialism is not only 
problematic conceptually but crucially how dangerous it is in the social sphere. 
Essentialist narratives can be readily resurrected and strategically deployed to 
explain complex socio-economic problems. Essentialists notions of Latinos as 
undeserving and promiscuous, for example, have been used to construct them as 
undeserving recipients of government aid. For the cosmopolitan it is a moral duty 
and political responsibility to refuse essentialism under any of its guises (Gilroy, 
2000: 277). Diasporic identities are a viable alternative to essentialised identities and 
culture with the displacement allowing for the recognition of the fundamentally 
hybrid nature of modern identities. Politically it also allows a radical struggle against 
the essentialism ingrained in ‘race’ and nationalism.  
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism shows how the world is made of the interaction between 
ideas, social action and social structure. ‘Race’ - in this re-imagined difference - does 
not disappear behind its concrete consequences (i.e. Winant) nor is it discarded as an 
ideology (i.e. Miles). It is an imagined world where individuals would perceive 
physical appearance in a non-racial manner. Physical difference would mean simply 
diversity in appearance. The fundamental distinction between fixed and diasporic 
identities is how diasporic identity allows for the recognition of difference without 
binding the individual to it. The two are paradoxical but nonetheless characteristic 
features of modernity. The former functions as closure while the latter provides 
individual freedom. Hall articulates this anti-essentialist position: ‘A recognition that 
we all speak from a particular place, out a particular history, out of a particular 
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experience, a particular culture, without being contained by that position (Hall, 1996: 
447).’ 
 
Could the ‘rootless cosmopolitan of the Black Atlantic’ become fixed in its very lack 
of fixity (Gilroy, 2000:115)? No matter how negotiable or transformable, the concept 
of the ‘Black experience’ remains. St Louis (2001) has noted Gilroy’s cosmopolitan 
histories remain within the orbit of ‘race’. Black intellectual figures and cultural 
fields are centred. Are these histories distinctively or singularly ‘Black’? Is the Black 
Atlantic part of a universal process? However answered, the ‘Black subject’ still 
exists. It would appear that sameness remains, in some form, at the heart of 
‘diasporic identities’ (Anthias, 1998). Does the assumption of a commonality of 
experience between certain individuals that cannot be shared by others on the basis 
of historicity represent a problem?  
 
The commonality of individuals confronted by the same history, of course, cannot be 
denied. However, claiming the existence of a collective experience shared by all 
comes close to denying that some might not share it. There are unasked and 
unanswered questions here. What is experience? Can there be ‘shared experience’ 
between human beings? It may well be the case that the real essentialism is not in the 
descriptor ‘Black’ but in the fact that an ‘experience’ is assumed to be shared by 
people who have been through the same process.  
 
Cosmopolitanism welcomes a counter-history which reckons with ‘race’ and its 
destructive consequences for the promises of modernity (Gilroy, 2000). 
Transcending the particularistic traditions of ‘race’ ultimately requires cultivating 
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broad and international perspectives with which to dismantle the historical 
implications of ‘race’ (Eze, 2001:194). Postracial cosmopolitanisms represent 
ethically informed responses to the sufferings wrought by raciology. It is a 
perspective derived from a principled, global approach to the history of extreme 
situations (Gilroy, 2004:156). Postracialisms informed by these histories develop 
genuinely inclusive human identities which speak to the universality of our 
vulnerability to the wrongs we visit upon each other. Uncovering histories of 
suffering breaks with practices of colonial denial and historical amnesia, and 
according to Gilroy, equips us with the resources to furnish the peaceful 
accommodation of otherness in relation to this fundamental commonality. 
Cosmopolitan histories locate the origins of old xenophobic impulses in imperial 
history and detail their contemporary recycling in absolutist cultural rhetoric.  
 
8.8 Translating Cosmopolitanism: The Problems of a Political Program 
 
This is an audacious move to recentre a history complicit in the denial of dignity to 
colonial populations. The vision insists on the necessity of an inclusive humanism in 
opposition to the hypocrisy of earlier humanisms. It is a radical reappropriation of 
the terms of modernity by those who have been excluded from those terms. It is a 
project of challenging ‘race’ in terms not set by ‘race’ but rather in universalistic 
human terms (Butler 2000:40). This project is compelling in its attentiveness to 
racism and its refusal to allow past corruptions to have exclusive control over 
defining the parameters of the universal within politics. 
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Can these ambitions be translated into a politics? Without a discernible politics it 
seems an overly theoretical project (naïvely utopian?) gesturing towards but not 
confronting the materiality of racisms. Rob responded to the project of historical 
recovery in terms of how colonial histories might be negotiated within an effective 
antiracist praxis:  
I’m not sure how good a tactic it [discussing colonial histories] is 
currently. We think about what’s going to have the most political mileage in 
the current policy debate. It’s probably not a reminder of that history. 
Looking back at our first film which was 1971, it was a lot about empire a lot 
about slavery, in order to also address issues about what contemporary 
racism was. It’s a 15 minute film and the first 7 minutes talk about empire. I 
wouldn’t start that now. Politically there’s not much mileage in it. For most 
activists you work with what arguments work right now. There are so many 
reasons why racism is wrong so we shouldn’t just be bound to one 
argument. 
 
Rob suggests imperial histories lack political traction. Rob’s discussion of ‘tactic’ 
suggests strategically shifting to fit the here-and-now with a wariness towards 
potential political backlash. Runnymede is certainly aware of how public discussion 
of colonialism might reawaken white resentment. A pragmatic antiracism is, of 
course, not without its own problems. Postracial cosmopolitanism after all depends 
on good faith and auto-critique. ‘Race’ was integral to the cultural formation of 
modernity, the gradual elaboration of ‘the West and the rest’ (Hall, 2000).  
 
How then might such antiracism defend the failure to engage such a significant 
‘regime of truth’? Traces of this structuring discourse in the formation of modernity 
persist today (Gilroy, 2000:53)? Is Runnymede in not engaging these discourses 
complicit in the concealment of the histories of identities? Might such a strategy 
obscure crucial moral and political questions? Methodological pragmatism also risks 
confining the political imagination within the boundaries of the state. Antiracism 
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misses an opportunity to reassert democracy with debate determined by the political 
imperatives of a particular conjuncture. Revisiting modernity’s histories and 
acknowledging how exclusionary forces compromised universal promises could be 
productive for revitalizing the ethical sensibilities of antiracism. 
 
Lila and Yusef both suggested how challenging that discussion would be with the 
current government:  
Listen to this government and some of the public speeches that have 
been made. You won’t hear ‘race’. This government doesn’t even use the 
term. I would actually go further than that and say not only has it 
disappeared but that there is a perception, which I hold to by the way, that 
it is, somehow discouraged (Lila). 
 
It has become more difficult to talk about ‘race’ and consequently more 
difficult to talk about and address racism. It becomes more difficult to even 
develop and enact solutions to it because we’re not talking about it; almost 
not accepting that it’s there. (Yusef) 
 
The ConDem coalition discourse bypassing or denying ‘race’ as a way of making 
sense of discrimination poses difficulties. Postracialism may need to differentiate 
itself from its insidious Others. This task involves a sophisticated conversation about 
‘race’ and a clear explanation of the ethico-political stakes of racism. Additionally, 
antiracism wrestles with a discourse of obsolescence which locates racial 
discrimination as a thing of the past even claiming racial minorities now have the 
upper hand (see Hewitt, 2005). Antiracism itself is under threat. 
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism recognises how ‘race’ became an organising concept 
employed to exclude certain groups from humanity and to pervert the principles of 
modern democracy (Eze, 2001:134). Acknowledging how the political codes of 
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modernity integrated a deadly force is a central task of these histories (Gilroy, 
2004:63). Cosmopolitanism is sensitive to histories of suffering and rebellion 
refusing to exalt victimage or to reinforce a hierarchy for ranking world-historic 
injustices. But how can that careful detailing take place? Alice reflected on this 
point: 
Terms have a history. ‘Race’ has a history. Racism has a history. 
Slavery has a history. And yes they come value-laden. But that is part of 
human history in some ways and there’s no getting away from that. Maybe 
it’s having a more sophisticated dialogue as to how that happened. And how 
much of that can be a burden and how much of it can we acknowledge and 
talk about slavery and talk about colonialism, whilst leaving some of it 
behind. Or leaving some of the damage of it behind in a different way. I 
don’t know how or even if, that’s possible. 
 
 
Alice asks what does authentic humanism look like? What is the place of empathy in 
it? And similar to Rob’s point; is there something like a moral statute of limitations 
on these wrongs? Postracial cosmopolitanisms avoid essentialising victims. 
Victimage, as argued earlier, cannot guarantee a richer more ethically and politically 
informed consciousness. Cosmopolitan histories aim for productive results; re-
definitions of what liberalism was and reflection on what cosmopolitan democracy 
should be (Gilroy, 2004:20). Postracialism embraces a perspective which draws on 
trans-national histories to furnish resources for informing new modes of belonging. 
 
Great ethico-political gains are to be had including the development of ethical 
obligations that set aside nationality in favour of universalist pursuits shifting from 
Euro-centric to cosmopolitan ways of thinking (Gilroy, 2004:98). Postracial 
cosmopolitan critiques of modernity’s provincial ethics are distinguished by a 
genuinely global vision not simply another imperialistic particularism dressed in 
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universalist cloth. They introduce a creative view of humanity appreciating identities 
that stress experiential plurality and negotiated political associations.  
 
The utopian ambition is a welcomed alternative in a climate of renewed cultural 
essentialism (see Huntington, 2002). Postracialism - a worthy ambition – still 
appears to suffer charges of impracticality. Lila described this well: 
We don’t often go into these academic debates about ‘race’ itself. And 
that tells a lot about where we are. Maybe it’s an assumption that we’re on 
instead of a plan. Or it’s an assumption that as I started off saying we have 
to take we take certain things for granted and move forward. That’s the 
approach that we take and the categories that we use. 
 
Lila’s hints at the inadequacy of not dialoguing about ‘race’ and suggest this carries 
consequences (reification etc.) - which cannot be examined because of the 
imperative to ‘move forward’. Institutional structures and funding priorities forestall 
important debates and shape the contours of antiracism. Deference to historical 
inertia is hardly justifiable in ethico-political terms and only gives force to the 
utopian spirit of postracialism. How liberatory is an antiracism that lacks an 
alternative vision of ‘how things could be’ and fails to thoroughly reflect on 
imagining and bringing into being another non-racist egalitarian world? 
 
The decision to not unpack ‘race’ is rationalised. There is seemingly no time for 
‘academic debates’- characterised as frivolous discussions (accurately?) - in 
antiracism. Lila implicitly asks; might this laudable ambition be a fanciful pursuit 
considering racism is entrenched in social, economic and political structures? 
Postracial cosmopolitanism appears apolitical without confronting material racisms. 
Without an examination of key concepts, without a struggle over meanings, what is 
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there beyond a political inertia to continue working with existing concepts and tried-
and-tested methods?  
 
Cosmopolitanism points to the withering of ‘race’ (Hill, 2001) and to its declining 
significance to identity formation and political affiliation. Lila’s political realism, 
however, casts doubt on that withering process. How does cosmopolitanism 
engender withering? Is cosmopolitanism a spectator to an organic process of decline, 
the causes of which are multifarious and largely unknown? Rob described the 
significance of this gradualist deconstruction, admittedly difficult to measure:  
We constantly have discussions on how to do work on racial inequality which 
doesn’t make ‘race’ real. And I’m not sure we’re having that much success at 
having answers, but actually even raising that as a potential issue has big 
knock on effects in spheres we are connected to. 
 
Postracial cosmopolitanism in creating a space for critical questioning and utopian 
imagining offers the opportunity for discussion and disagreement, for the ethical 
labour of working out our political commitments and ideas. Rob described the need 
for this discussion in relation to the dearth of affirmative antiracist claism:  
It’s interesting we had a meeting with seven of the eight largest race 
equality organisations in London and the opposition bench race equality 
minister. And he asked what three things would you like me to support. We 
were like uhhhhh, we’d kind of like you all to be nicer. I think as a 
movement we’ve got to start to articulate what those demands are. What is 
better? What would progress be? And how do we want government to 
account for it? 
 
Postracialism offers a sketch for imagining ‘what is better’ and ‘what progress would 
be’. Still in need of more precise political articulation, it nevertheless represents an 
important contribution to the ongoing debate about the ethical and political status of 
‘race’. In my conversation with Alice it was clear that postracialism’s pressing 
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questions had opened up a dialogue on a purportedly settled topic. She described her 
‘internal debate’ ignited by postracialist questions:  
It’s an internal debate I have with myself whether that means we are 
colluding, by focusing on ‘race’, I don’t know. That’s a bigger question I 
constantly struggle with. Should different organisations be coming together 
and saying actually the issue isn’t ‘race’, it’s socio-economic power, it’s 
poverty, it’s deprivation. Those are the issues that we need to be addressing. 
We attempt to do some of that work in other areas. We are members of 
equality and diversity forum starting to look at some of the common issues 
across equality sectors. We do talk about poverty as kind of equality sector 
rather than just ‘race’. It’s a constant tension for me on an individual level 
cause I just think actually are we, is the platform that we are using colluding 
with maintaining the system? Rather than saying actually let’s forget about 
‘race’ it’s about poverty, let’s focus on poverty. I don’t know, it’s a tension I 
constantly feel. 
 
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
Alice’s uncertainty about ‘colluding with the system’ is a useful place to conclude 
this chapter. Her circumspection towards ‘race’ and her imaginative work on how to 
address racism without ‘race’ encapsulates a key component of postracial 
cosmopolitanism. As Rob remarked the answers are not forthcoming but in raising 
questions and reflecting on the status and meaning(s) of ‘race’ these interventions are 
enabling s radical rethinking of antiracist politics and boldly addressing what Hall 
called the problem of the 21
st
 century, ‘living with difference’. Postracial humanism 
is not without its shortcomings – examined in this chapter as potential condescension 
toward racial experience, the fetishisation of agency and the thwarting of successful 
identity politics.    
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Postracial cosmopolitanism’s principled estrangement from one’s own culture and 
history appears to be well equipped to engage the complex dilemmas and 
opportunities of contemporary life. For its proponents, estrangement presents a rare 
opportunity to know the world better and to experience it in more complex and 
satisfying forms through a critical self knowledge (Appiah, 2006:47). Postracial 
cosmopolitanisms seek to imagine and work to build a multicultural society without 
the phobia of strangers or otherness and the paranoid notion of ontological jeopardy. 
In distinct ways they attempt to theorise conceptions of humanity that allow for the 
presumption of equal value and move beyond the parochialism of tolerance into a 
more active engagement with the irreducible values of diversity within sameness 
(Hill, 2001:76).  
322 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion: The Stakes and Futures of Postracialism 
 
 
9.1 Racism and Postracialism an Overview: The Postracial Paradox 
 
Taken as a collective set of critical discussions, postracialism represents a thorough 
and persuasive critique of the scientific, political and ethical problems with ‘race’. 
This thesis with the aid of archival material and interview data has critically 
surveyed and analysed crucial points of consideration showing how postracial 
projects have transformed discussions around ‘race’. My empirically driven and 
theoretically informed assessment of whether ‘race’ is a necessary, contingent, or 
dispensable category examined the scientific, political and ethical basis and stakes of 
getting rid of the category as it consistently returned to the postracial paradox. 
Discussions of antiracist organising, postracial bioscience and cosmopolitanism 
showed how the paradox complicates unreflexive or extreme formulations of 
postracialism which can only align with reactionary politics. Postracialism - to 
navigate the Scylla of colourblindness and the Charybdis of the ‘declining 
significance of race’ may need to centre the postracial paradox and grapple with the 
utility (necessity?) of ‘race’ (in some form) for antiracist struggle, progressive 
medical practice and ethically responsible cosmopolitanism. Postracialism may be 
productively conceptualised as raising a set of dilemmas and attempting to begin the 
work of struggling with and against ‘race’ in political, policy, and everyday spheres.  
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Throughout the US and Europe racial discrimination and racist violence are constant 
events resurgent in everyday life and political life. A 2009 US Department of 
Homeland Security report explicitly warned of the mounting threat of far-right 
violence. The foretold bloodshed manifest in July of 2012 when Wade Michael Page, 
a known white supremacist, murdered six Sikhs gathered at a temple to prepare a 
community meal in Oak Creek, Wisconsin (Goodwin, 2012). The murderous 
rampage of Anders Breivik in Norway, David Copeland’s nail bombings in the UK, 
the violent crimes of the National Socialist Underground, (a neo-Nazi cell in 
Germany) along with the rise of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn Party in Greece 
constitute an expanding network of violent extremism in Europe.  
 
The rise of racist violence and the increase of neo-Nazi networks globally take place 
together with more coded culturalist racisms in mainstream political discourses on 
immigration. The significance of racial difference is evident in encrypted racist 
agendas on asylum seekers. In the UK, for example, asylum seekers and immigrants 
(particularly Romanian and Bulgarian for whom EU travel restrictions will shortly 
be lifted) are constructed as threats to national law and order and as potentially 
parasitic toward ever-shrinking state welfare benefits (Smith, 2013). A 2010 Institute 
for Race Relations’ report showed that between 2006-2010 seventy-seven asylum 
seekers and migrants have died as a result of, ‘direct racism or indirect racism 
stemming from asylum and immigration policies’.66 Paradoxically, this proliferation 
of racism in public life coexists with the state’s trumpeting of a certain 
‘postracialism’ – the celebration of a properly managed racial diversity. In the 
opening ceremony of the 2012 London Olympics the representations of and tributes 
                                               
66 http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/DtDM_2006_2010.pdf (last accessed 17 February 2013) 
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to the Empire Windrush and the Notting Hill Carnival arguably aligned with the 
forging of a national consensus around a symbolic retreat from discussions of 
persistent racism suggesting that the ‘racial past’ (discrimination and inequality) has 
been and should be transcended in a celebration of a harmonious multiethnic Britain.  
 
In the US this discourse grows out of the uncritical celebration of the re-election of 
Barack Obama as signalling the postracial moment. Obama becomes the 
personification of the Civil Rights mantra, ‘We shall overcome’. He embodies the 
realisation of the triumph over material and symbolic racism. The discourse obscures 
the centrality of racism in American society encapsulated by the persistent racialised 
wealth gap (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006). It also gives ‘progressive’ affirmation to an 
ideology first articulated in white backlash – why do we still need compensatory 
programs for historically marginalised groups if ‘race’ is politically and materially 
irrelevant? This is not just the multicultural rhetoric of naive journalism. Legislation 
and court rulings – including a 2007 US Supreme Court decision that ruled school 
integration plans should generally not consider ‘race’ to integrate schools - are also 
informed by these discourses. Chief Justice John Roberts’ majority opinion 
suggested, ‘The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race’. 67 Roberts’ colourblind casuistry renders 
progressive and responsible uses of ‘race’ - for example widening access to higher 
education to correct historic and persistent inequalities - problematic.  
 
Progressive race-based solutions using ‘race’ as a part of a corrective program are 
equated with committing the same error as white supremacist usages. This postracial 
                                               
67 http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-908.ZO.html (accessed 25 February 2012) 
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impostor disavows in absolute terms any reference to or application of racial 
categories and with it wholly dismisses the macro-analysis of racism in political and 
economic structures. It advertises the arrival of a post-racist egalitarianism through 
the formal equalities established by civil rights legislation and tokenistic disruptions 
to inequality and exclusion such as the presence of ‘saris and samosas’ on British 
high streets. 
 
9.2 Chapter Summaries 
 
The postracialism I introduced in chapter one challenged this modernist narrative of 
universal progress and the bogus claim to the realisation of a postracial utopia. These 
narratives attribute enduring racialised inequalities, when acknowledge at all, to 
nonracial factors. Racialised stratification is interpreted as the effect of market 
relations, personal choice, naturally occurring phenomena and imputed cultural 
limitations. The preceding chapters sharply criticised colourblindness for hiding 
structural racism behind a mask of assumed meritocracy. Chapter one made a robust 
case for another postracial perspective that emerges from an ethico-political concern 
with the political implications and ethical failures of current theorisations of ‘race’ 
and the reification of essentialised and homogenised racial difference.  
 
This postracialism presents a developed analytical paradigm capable of 
understanding and explaining the evolving racisms of today. It also imagines and 
attempts to bring into being a postracial political landscape that enables democratic 
postracial projects. Further, it promises a view of humanity with the conceptual 
complexity for theorising the fluidity of identities that stress experiential plurality, 
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manifold affinities and voluntary political associations. Finally, it makes the ethical 
turn as it encourages the individual to become self-critical and self-reflexive in both 
her political allegiances and affiliations. This last dimension is connected to a feeling 
of impotence in and futility with academic theory when confronted with the 
resurgent manifestations of 21
st
 century racism (Alexander, 2002). 
 
The partitioning of theory and practice has led to an increasing separation of 
academic from activist life. I responded to and explored this separation 
methodologically through interviews with London based antiracist organisations. 
The professionalization of the intellect in academia has restricted political 
engagement and public dialogue. Intellectual production has been corralled into 
commodified spheres of specialised and de-radicalised thought very much distanced, 
if not alienated from activism (Jacoby, 1987). The disappearance of the activist-
intellectual and the growing gulf between theory and praxis resonates in the lack of 
work on racism in postracial discussions (St Louis, 2002). The ‘success’ of 
postracial critiques and deconstructions may have backfired with unintended 
consequences. ‘Race’ has come under intense scrutiny with the unreality of ‘race’ 
firmly established in social-scientific and biological quarters. Racism meanwhile has 
been mystified or worse still dropped off the critical agenda.   
 
The postracial overemphasis on ‘the end of race’ (see Hill, 2001) has been 
accompanied by a withdrawal of scholarly life from structural concerns and material 
inequalities. A corresponding trend in postracial debates has been the intensification 
of the separation of theoretical work from empirical labour. Postracial arguments 
circulate in overwhelmingly theoretical and abstract realms (see Gilroy, 2000). These 
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discussions avoid the rather messier, incommensurable realities such as the ontology 
of ‘race’ or the utility of ‘race’ to forging antiracist coalitions that identify and 
address the injustice experienced as racial - whether imagined or not. As noted in 
chapter two, the privileging of theory over empirical research and the separation of 
concepts (‘race’) from context (racism) was a site for my methodological 
intervention into postracial discussions. This thesis (re)turns to the empirical labours 
that established the sociological discipline with an orientation embedded in historical 
sociology and informed by archival and interview data. Archival research and 
qualitative interviewing - overlooked in the bulk of library-based postracial debates - 
have methodological merit. The rich empirical data explored in this thesis makes a 
humble contribution to enriching postracial discussions by addressing those messier 
realities of ‘lived experience’, practical politics, and racialised health disparities. 
 
In chapter three I constructed an intellectual lineage to postracialism and its 
forerunner nonracialism by surveying the seminal thinkers and critiques of those 
histories. The chapter (re)constructed the historical fragments of nonracialism as it 
explored the long history of critique and disquiet on ‘race’ showing how 
nonracialism presented a counter-hegemonic paradigm that laid the foundation for 
postracialism. The chapter traced the conjunctures of non/postracialism, assembled a 
non-linear history of postracial discussions and illustrated how the main critiques 
and rejoinders to racialism have developed and been applied in their historical 
contexts. I organised the diffuse literatures into three historical periods to map the 
paradigmatic shifts in the central concerns and extensiveness of the critiques; (1) the 
(pre)history of ‘race’ before the 18th century ending at the start of the 20th, (2) the 
20
th
 century and stretches through to the 1980s and (3) the 1980s to today. The first 
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two discussions allowed me to further narrow my own project by focusing on what I 
defined as postracialism which involved the scientific, political and ethical critique 
of ‘race’.  
 
Chapter four engaged qualitative data through an investigation of non/postracial 
universalisms attempting to (re)signify the human in ways that refute the 
ethnocentric histories of modernity. The chapter unpacked how these attempts to 
escape the strong orbit of ‘race’ frequently involved contradictory features. It 
explored the significance, for example, of how critiques of racial exclusion coexisted 
with a fidelity to existing racialist conceptions while also critically assessing the 
implications of this paradoxical simultaneity for postracialism. The chapter 
developed the concepts of narcissism, racial ventriloquism and anti-identity identity 
politics as framing devices for considering what I argued represented three forms of 
narcissistic non/postracialism: religious universalisms, mixed-racialism and white 
abolitionism.  
 
Ultimately the chapter contended that these forms of non/postracial narcissism – 
Quaker, Baha’I and secular nonracialism, mixed-racialism and white abolitionism – 
functioned as invitations for consideration of the challenges of escaping the ‘allure of 
race’ and the problems of how we constitute identity and live with difference. The 
chapter contended that postracialism offers a radical anti-foundationalist approach 
that responds to and in some sense resolves the inherent problems in constructionism 
namely the reliance on ontological security. The exploration of archival data, 
however, raised interesting and dilemmatic tensions concerning modes of 
identification based on sameness. Ultimately the data and the discussion illuminated 
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how narcissistic non/postracialism face intractable challenges particularly recovering 
histories of suffering and constituting an antiracist politics without ‘race’. 
 
Chapter five critically interrogated postracialist attempts to escape the centripetal 
forces of ‘race’ through ethical critiques. The discussion drew upon the 
methodological arc of the thesis through the use of Foucault’s a priori, which 
exhorts against the perils of presentism. The analysis drew upon the Foucauldian 
‘history of the present’ by problematising the present ‘truths’ of postracialism. The 
analysis placed a wealth of unpublished archival material in conversation with 
current debates in order to re-examine and think through some of the stuck places, 
complexities and ambiguities of (proto) postracial projects.  
 
The chapter ultimately argued that although ‘race’ is not biologically ‘real’ it is 
nevertheless socially real and is crucially a central part of self-conception and 
determinant of life chances. Archival data enabled a rethinking of the postracial 
ambition. The question of erasure cannot be reduced to the ontology of ‘race’ as real 
or not because, moral concerns and moral positions are behind ontological ones. The 
chapter contended that the very discussion of jettisoning ‘race’ must be grounded in 
the history and contemporary manifestation of racisms. Archival materials served as 
powerful reminders that the (hyper)focus on the ontological question could also 
divert much needed ethical attention away from pressing issues of discrimination and 
oppression. 
 
Chapter six attempted to tackle those pressing issues through an engagement with 
the widening gulf between postracial discussions and antiracist practice. In the 
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chapter I attempted to bring theory and praxis into a conversation that resisted 
empirical lip service and theoretical abstraction. The chapter critically investigated 
the possibilities of a postracial antiracism by rearticulating the objective expressed 
within Gilroy’s conviction as a question; can action against racial hierarchies 
proceed more effectively when (it)…is purged of any lingering idea of ‘race’ 
(Gilroy, 2000:13)? 
 
I explored the postracial ambition through data collated from a series of semi-
structured interviews conducted with representatives from London-based ‘race’-
equality organisations.
68
 The source material for the chapter was principally 
concerned with exploring the implicit suggestion that (if indeed possible) 
postracialism can be reformulated to enable a more efficacious antiracism. 
Interviews explored the theoretical and practical efficacy of ‘race’ and probed the 
possibility to encourage and make possible postracialist resistance to racism.
69
  
 
The chapter argued that in spite of the practical problems and warranted hesitation 
expressed in the interview material the theory/praxis dialogue and the extension of 
postracial insights into activist work was a productive engagement. Postracialism 
invited antiracism to consider a different set of questions beyond contesting racist 
discrimination. And in so doing it disturbed the commonsense footing of ‘race’. The 
dialogue was most certainly mutually beneficial. Interviewees clarified in explicit 
terms the pressing problems confronting postracialism, particularly the lack of a 
coherent political program and an examination of its conditions of possibility.  
 
                                               
68 See Appendix 1 for the description of interviewees 
69 See Appendix 2 for the Schedule of Questions 
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Chapter seven explored postracial bioscience defined by St Louis (forthcoming) as a 
robust scientific approach which without the hesitancy and contradiction of earlier 
critiques consistently deconstructs ‘race’. I argued that postracial bioscience provides 
the affirmative basis for the ethical and political critiques examined earlier, extends 
beyond the empiricist assumptions of positivistic paradigms and ultimately enriches 
epistemological, methodological and ethical understandings.   
 
The chapter also maintained that the scientific field cannot be left uncontested given 
the social authority of science and how naturalised notions of ‘race’ have rationalised 
gross abuses. Restating the evidence disproving the biological ‘race’ concept as well 
as illuminating its conceptual imprecision is vital to postracial bioscience. Postracial 
bioscience deconstructs ‘race’ opening up space for an integrated science which 
examines structural inequalities and social processes like class stratification and 
racism. Although far from achieving a consensus, its wide range of critical and 
prescriptive insights have succeeded in stimulating debate on the usefulness of ‘race’ 
in epistemological, methodological and ethical terms.  
 
 The chapter contended that postracial bioscience shows that keeping racial 
categories does not serve the purpose of reducing health disparities in the context of 
genetic research. Reducing disparities requires understanding the social and 
structural forces of racism and inequality in addition to the complex gene-gene and 
gene-environment interactions that together comprise disease risk. The chapter made 
a case for postracial biomedicine as (re)focusing the major objectives of medical 
research and practice to the treating, curing and preventing disease particularly those 
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which make racial categorisation meaningless at both the scientific and social level 
precisely because they are not specific to any one group (Roses, 2000). 
 
Chapter eight extended that discussion through an examination of the critique of 
‘race’ based on egalitarian principles. The chapter explored postracial 
cosmopolitanism through both theoretical literature and qualitative data arguing that 
in spite of limitations it offers an ethically laudable re-imagination of living with 
difference. The answers are not forthcoming but in raising questions and reflecting 
on the status and meaning(s) of ‘race’ postracial cosmopolitan interventions are 
enabling a radical rethinking of antiracist politics and intrepidly addressing what 
Hall called the problem of the 21
st
 century, ‘living with difference’. The chapter also 
unpacked some of the shortcoming of postracial humanism including potential 
condescension toward racial experience, the fetishisation of agency and the 
thwarting of successful identity politics.    
 
The chapter argued that postracial cosmopolitanism’s principled estrangement from 
one’s own culture and history, in spite of its limitations, appears to be well equipped 
to engage the complex dilemmas and opportunities of contemporary life. The chapter 
concluded that postracial cosmopolitanisms makes crucial intimations towards 
reimagining and living with difference by imagining and working to build a 
multicultural society without the phobia of strangers or otherness and the paranoid 
notion of ontological jeopardy.  
 
 
9.3 Postracialism: The Paradox and the Promise 
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In its critical engagement with postracial discussions this thesis has argued that 
‘race’ cannot simply be jettisoned. Historical investigation, archival data, interview 
material and theoretical discussions show ‘race’ to be at once empirically and 
analytically slippery and ontologically and practically sticky. The real effects of 
‘race’ are not only witnessed in racial identities which, as argued above, can be 
critiqued from a variety of ethical and political positions. The limited engagement 
with racism in postracial discussions has resulted in an incomplete discussion of 
lived experience. This omission may have strengthened the application of postracial 
theory providing it with a tidier and more convincing account. This thesis has 
demonstrated through the use of interview data how the failure to engage racism has 
resulted in insubstantial accounts of the problems and issues confronting racialised 
communities specifically school exclusions and racial profiling.  
 
On the one hand, ‘race’ is contested in theoretical discussions, policy discourses and 
indeed in the everyday. On the other hand, ‘race’ has very real, very salient 
meanings in the continued and widespread racisms across the globe. The instability 
of ‘race’ as a concept and category coexists with tenacious forms of racism. I have 
referred to this central dilemma in the postracial ambition as the postracial paradox. 
Postracialism disavows racial concepts maintaining they provide support to 
discriminatory practices such as racist admissions policies and practices in 
universities. However, it is the very concepts rejected in postracialism that are 
absolutely essential for identifying the discriminatory practices involved in 
preferential acceptance in higher education. Comparative racial data mapping 
historical admissions trends is debatably entwined in reification and may even 
strengthen the harmful categories antiracism is attempting to contest. All the same, it 
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is this longitudinal data that offers the indispensable proof of systemic inequality. 
Racial data is essential for the development of ameliorative strategies and solutions.  
 
 Postracialism must remain vigilant so as not to descend into a neo-conservative 
colourblindness or an apolitical ‘racelessness’ whereupon older political gains and 
structural inequalities are overlooked. It appears ‘race’ will have to be kept in some 
de-essentialised form as part of that strategy. Postracialism brings with it the 
methodological challenge of working with and against ‘race’ (Gunaratnam, 2004). 
This doubled approach of working with and against ‘race’ represents a distancing 
from more extreme postracial perspectives fixed on the unreality of ‘race’ and its 
ethical and political dangers and/or its biological falsity. Postracialism cannot 
confine itself to the narrow discussion of whether ‘race’ is real or not. It must 
continue to ask imaginative questions directed at combating racism and racial 
stratification.  
 
Postracialism has a significant contribution to make. It potentially holds the promise 
of opening up other ways of being and opening up ‘race’ to epistemological and 
ontological scrutiny. Ontological critiques have, for instance, shown how ‘race’ is a 
contributing but crucially not a determining or primary existential dimension of 
human existence (St Louis, 2002). In discussion with Rob from Runnymede chapter 
six explored how ‘race’ might be used in pursuit of progressive antiracist strategies. 
In other words, how can we put postracial theory into postracial practice? Can we 
devise a post-identity politics? Is it possible to work against as opposed to through 
identity politics? These are important questions for postracialism to continue to 
335 
 
wrestle with and to critically explore through empirically informed and theoretically 
engaged discussions. 
 
Postracialism is not only explicitly a utopian project but it is also willing to resist 
theoretical dogma. Postracialism, as I argued in my literature review, has a long 
history of being willing to stand back from current academic debates, to reflect and 
to ask questions of the proffered truths about ‘race’. The discussions I examined 
above aimed to unsettle - sometimes only momentarily - the certainties of bounded 
difference. Of course, there is no shortage of intractable problems and dilemmas in 
postracialism. The historical example of Jean Toomer and the postracial intimations 
of Runnymede, however, suggest there are already initial, tentative imaginings and 
attempts to de-reify ‘race’ and to cohere a polity around a category not trapped by 
absolute and essentialist predicates. It must be emphasized that ‘race’ remains a 
primary descriptive marker of individual and group characteristics. The explicit 
racism in Breivik’s manifesto, for example, exemplifies how at times ‘race’ is used 
as a validation of intolerance and a stimulus to violence. Alongside these violent 
reminders of the salience of ‘race, Runnymede’s project and the postracial 
bioscience discussed above are creative subversions and utopian ambitions aiming to 
place the category under erasure. In these examples we might begin to both imagine 
and practice how we might liberate ourselves from the reified and hegemonic 
discourses of ‘race’.  
 
Without the neat guarantees of ‘race’ we encounter a tremendous scientific, political 
and ethical project of confronting social injustice without the racialised forms of 
social description, explanation and justification that have guided science, politics and 
336 
 
ontology for centuries. Postracialism is an ethico-political invitation for us as 
sociologists committed to progressive antiracism to develop more compelling 
arguments that are not reliant on naturalizing categories. If the project is to have any 
ethical or political force it is that in moving beyond ‘race’ we might more effectively 
combat racisms. The postracial ambition might be understood as a laudable ambition 
which takes bold and imaginative steps towards an authentically democratic and 
utopian politics aimed at dismantling racism.   
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Appendix 1: Interviewee List 
 
*All interviewees excepting Rob Berkeley have been made anonymous*  
 
 
‘Alice’  – Research Officer at Social Policy Institute 1 
 
‘Evan’ – Director of an antiracist organisation working in Social Policy Institute 2 
 
‘Lila’-  Director of an activist organisation 
 
Rob Berkeley – Director of the Runnymede Trust, the UK’s leading antiracist think-
tank. 
 
‘Yusef’ – Research Officer working in Social Policy Institute 3 
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Appendix 2: Schedule of Questions 
 
 
1. Could you begin by introducing yourself, telling me a bit about who you are, 
a bit about your professional and/or activist experience(s) and what type of 
work you are involved in now?  
 
2. Could you talk a bit about how your organization understands race?  
 
3. Could you talk about how your organization defines racism?  
 
4. How do you understand the relationship between race and racism? For 
example, is race necessary for racism?  
 
5. Race is not a biological category. But still, academics and activists continue 
to use it. Why do you think that this is?  
 
6. Some people, concerned with how race seems to make social relationships 
appear natural, advocate for abolishing the category. They understand race 
as a product of racism, which unlike race explains racial inequality.What 
would it mean for antiracist work if race wasn’t used to explain inequality?  
 
7. These critics are also point to the usage of race in creating a hierarchy of 
humanity and justifying practices such as slavery. They suggest race cannot 
escape this history. That race implicitly carries judgments of worth and 
capacity. Is this critique meaningful to antiracist work?  
 
8. Critics also argue that fighting against race is an important part of the 
struggle against racism. Race is understood as a category created by racists to 
rank people and justify oppression. Is this argument of significance for 
antiracism? How might it impact antiracism? 
 
9. These critics shift the focus off of race and onto racism. And how racism 
recreates race and distributes social and material goods accordingly. Without 
using race, this antiracism would focus on the social and economic invention 
of race and the unequal distribution of social and material goods. Might this 
have any relevance to your current work?  
 
10. Critics argue that race discourages the experience of a common humanity 
through racial divisions. Divisions which degrade and persecute many. Is this 
critique of significance to your work or antiracist work?  
 
11. Critics argue that racial commonality is a false one. They suggest it simplifies 
individuality and assumes shared political views, values, and experiences. 
This assumed commonality is based on a false biological sameness. What if 
any are the implications of this analysis of race as morally dangerous for 
activist work on race?  
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12. Critics also criticize ‘race’ for complicating struggles for justice by dividing 
coalitions against pressing concerns such as poverty. They maintain that a racial 
framework ignores the complexity of issues faced. For example sexism or 
homophobia. How might this critique of ‘race’ as a political wedge causing 
division be applicable? 
 
13. These critics recognize that to get beyond ‘race’, means more than just no 
longer using it or more dangerously pretending it is irrelevant to life chances 
and opportunities. Race has become so significant to politics, economics, 
identity, welfare provision etc, that it will not simply vanish. Any approach 
hoping to move beyond race must address racism. This project, hopes to 
work both with and against race? What might it mean for antiracist work to 
adopt such a strategy? 
 
 
